Hamilton v. Pappalardo
Decision Date | 22 May 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 95-P-794,95-P-794 |
Citation | 677 N.E.2d 1176,42 Mass.App.Ct. 471 |
Parties | Nancy Lee HAMILTON 1 v. Salvatore PAPPALARDO, Jr. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Max Volterra, Attleboro, for plaintiff.
John F.D. Jacobi, III, Attleboro, for defendant.
Before DREBEN, GILLERMAN and JACOBS, JJ.
The separation agreement of the parties was incorporated and merged in their 1980 divorce judgment. It provided that the plaintiff was to have custody of the two children of the parties, Steven, then six years old, and Alison, then three years old, and that the husband pay weekly support of forty-five dollars per child. Among its other provisions were the following:
On June 19, 1990, the plaintiff filed a "complaint for modification" alleging changes in circumstances in the form of an increased need for child support and as a result of Steven having been diagnosed "on or about July 24, 1987," as being moderately to severely learning disabled, necessitating private schooling for the two prior years at a cost of approximately $27,950 per year. She requested that the divorce judgment be modified by increasing child support from $45 to $135 per week per child and ordering the defendant "to contribute ... to the cost of the special education" of Steven.
After a trial, a judge of the Probate and Family Court, on September 9, 1994, made findings of fact, none of which is contested and which establish the following: Steven is "a special needs child" with motor, speech, and thought process deficiencies. He attended the Norton public schools through the seventh grade, receiving special needs services pursuant to an Individual Education Plan (IEP). In 1987, the plaintiff was notified by the Norton school system that Steven was not doing well and that intervention was required. She sought advice and assistance from various officials and professionals. As a result, she retained the service of a qualified educational consultant who carried out an extensive investigation and concluded that Steven "was being poorly served at the Norton school system and that he needed totally different services." When the Norton school system refused to modify its plan for Steven, the plaintiff placed him in the Landmark School in accordance with the recommendation of the consultant. The consultant's advice later was confirmed by a hearing officer of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals. The judge made the following findings as to the defendant's involvement in these events:
The parties did not thereafter discuss the fact or cost of Steven's education at the Landmark School until the plaintiff filed her complaint for modification.
Steven attended the Landmark School during the school years of 1988-1989, 1989-1990, and 1990-1991. The total expenses related to that attendance during those years was $83,651.72, $60,582.64 having been expended during the first two years and $23,069.08 during the third year. When the town of Norton refused to reimburse the plaintiff for the expenses incurred by her in behalf of Steven at the Landmark School, she brought a law suit against the town which she settled in 1993 for $80,000. She used $63,845.26 of the proceeds to pay legal and consulting fees. 2 At the time of the judge's decision, the plaintiff was earning $37,000 a year from her occupation as a school librarian, and the defendant $47,450 per year from his occupations as a teacher and as an officer in the United States Army Reserve. The judge determined that Steven was not emancipated and principally dependent upon the plaintiff, entitling her to child support from the defendant.
The judge further found that a material change of circumstances had occurred since the time of the divorce as a result of the plaintiff's increased needs for child support and Steven's having been diagnosed with a "severe learning disability" which "created the need for private schooling for him." He ordered that a judgment enter on the complaint for modification containing, among other provisions, 3 an order that the defendant pay to the plaintiff, $10,425 "representing his share of the education expense, legal fees and consulting fees incurred by the plaintiff for Steven ... for the 1990-1991 school year."
The judge concluded as follows:
"The defendant owes the plaintiff nothing with respect to the expenses for attendance of Steven ... at the Landmark School prior to the 1990-1991 school year on grounds as follows:
(a) Modification actions may only work prospectively from filing of the Modification, and two of the three school years had already passed and been paid for by the plaintiff prior to the filing of the Complaint for Modification in June, 1990 ...
(b) The plaintiff never made demand upon or requested that the defendant pay any portion of the costs of Landmark School until the filing of the Complaint in June, 1990 4;
(c) The plaintiff never consulted with the defendant nor obtained his assent to the choice of schooling for Steven ..., or the medical evaluations;
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