Hamilton v. Linn

Decision Date10 February 1947
Docket Number39993
Citation200 S.W.2d 69,355 Mo. 1178
PartiesMary E. Hamilton and Solomon E. Hamilton, Appellants, v. Lulu L. Linn, Audrey Linn McTaggart, Julie Linn Frazier, Alma Linn Davis, Newton Carson, Jr., and Claude Madison
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1947.

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court.

Reversed and Remanded (with directions).

Horace Merritt for appellants.

(1) Section 1013, R.S. 1939, applies to any suit based upon a written contract for sale of real estate and such a suit is not barred until ten years from date of the accrual of the cause of action. Jones v. McGinley Land Co., 228 Mo.App. 944; Curtis v. Sexton, 201 Mo. 217, 100 S.W 17; Roberts v. Randleman, 352 Mo. 980; Hall v Bank, 145 Mo. 418. (2) Administrator should not be made a party to a suit for specific performance. McQuitty v. Wilhite, 218 Mo. 586, 117 S.W. 730; Schulters, Admr., v. Bockwinkle, 19 Mo. 648.

Alva F. Lindsay for respondents.

(1) The plaintiff's petition is so fraught with uncertainty, evasion, doubt and equivocation that it fails to state a cause of action, in equity, against the heirs of the owner of the real estate. The trial court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion properly sustained respondents' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' petition. Oliver v. Johnson, 142 S.W. 274, 238 Mo. 359; McQuany v. Mo. Land Co., 130 S.W. 335, 230 Mo. 342; Melville v. Waring, 141 S.W. 12, 159 Mo.App. 395; Hargis v. Smith, 178 S.W. 72. (2) The judgment before the justice of the peace for rent and restitution of the property to the then owner terminated the contractual obligations between the parties. There is no definite allegation that a subsequent payment was made and the contract reinstated. (3) No claim having been filed during the administration of the estate of W. N. Linn and the estate having been regularly closed and executor discharged, a suit for money had and received is barred by the statute of limitations. Secs. 182, 186, R.S. 1939. (4) The executor is not a proper or necessary party to this suit. Foster v. Wright, 187 S.W.2d 974.

OPINION

Douglas, J.

Plaintiffs filed this suit in November, 1942. In 1945 plaintiffs filed an amended petition alleging that in 1920 they made a written contract with W. N. Linn to purchase certain real estate in St. Joseph for $ 1250, payment to be made by monthly installments of $ 12.50; that when the purchase price, interest and other charges were paid Linn agreed to convey the property to them; that they not only paid in full but overpaid to the extent of $ 590; that they demanded a deed from Linn in July, 1933 which he failed to deliver; and that Linn died and the property was conveyed by his heirs to defendant Carson. A copy of the contract is attached to the petition. Plaintiffs further state that defendants Linn, McTaggart, Frazier, and Davis, the widow and daughters of Linn, have asserted an interest in the property, and that defendant Madison, Linn's executor, is also interested in the property. They allege conspiracy and fraud on the part of defendants in the overpayment of the contract price.

Plaintiffs pray the court to vest the title to the property in them, to divest title out of defendant Carson, and to cancel all claims the other defendants may have in the property. They further pray for a judgment against defendants for the amount they have overpaid. In the alternative they ask the court to make an accounting of the amount they have paid, to set off the reasonable rental of the property for the time they occupied it, and to render judgment for the balance, and for general relief.

All the defendants except Carson filed motions to dismiss on three grounds. First, because the petition does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted; second, "Said petition shows on its face that it is barred by the statute of limitations provided for in Section 182 and 186 of R.S. 1939"; and third, that in July, 1933 Linn obtained a judgment in the justice court against plaintiff for rent and possession of the property and that such judgment is res adjudicata of this case.

Defendant Carson did not file a motion to dismiss but filed an answer asserting his title to the property and denying generally.

The court sustained the motions to dismiss. It went further and on its own motion dismissed as to defendant Carson. It entered a formal judgment of dismissal of the case and against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed.

The record does not reveal for what reason the trial court voluntarily assumed the prerogative of dismissing on its own motion as to defendant Carson, who had filed an answer and joined issue. Such action is of course erroneous. Nor does the record show on which ground or grounds the motions to dismiss were sustained.

The petition properly states a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1684 R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., the provision for suits to quiet title. That section authorizes such a suit by any person claiming either legal or equitable title, whether in possession or not.

It is well settled that a contract for the sale and purchase of real estate vests an equitable title thereto in the purchaser. Savings Trust Co. of St. Louis v. Skain, 345 Mo. 46, 131 S.W.2d 566; State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Baumann, 348 Mo. 164, 153 S.W.2d 31; Hernandez v. Prieto, 349 Mo. 658, 162 S.W.2d 829. And when the purchaser has performed the conditions of the contract as alleged here the application of the rule is especially warranted. Levine v. Humphreys, 297 Mo. 555, 249 S.W. 395.

A purchaser under such a contract, being considered in equity as the owner of the real estate involved, may maintain an action to quiet title. 44 Am. Jur. Quieting Title, sec. 54; 51 C.J. Quieting Title, sec. 83; Lambert v. St. Louis & G. Ry. Co., 212 Mo. 692, 111 S.W. 550.

A suit to quiet title is governed by the ten-year statute of limitations of Section 1002, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A. Haarstick v. Gabriel, 200 Mo. 237, 98 S.W. 760; Powell v. Powell, 267 Mo. 117, 188 S.W. 795. And the record shows this suit was brought within ten years after plaintiffs were put out of possession.

Plaintiffs have stated a good cause of action for quieting title to the real estate.

Plaintiffs filed their amended petition on May 14, 1945 and defendants filed their motions to dismiss thereafter. The New Code of Civil Procedure by Section 3 became effective on January 1 1945 as to all actions brought after that date, and also as to further proceedings in all actions then pending, unless the court decides otherwise. Laws 1943, pp. 353-397, Mo. R.S.A., sec. 847.1 -- .145. Thus the New Code now governs this proceeding. The New Code abolishes the use of a demurrer and provides a motion which now performs the office of a demurrer. Objections and...

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10 cases
  • Empire Storage & Ice Co. v. Giboney
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 8, 1948
    ...well might have been stated in greater particularity. But defendants waived their right to compel this by timely motion Hamilton v. Linn, 355 Mo. 1178, 200 S.W.2d 69. However, even in its general terms we find the sufficiently alleges an unlawful combination in restraint of trade such as Se......
  • Burke v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 9, 1961
    ...837, 840). The city's motion, which does not prove itself (Locasio v. Ford Motor Co., 240 Mo.App. 269, 203 S.W.2d 518; Hamilton v. Linn, 355 Mo. 1178, 200 S.W.2d 69), together with the evidentiary statutory and ordinance provisions mentioned, do not conclusively establish that the city was ......
  • Randall v. St. Albans Farms, Inc.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 10, 1961
    ...upon the party filing such a motion to make proof of its allegations. Rippe v. Sutter, Mo.Sup., 292 S.W.2d 86, 89(6-9); Hamilton v. Linn, 355 Mo. 1178, 200 S.W.2d 69, 71; Metcalf v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 360 Mo. 1043, 232 S.W.2d 526, 530(4, 5). No evidence was offered as to the type......
  • Bob Degeorge Assocs., Inc. v. Hawthorn Bank
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 11, 2012
    ...the owner of equitable title to the property, which is a sufficient interest for a mechanic's lien to attach. See Hamilton v. Linn, 355 Mo. 1178, 200 S.W.2d 69, 70 (1947). The mechanic's lien attaches only to the equitable title, however, as it cannot attach to a greater interest than that ......
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