Hamilton v. State

• Decision Date: 02 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 494,494
• Citation: 351 A.2d 153,30 Md.App. 202
• Parties: Perry L. HAMILTON v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 202

30 Md.App. 202

351 A.2d 153

Perry L. HAMILTON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 494.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 2, 1976.

Geraldine Kenney Sweeney, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on the brief, for appellant.

Bruce C. Spizler, Asst. Atty. Gen. with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., William A. Swisher, State's Atty., for Baltimore City, and Michael Glushakow, Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before POWERS, MENCHINE and DAVIDSON, JJ.

MENCHINE, Judge.

Brought to bench trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on two charges of storehouse breaking, Perry L. Hamilton was convicted and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years imprisonment. Prior to commencement of the trial, the trial judge was informed by assigned counsel 'that Mr. Hamilton * * * has advised me at this time that he wishes to proceed without counsel and I told him that he would have to tell that to the Court and the Court would have to rule on the request.' The trial judge responded as follows: 'You may proceed without counsel, but you ¹ may sit at the trial table.'

That one accused of crime has an independent constitutional right of self-representation is now beyond question. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United States said:

'The Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history.'

The Court then added:

'There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.' 422 U.S. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2539, 45 L.Ed.2d at 580.

The Supreme Court cautioned that when an accused makes known his desire to represent himself, the trial judge should assure of record that such choice has been knowingly and intelligently made, saying at 422 U.S. 835, at 95 S.Ct. 2541, at 45 L.Ed.2d 581:

'When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forego those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268.'

The Supreme Court had been, however, quite emphatic that the constitutional right to self-representation is absolute if knowingly and intelligently demanded, saying at 422 U.S. 834, at 45 L.Ed.2d 581:

'It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (concurring opinion of BRENNAN, J.).'

It is true that the...