Hamilton v. Motor Coach Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 8551,8551
• Citation: 569 S.W.2d 571
• Parties: William F. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. MOTOR COACH INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 571

569 S.W.2d 571

William F. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. MOTOR COACH INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee.

No. 8551.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

July 5, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 1, 1978.

Henry Stollenwerck, Dallas, for appellant.

John L. Lancaster, III, Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, for appellee.

RAY, Justice.

This is a products liability case. Appellant (plaintiff), William F. Hamilton, brought suit against appellee (defendant), Motor Coach Industries, Inc. (MCI), seeking damages for an injury which blinded him in one eye. The case was tried before a jury, but after Appellant Hamilton had rested, the district court instructed a verdict and rendered judgment that Hamilton take nothing. Appellant has perfected his appeal and submits one point of error for our consideration. The point of error is as follows:

"The Honorable District Court erred in holding that Hamilton had failed to produce evidence of a complete cause of action based upon the tort of having placed an unreasonably dangerous product into the channels of commerce."

We agree that the trial court erred and its judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVIEW OF AN INSTRUCTED VERDICT

In reviewing the judgment of the trial court following the granting of an instructed verdict, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant. 3 McDonald's, Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 11.28.1 and Sec. 11.28.2. An instructed verdict is proper only where there is no evidence, or where the evidence is of such a character as to be of no probative force or value. Mundy v. Stiles, 257 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex.Civ.App.Waco 1953, writ ref'd n. r. e.).

THE FAVORABLE FACTS

Appellant Hamilton sought damages for injuries he received in 1975 when he was undertaking to repair or rebuild a spring loaded air cylinder which was either manufactured by the appellee, MCI, or built to its specifications. Appellee contended that Hamilton was not a "user" or "consumer" within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 402A (1965); that appellant failed to carry his burden of showing that the air cylinder reached him without substantial change from the condition in which it left appellee MCI; and, that because Hamilton was a mechanic experienced in the repair and handling of air cylinders, there was no duty to warn him of a danger of which he should have been aware by virtue of his experience and training.

Appellant Hamilton only sought damages for his injuries under the strict liability tort action covered by Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 402A (1965). Sec. 402A states the following:

"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."

The evidence establishes that the air cylinder which injured appellant was either placed in a bus manufactured by MCI or as a part thereof or was sold directly as a replacement part.

The air cylinder was purchased by Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma coaches (TNMO) from MCI either as original equipment on a bus or as an original replacement, and, without any alteration in it, other than use, the cylinder was sent by TNMO to West Tex Industries (West Tex) for reconditioning.

When the cylinder was placed into the channels of commerce, MCI anticipated that it would be subject to the action of corrosion and would need to be serviced and repaired by a workman on separate occasions. MCI was also aware that mechanics without formal training might work on the air cylinder.

No restrictions were placed on the product in the sale which MCI made relative to those who could perform repair work on the cylinder. MCI knew that the presence of the spring in the cylinder presented a potential danger to anyone who might be required to work on the air cylinder and such fact was known to MCI when the cylinder was placed into the channels of commerce. The cylinder had no warning on it concerning the potential dangers of or the presence of the spring. MCI recognized that the potential danger existed and that a warning was needed and provided a warning in its parts manuals which were made available to those persons who purchased a bus.

When MCI placed the cylinder into the channels of commerce, it knew that under certain conditions the piston in the cylinder might stick in a position so that the spring was depressed. The evidence established that when the spring was depressed, it could achieve two hundred fifty pounds of force and eleven hundred pounds per square inch of pressure. The two hundred fifty pounds of spring force was expected by MCI.

Appellant Hamilton picked up the package containing the cylinder dispatched from TNMO to West Tex. Appellant did not know that the cylinder was spring loaded nor did it occur to him that it was. Hamilton undertook to repair the cylinder and while doing so the spring loaded piston and shaft inexplicably released and were propelled into his right eye, blinding him in that eye.

THE CAUSAL CONNECTION ISSUE

The evidence in this case establishes a fact issue relative to causal connection between the seller's placing its product into the stream of trade and whether such contributed to the user's injury. It is clear that MCI was engaged in the business of marketing air cylinders and that it placed this air cylinder into the stream of trade. The favorable evidence indicates that Hamilton was injured as a result of the air cylinder having been placed into the stream of trade. It is now settled law in Texas that a cause of action exists against a seller who may be a manufacturer of an unreasonably dangerous product when such dangerous condition contributes to the user's or consumer's injury. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1967). See Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade Of Litigation, 54 Texas L.Rev. 1185, 1197 (1976); Green & Smith, Negligence Law, No Fault, and Jury Trial III, 51 Texas L.Rev. 207, 217-22 (1973).

THE DUTY OF THE SELLER

The duty of the seller under Sec. 402A is to refrain from placing a product into the stream of trade in an unreasonably dangerous, defective condition. Or put another way, the seller is under a duty not to market a product which subjects the consumer or user or someone in the vicinity of its use to an unreasonable risk of harm. Keeton, Products Liability Inadequacy of Information, 48 Texas L.Rev. 398 (1970). Likewise, the courts have expanded Sec. 402A and the risks that fall within its scope, and subject a seller to liability if he introduces an unreasonably dangerous, though nondefective product into the stream of trade without adequate warning of its danger or without adequate directions for its use. Further, a seller is subjected to liability if he introduces into the channels of commerce a nondefective product that he can anticipate will undergo change and become unreasonably dangerous if the seller does not warn the consumer or user of such danger. Sharp v. Chrysler Corporation, 432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 14th Dist.1968, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Darryl v. Ford Motor Company, 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.1969); General Motors Corporation v. Hopkins,548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex.1977). Comment "1" of Section 402A of the Restatement recognizes that a "user" includes those who are utilizing the product for the purpose of doing work upon it for the ultimate buyer. Appellant Hamilton falls within the category of a user. See Helicoid Gage Div. of American Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 14th Dist.1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.), and Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 14th Dist.1975, no writ); Sales & Perdue, The Law Of Strict Tort Liability In Texas, 14 Hous.L.Rev. 1, pp. 129-130 (1976-77). In the present case the favorable evidence shows that MCI expected the air cylinder to undergo change from its use; that the cylinder would need servicing; that the cylinder might become unreasonably dangerous; and that it could be expected that the cylinder might be serviced by untrained or uninformed workmen. It is our opinion that the seller, MCI, owed a duty to Hamilton, a user, to refrain from placing an unreasonably dangerous air cylinder into the stream of trade without an adequate warning of its dangers. Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade Of Litigation, 54 Texas L.Rev. 1185, 1200 (1976). It is a fact issue as to whether the air cylinder was unreasonably dangerous as will be discussed next.

THE VIOLATION OF DUTY ISSUE

A more perplexing issue raised by the evidence is...