Hamilton v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action NO. 09-11725-DPW |
| Citation | 209 F.Supp.3d 397 |
| Parties | Diane HAMILTON, Lynne P. Cunningham and Claire Kane, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., Partners Community Healthcare, Inc., the Brigham and Women's Hospital, Inc., Brigham and Women's/Faulkner Hospitals, Inc., Martha's Vineyard Hospital, Inc., the Massachusetts General Hospital, Mclean Healthcare, Inc., the Mclean Hospital Corporation, Nantucket Cottage Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Healthcare System, Inc., North Shore Children's Hospital, Inc., North Shore Medical Center, Inc., NSMC Healthcare, Inc., the Salem Hospital, Union Hospital Auxiliary of Lynn, Inc., and Faulkner Hospital, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Jody L. Newman, Collora LLP, William A. Haddad, Beck Reed Riden LLP, Boston, MA, Michael J. Lingle, Patrick J. Solomon, Jessica L. Witenko, Thomas & Solomon LLP, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Angelo Spinola, Anne M. Mellen, Lisa A. Schreter, Bradley E. Strawn, Littler Mendelson, PC, Atlanta, GA, Christopher B. Kaczmarek, David C. Casey, Littler Mendelson P.C., Boston, MA, Jerry H. Walters, Jr., Littler Mendelson, PC, Charlotte, NC, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Diane Hamilton, Lynne P. Cunningham and Claire Kane (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought this case as a state wage and hour action in the Middlesex Superior Court on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees of a number of entities said to comprise the Partners Healthcare System. It was removed to this court on federal preemption grounds. It has been considered jointly with an earlier filed federal claim action (Civil Action No. 09–11461–DPW), brought by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants, raising wage and hour claims under various federal statutes.
In this nominally state law case, plaintiffs allege1 that their employers maintained policies which violate Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (Count I), requiring prompt payment of wages, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151 § 1A (Count II), requiring the payment of overtime wages for time worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. Plaintiffs further contend that the employers' activities constitute breach of express or implied contracts and form the basis for claims of money had and received in assumpsit, quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and failure to keep accurate records. Id. Counts III-IX, XII-XIII. Two counts alleging equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel, id. Counts X-XI, were dismissed by stipulation of the parties [Dkt. No. 84]. Defendants moved [Dkt. No. 117] for judgment on the pleadings on all remaining counts. By endorsement, I have granted [Dkt. No. 165] the motion in part and denied the motion in part. This Memorandum and Order provides the parties with the extended explanation I promised them for that disposition of the motion.
The named defendants in this action are the following entities: Partners HealthCare System, Inc., Partners Community Healthcare, Inc., The Brigham and Women's Hospital, Inc., Brigham and Women's/Faulkner Hospitals, Inc., Martha's Vineyard Hospital, Inc., The Massachusetts General Hospital, McLean Healthcare, Inc., The McLean Hospital Corporation, Nantucket Cottage Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Hospital, Newton-Wellesley Health Care System, Inc., North Shore Children's Hospital, Inc., North Shore Medical Center, Inc., NSMC Healthcare, Inc., The Salem Hospital, Union Hospital Auxiliary of Lynn, Inc., and Faulkner Hospital, Inc.2 Compl. ¶ 2. In addition to the named defendants, the complaint lists 27 healthcare facilities and centers said to be operated by named defendants and over 100 "affiliated" healthcare facilities and centers. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiffs refer to the named defendants, their facilities and centers, and the affiliates as "Partners" or "Defendants." Id. ¶ 7.
With respect to the Plaintiffs themselves, the complaint merely states that they Id. ¶ 61. One might infer from the complaint that Plaintiffs have been employees of one of the many Defendants (or perhaps an affiliate) but the complaint provides no information as to which Defendant(s) employed which Plaintiff(s), where or over what time period.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants maintain pay policies which deny Plaintiffs their compensation for all hours worked, including applicable premium pay. Compl. ¶ 64. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants (1) automatically deduct thirty minutes of time per day from each paycheck for meal breaks, without ensuring that such breaks are taken; (2) suffer or permit Plaintiffs to work before and/or after each scheduled shift without compensation; and (3) suffer or permit Plaintiffs to attend compensable training programs without pay. Id. ¶¶ 72-102.
The plaintiffs' complaint was met with a motion to dismiss asserting inadequate pleadings [Dkt. No. 26]. Plaintiffs, for their part, sought remand [Dkt. No. 40] to the state court. When the parties reported that they were engaged in mediation, I denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for remand "without prejudice to resubmittal if the ongoing protracted mediation process proves unsuccessful." [Unnumbered docket entry May 6, 2010].
The mediation process ultimately generated two successive motions for preliminary approval of class and collective action settlements. At hearings on each motion, I denied them because—for a variety of reasons—I could not find the settlements proposed had any prospect of final approval as fair, adequate or reasonable. See generally Dkt. No. 96 (); Dkt. No. 110 (). My fundamental concern, as expressed at the hearing, was that the settlement proposals—involving some 63,000 employees in a multiplicity of job classifications at a multitude of institutional settings—raised inadequately addressed structural problems. Cf. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 827 F.3d 223, 235-36, 2016 WL 3563719 at *8 (2d Cir. June 30, 2016).
Although I informed the parties that I would entertain one last effort by them aimed at securing approval to notice a proposed settlement, the defendants instead resumed pleadings motion practice by filing the motions for judgment on the pleadings in both the federal claim and the state claim actions. After those motions were filed, Plaintiffs' Counsel voiced the possibility that they might seek leave to amend, but have never followed through with a proper motion to amend.3 After an extended period of time, I explain in this—and the related Memorandum and Order I enter under the state claims action today—the reasons why I am entering the final judgments in this and the related case on the basis of the operative complaint.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be made "after the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." A motion for judgment on the pleadings is evaluated under the same standard as a motion to dismiss. Remexcel Managerial Consultants, Inc. v. Arlequín , 583 F.3d 45, 49 n. 3 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Citibank Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodríguez Santana, et al. , 573 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir.2009) ); see also Erlich v. Ouellette, Labonte, Roberge & Allen, P.A. , 637 F.3d 32, 35 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) ().
Motions to dismiss are reviewed "accepting as true all well-pleaded facts" in the complaint, "analyzing those facts in the light most hospitable to the plaintiff's theory, and drawing all reasonable inferences for the plaintiff." U.S. ex. rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc. , 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir.2011).
A complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). While a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of her ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. "An adequate complaint" for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2), must therefore "provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim." Ocasio – Hernández v. Fortuño – Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) ; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ().
In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs engage in improper claim splitting, fail to allege sufficient facts to show standing or allege employer relationships, and fail to plead plausible claims. They also contend that an exemption for hospitals requires dismissal of the statutory claims, that the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims for overtime wages, that all claims are preempted by ERISA and must be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies, and that the claims of Plaintiffs Cunningham and Hamilton are preempted by § 301 of LMRA, which also requires their dismissal.
Although there is no motion to remand currently before me, at the...
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