Hamilton v. McAuliffe

• Decision Date: 22 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 147,147
• Citation: 277 Md. 336,353 A.2d 634
• Parties: Hubert Haminton v. John F. McAULIFFE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 336

277 Md. 336

353 A.2d 634

Hubert Haminton v. John F. McAULIFFE.

No. 147.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 22, 1976.

Gary Howard Simpson, Bethesda, for appellant.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Glenn W. Bell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Hubert Hamilton, a 35-year-old Jehovah's Witness, was shot through the chest on the evening of December 12, 1973, and was hospitalized under the care of two physicians who determined that he could not survive without immediate surgery and a blood transfusion. Hamilton consented to the surgery but refused to authorize a blood transfusion even though he was informed by his physicians that he would die if surgery was undertaken and a blood transfusion was not given in the course of the surgery. Hamilton's refusal to consent to the blood transfusion was based on two grounds: (1) that his religious tenets would not permit him to receive a blood transfusion under any circumstances and (2) that a blood transfusion would violate his constitutional right of privacy.

Hamilton's wife and two brothers filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking authority for the physicians to proceed with the transfusion notwithstanding Hamilton's refusal to consent. The court appointed counsel to represent Hamilton and an emergency hearing was held in the hospital on December 12 at which Judge John F. McAuliffe presided. After ascertaining that Hamilton fully understood the ramifications of his decision not to consent to the blood transfusion, that he was separated from his wife, and that he had a two-year-old child for whom he was the sole support, Judge McAuliffe authorized the transfusion; he concluded that 'since death would likely follow unless a transfusion was authorized, I should authorize the hospital and physician to proceed with transfusions as if the patient had given consent, and that the substantial interest of the state warranted the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.'

After the transfusion was given to Hamilton, he filed a timely appeal of Judge McAuliffe's order to the court of Special Appeals. That court, by order dated January 18 1974, dismissed the appeal 'as moot and to the extent it is not moot, it is interlocutory.' Hamilton did not seek review of that judgment in this Court, nor did he initiate any further proceedings before Judge McAuliffe with reference to the order of December 12, 1973.

On November 13, 1974, 11 months after the blood transfusion was given to Hamilton, he filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging violation by Judge McAuliffe of his state and federal constitutional rights. Hamilton asserted that Judge McAuliffe infringed his First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights which were protected from state interference by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ¹ and that he had also violated his constitutional right to religious freedom under Articles 36 and 45 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. He prayed that a declaratory judgment be entered against Judge McAuliffe, declaring that his order of December 12, 1973 authorizing the blood transfusion was 'erroneous'; he also sought an order preventing Judge McAuliffe 'from presently and in the future ordering a blood transfusion for Mr. Hamilton.' No money damages were claimed.

A demurrer was filed on behalf of Judge McAuliffe asserting that the case presented only moot questions of law and that consequently no justiciable controversy existed. The court (Bowen, J.) sustaind the demurrer without leave to amend. It concluded that the declaration failed 'to state a justiciable issue ripe for determination under the declaratory judgment process'; that it was improper to invoke the declaratory judgment process in the absence of 'a real and present question which involves substantial future interest which is susceptible of being decided presently so that future conduct may be ordered in accordance with the present decision'; and that it was not the function of the Declaratory Judgments Act to permit a collateral attack on an action already taken. Hamilton appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari pursuant to Maryland Code (1974) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-203.

The question on appeal, as Hamilton sees it, is 'whether a declaration complaining of a violation of his civil rights by a judge who ordered that he undergo an involuntary blood transfusion involves a continuing 'case in controversy' after the subject order has been passed, the blood transfusion given and where the patient survived and has no present need for further transfusions.' Relying principally upon Supreme Court cases, Hamilton claims that the case presents a justiciable controversy because Judge McAuliffe violated his civil rights and thereby caused him to suffer an actual injury which, in view of Judge McAuliffe's judicial immunity, could not be redressed except by a declaration of his rights.

The Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Code, Courts Article, § 3-409(a) provides, with exceptions not here pertinent, that:

'. . . a court may grant a declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case, if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, and if:

(1) An actual controversy exists between contending parties;

(2) Antagonistic claims are present between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation; or

(3) A party asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege and this is challenged or denied by an adversary party, who also has or asserts a concrete interest in it.'

That the existence of a justiciable controversy is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a declaratory judgment in Maryland is well settled. Prince George's Co. .v Bd. of Trustees, 269 Md. 9, 304 A.2d 228 (1973). A controversy is justiciable "when there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded." Patuxent Co. v. Commissioners, 212 Md. 543, 548, 129 A.2d 847, 849 (1957). It is thus clear that the declaratory judgment process is not available to decide purely theoretical questions or questions that may never arise, Prince George's Co. v. Chillum-Adelphi, 275 Md. 374, 340 A.2d 265 (1975); Liss v. Goodman, 224 Md. 173, 167 A.2d 123 (1961), or questions which have become moot, Eberts v. Congress'l Country Club, 197 Md. 461, 79 A.2d 518 (1951), or merely abstract questions, Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944). That the declaratory judgment process should not be used where a declaration would not serve a useful purpose or terminate a controversy is equally well settled. Liss v. Goodman, supra; Bachman v. Lembach, 192 Md. 35, 63 A.2d 641 (1949); Staley v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 189 Md. 447, 56 A.2d 144 (1947).

In sum, a declaratory decree should not be given unless

'there is either an actual existing controversy, or antagonistic claims which indicate inevitable litigation, or when a party asserts a legal status or right and there is a denial by an adversary party, and the court is satisfied that such a decree will serve to terminate the controversy.'

Eberts v. Congress'l Country Club, supra, 197 Md. at 465, 79 A.2d at 519.

As the Supreme Court observed in Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959, 22 LEd.2d 113 (1969), declaratory relief requires factual allegations which, under all the circumstances, show that

". . . there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, for sufficient...