Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 1210,1210
• Citation: 71 Md.App. 165,524 A.2d 117
• Parties: Michael Carlton SMITH v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 165

71 Md.App. 165

524 A.2d 117

Michael Carlton SMITH v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 1210, Sept. Term, 1986.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 20, 1987.

W. Ralph Birt, Jr., Assigned Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Alexander Williams, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County and David M. Simpson, Asst. State's Atty. for Prince George's County of Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before ALPERT, ROBERT M. BELL and WENNER, JJ.

ALPERT, Judge.

Unwilling to spend the rest of his life behind bars, appellant Michael Carlton Smith challenges his conviction, inter alia, on the basis that he was denied his right of self-representation. The facts are as follows.

On November 19, 1985, appellant was named in a twenty-four count indictment alleging the commission of first and second degree rape, false imprisonment, kidnapping, assault with intent to murder, assault and battery, weapons charges and various other related sexual offenses, all stemming from an alleged attack on Roberta Spann on September 21, 1985. A motion in limine and various pre-trial motions to suppress physical evidence, statements, and photographic identifications were heard and ruled on by the trial court. In particular, the trial court denied appellant's motion to represent himself and granted, pursuant to the Maryland Rape Shield Statute, ¹ the State's motion to preclude testimony by the victim concerning her prior sexual conduct.

Appellant was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The State's case consisted primarily of the testimony of the victim as to the particulars of the incident. Medical evidence as to the victim's condition immediately following the incident was admitted in corroboration of her story. In addition, several policemen and a lay witness testified concerning the factual surroundings of the incident and the chain of custody of certain physical evidence. At the conclusion of the State's case, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, which motion was denied.

Counsel for the defense then sought to call the victim, Ms. Spann, as a witness in the presentation of its case. The State objected and moved to preclude the defense from calling the victim on the basis of the Maryland Rape Shield Statute. The trial court granted the State's motion. With that, the defense rested, presenting no evidence.

The jury found the appellant guilty of three counts of rape, one of kidnapping, one of attempted murder, and two of deadly weapon charges. The court merged one rape count with the other two. The defense moved for a new trial, which motion was also denied. On September 9, 1986, appellant was sentenced to two consecutive life terms on the rape convictions, thirty years for kidnapping, thirty years for assault with intent to murder, and three years on each of the two weapons charges (all concurrent with the life sentences).

Appellant filed a timely appeal and presents the following two questions:

1. Did the trial court commit error in denying appellant's request to represent himself at trial?

2. Did the trial court misconstrue and misapply the Maryland Rape Shield Law so as to deny appellant his right to present a defense and to otherwise improperly exclude relevant evidence.

We will address each question in turn.

I. The Right to Self-representation

Appellant first contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. ² A criminal defendant has two mutually exclusive rights under the Sixth Amendment: the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to represent himself. Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 486 A.2d 163 (1985). The right to self-representation is absolute upon a valid waiver of the right to assistance of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Leonard, 302 Md. at 119, 486 A.2d 163; Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702, 703, 221 A.2d 908 (1965); Hamilton v. State, 30 Md.App. 202, 205, 351 A.2d 153 (1975). When a defendant indicates that he wishes to defend pro se, the court must determine whether he "truly wants to do so." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. at 2532; Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 128, 406 A.2d 98 (1979). Thus, a two-step judicial inquiry must be made. Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 100, 472 A.2d 953 (1984); Snead, 286 Md. at 128, 406 A.2d 98. The court must first ascertain whether the defendant "clearly and unequivocally" wants to defend himself. Id. If the court so ascertains, it must then inform the defendant of the benefits of counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel and inquire whether the accused "knowingly and intelligently" desires to forgo those benefits. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2534; Snead, 286 Md. at 121, 406 A.2d 98; Meyer v. State, 49 Md.App. 300, 306-07, 431 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 291 Md. 779 (1981); Hamilton, 30 Md.App. at 204, 351 A.2d 153. "The record must show that the defendant was competent to waive the right to counsel and that he knowingly and intelligently has done so after being made aware of the advantages and disadvantages of self-representation." ³ Snead, 286 Md. at 129, 406 A.2d 98 quoting State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 267, 347 A.2d 219 (1975) (footnote omitted). See also Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 123, 394 A.2d 1190 (1978); Hamilton v. State, 30 Md.App. 202, 204, 351 A.2d 153 (1976).

The question of how a court is to measure the validity of each defendant's waiver of his right to counsel has troubled the judicial system since the Faretta holding was announced by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2549, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (Blackmun, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (many of the questions left unanswered by the majority opinion "such as the standards of waiver ... will haunt the trial of every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self representation"). It is clear, however, that competency to stand trial and competency to make a knowing and intelligent (i.e., a constitutional) waiver of the right to counsel are not necessarily the same. Snead, 286 Md. at 129 n. 5, 406 A.2d 98; Renshaw, 276 Md. at 267 n. 3, 347 A.2d 219. See also Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 892 n. 10 (5th Cir.1977) and cases cited therein. Compare United States v. Smith, 778 F.2d 925, 931 (2nd Cir.1985) ("waiver of right to counsel under sixth amendment is to be measured by a stricter standard than is a similar waiver under the fifth amendment.") For example, there may be a situation in which a defendant has the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and assist counsel in his defense, but lacks the mental capacity to waive counsel and represent himself. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1123 n. 13 (D.C.App.1972).

The validity of a defendant's waiver of counsel must be determined in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. United States v. Johnson, 659 F.2d 415, 416-17 (4th Cir.1981). Among factors uniformly considered are the background, experience, age, general capabilities and conduct of the accused. ⁴ McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1985); Johnson, 659 F.2d at 417; United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir.1978). Factors, less uniformly, but also considered include: familiarity with the court system, Cordoba v. Harris, 473 F.Supp. 632, 638, aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (S.D.N.Y.1979), the existence of a history of irrational behavior, and medical opinions regarding the defendant's mental abilities. Evans v. Raines, 534 F.Supp. 791, 795 (D.Ariz.1982). Compare Stepp v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 447, 453-5 (5th Cir.1975) (attempted suicide alone does not evidence insufficient mental capacity to make knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel). "Technical legal knowledge, as such, is not relevant to an assessment of an accused's knowing exercise of his right to defend himself." Snead, 286 Md. at 129, 406 A.2d 98, citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. See also United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 (10th Cir.1976) (court determination that an accused lacks expertise or professional capabilities cannot justify denying the right of self-representation). Compare United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir.1986) (court may not base its denial of a request to proceed pro se on defendant's inexperience or lack of confidence).

Before discussing the application of these factors to the case sub judice, we pause to consider the factual backdrop on which the Faretta decision itself was based. Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft. Well before the trial, Faretta requested that he be permitted to represent himself. ⁵ "Questioning by the judge revealed that Faretta had previously represented himself in a criminal prosecution, that he had a high school education, and that he did not want to be represented by the public defender because he believed that that office was 'very loaded down with ... a heavy case load.' " 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. at 2527. The trial judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. Specifically, he questioned Faretta regarding his knowledge of the hearsay rule and the State law concerning juror selection. 422 U.S. at 808, 95 S.Ct. at 2527. On the basis of this inquiry, the judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to assistance of counsel, 422 U.S. at 809, 95 S.Ct. at 2529. The judge also concluded that Faretta had no constitutional right to proceed pro se. 422 U.S. at 810, 95 S.Ct. at 2529. Accordingly, the judge also denied Faretta's requests for leave to act as co-counsel and to make certain motions on his own behalf. The public defender assigned to Faretta conducted the entire defense, at the end of which Faretta was...