Hamilton v. State, (No. 7515.)

• Decision Date: 15 January 1930
• Docket Number: (No. 7515.)
• Citation: 151 S.E. 805,169 Ga. 826
• Parties: HAMILTON. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

169 Ga. 826

151 S.E. 805

HAMILTON.

v.STATE.

(No. 7515.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 15, 1930.

Motion to Rehear Denied Feb. 22, 1930.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.

J. L. Hamilton was convicted of rape, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Len B. Guillebeau, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., J. W. LeCraw and E. A. Stephens, all of Atlanta, Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., and T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HINES, J. The defendant was indicted for rape. The jury found him guilty, and fixed his punishment in the penitentiary at from 18 to 20 years. He moved for a new trial upon the general grounds, and upon two special grounds.

1. The court gave in charge to the jury the following instruction: "Generally the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a fact. There are certain exceptions in the law to this general rule, and one of these exceptions is that the jury would not be authorized to convict the defendant of the offense or crime charged in this indictment on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Before you would be authorized to convict the defendant of rape upon the testimony of the victim alone, it would be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim should be corroborated by other evidence tending to show to the satisfaction of the jury that the crime of rape had been committed as charged, and that the alleged victim made some outcry or told of her alleged injury promptly, or her clothing was torn or dismantled, or that her person showed signs of violence, or there were other circumstances which tended to corroborate her story in the opinion of the jury; of all of which you gentlemen are to be the judges." The defendant excepts on the grounds that this instruction is argumentative and prejudicial; (e) that the court invaded the province of the jury in instructing them as a matter of law that satisfactory proof of any of the circumstances stated would be sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the female to authorize a conviction of the defendant; that the court expressed or intimated an opinion as to what had been proved; that the charge limited the corroboration of the testimony of the alleged victim to proof of the corpus delicti, and did not require any corroboration of the testimony of the alleged victim as to the identity of the person who committed the crime; and that the court instructed the jury what weight and credit should be given to the circumstances stated.

This instruction was not erroneous, as against the defendant, for any of the reasons assigned. It was not argumentative. The court did not instruct the jury that as a matter of law satisfactory proof of any of the stated circumstances would be sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the alleged victim to authorize the conviction of the defendant. The judge expressly told the jury that they would not be authorized to convict the defendant of the offense charged upon the uncorroborated testimony of the female alleged to have been raped; that, before they would be authorized to convict the defendant of the offense charged, it would be necessary that her testimony should be corroborated by other evidence tending to show to the satisfaction of the jury that the crime of rape had been committed as charged, and that the female made some outcry or told of her alleged injury promptly, or her clothing was torn ot dismantled, or that her person showed signs of violence, or there were other circumstances which tended to corroborate her testimony in the opinion of the jury; of all of which the jury were to be the...