Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank
Decision Date | 10 June 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-2624,96-2624 |
Citation | 82 Ohio St.3d 67,694 N.E.2d 442 |
Parties | HAMILTON et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. OHIO SAVINGS BANK, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
On October 20, 1995, the trial court summarily denied appellants' motion. The court's order reads, in its entirety:
The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded the cause. In so doing, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to certify those subclasses with outstanding mortgage loans pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2), but properly denied certification to those subclasses with retired mortgage loans pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3). In particular, the court found, with respect to the latter subclasses, that
In a separate opinion, Judge Diane Karpinski, concurring in part and dissenting in part, reasoned that "class certification should not be denied to [these] subclasses, because the statute of limitations issue does not predominate over the common questions of the subclass." She concluded that the entire prospective class should have been certified.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal.
Law Offices of Steven M. Weiss and Steven M. Weiss, Cleveland; Robert E. Sweeney Co., L.P.A., and Robert E. Sweeney, Cleveland, for appellants and cross-appellees.
Arter & Hadden, Hugh M. Stanley, Jr. and Irene C. Keyse-Walker, Cleveland; Marc W. Freimuth and Roy E. Lachman, Cleveland, for appellee and cross-appellant.
The single issue presented by appellant's appeal and Ohio Savings' cross-appeal is whether, and to what extent, the trial court properly refused to certify this case as a class action pursuant to Civ.R. 23.
In Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 31 OBR 398, 509 N.E.2d 1249, at the syllabus, the court held that "[a] trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a class action may be maintained and that determination will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion."
Appellants suggest that because there was no live testimony before the trial court and this court has before it the same written record, we should conduct a de novo review "akin to the review of a lower court's grant of summary judgment." We disagree.
Appellants cite no case in which an appellate court has opted for a de novo review over an abuse-of-discretion standard in this context. To the contrary, appellate courts overwhelmingly, if not universally, give trial courts broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class. See, generally, 5 Moore's Federal Practice (3 Ed.1997) 23-25 to 23-27, Section 23.04. Moreover, the appropriateness of applying the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing class action determinations is grounded not in credibility assessment, but in the trial court's special expertise and familiarity with case-management problems and its inherent power to manage its own docket. Marks, supra, 31 Ohio St.3d at 201, 31 OBR at 399, 509 N.E.2d at 1252; In re NLO, Inc. (C.A.6, 1993), 5 F.3d 154, 157. Thus, the fact that there was no live testimony in the trial court is inconsequential as concerns the applicability of the abuse-of-discretion standard to class action determinations.
However, the trial court's discretion in deciding whether to certify a class action is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by and must be exercised within the framework of Civ.R. 23. The trial court is required to carefully apply the class action requirements and conduct a rigorous analysis into whether the prerequisites of Civ.R. 23 have been satisfied. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon (1982), 457 U.S. 147, 160-161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 72 L.Ed.2d 740, 752; Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard (1981), 452 U.S. 89, 100, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2200, 68 L.Ed.2d 693, 703; Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co. (C.A.5, 1996), 84 F.3d 734, 740; In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. (C.A.6, 1996), 75 F.3d 1069, 1079.
While there is no explicit requirement in Civ.R. 23 that the trial court make formal findings to support its decision on a motion for class certification, there are compelling policy reasons for doing so. Aside from the obvious practical importance, articulation of the reasons for the decision tends to provide a firm basis upon which an appellate court can determine that the trial court exercised its discretion within the framework of Civ.R. 23, and discourages reversal on the ground that the appellate judges might have decided differently had they been the original decisionmakers. On the other hand, the failure to provide an articulated rationale greatly hampers an appellate inquiry into whether the relevant Civ.R. 23 factors were properly applied by the trial court and given appropriate weight, and such an unarticulated decision is less likely to convince the reviewing court that the ruling was consistent with the sound exercise of discretion. See Ojalvo v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 12 OBR 313, 315, 466 N.E.2d 875, 876-877; Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc. (C.A.9, 1996), 97 F.3d 1227, 1234-1235; In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litigation (C.A.3, 1995), 55 F.3d 768, 794; Eisenberg v. Gagnon (C.A.3, 1985), 766 * MESSAGE(S) *MORE SECTIONS FOLLOWF.2d 770, 785; Interpace Corp. v. Philadelphia (C.A.3, 1971), 438 F.2d 401, 404.
It is exceedingly difficult to apply an abuse-of-discretion...
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