Hamilton v. Village of McCall
| Decision Date | 31 December 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 9614,9614 |
| Citation | 90 Idaho 253,409 P.2d 393 |
| Parties | Ronald J. HAMILTON and Naomi M. Hamilton, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF McCALL, an Incorporated Village of the State of Idaho, Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Elam, Burke, Jeppesen & Evans, Boise, for appellants.
Robert Remaklus, Cascade, and William R. Padgett, Boise, for respondent.
This action was commenced by plaintiffs-appellants on October 19, 1962, to quiet title to certain real property situate in Valley County, Idaho. Defendant-respondent, Village of McCall, filed its answer and cross-complaint seeking to quiet title to the same property alleging adverse possession and use as the basis of its title. From a judgment in favor of defendant this appeal is taken.
The disputed property is described in paragraph 11 of the trial court's findings of fact, as follows:
'Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Lot 3 of Block 9 of Davis Beach Tracts, as platted and as appears on Amended Map of Davis Beach Tracts, in Section 4, Township 18 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, in Valley County, Idaho; thence South 50 feet; thence East 550 feet; thence North 65 feet; thence South 88~ 23' West 275.91 feet; thence South 59~ 17' West 76.74 feet; thence South 82~ 45' West 40.45 feet; thence North 37.1 feet; thence West 193.1 feet to the point of beginning.'
The following is a sketch which is here inserted solely for the purpose of graphically showing the relative location and identity of the disputed area. This sketch is not drawn to scale.
Prior to 1939 the disputed area together with the adjacent property lying both north and south thereof was owned by the Dewey-Davis Estate, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 'Estate'). In 1937, during the Estate's ownership of the area, the street known and referred to as '3rd Street,' lying immediately south of Lot 9 of Davis Beach Tracts, which had never been laid out or constructed on the ground, was vacated. Since the Estate at that time owned the property on both sides of said street the Estate became the owner of the area vacated.
During 1939 McCall Chamber of Commerce acquired title from said Estate to the real property lying immediately south of said vacated 3rd Street, upon which area a private golf course had been constructed by the Estate. During the same year the McCall Chamber of Commerce conveyed the golf course property to defendant Village. Since acquiring this property the defendant has maintained and operated it as the McCall Golf Course.
Plaintiffs alleged that on or about July 6, 1959, they entered into a contract with the Estate under the terms of which the Estate agreed to convey to plaintiffs a parcel of real estate which encompasses the area here in dispute. The deed conveying such parcel to plaintiffs was admitted herein as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
Under the conveyance by the Estate to McCall Chamber of Commerce the property conveyed is bounded on the north by what had constituted the south line of 3rd Street, and under the conveyance by Estate to plaintiffs the property conveyed is bounded on the south by the same line.
Defendant contends that it acquired said disputed real property by having adversely held and possessed the same under a claim of title not founded upon a written instrument for a period of five years continuously, pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 5-210. Plaintiffs rely upon their record title and contend that defendant's possession or holding, if any, of the disputed property was without color of right and not openly, notoriously or hostile and was subordinate to plaintiff's title.
Considerable conflicting evidence was introduced relating to defendant's occupation and use of the easterly portion of the disputed area as a conventional part of the golf course and the remaining westerly portion as a parking lot for the patrons of the golf course. The trial court found that the disputed area was unfenced except that there is a wire fence on the north of the easterly portion thereof, which fence was originally constructed to keep cattle off the golf course. The court also found 'that there is no evidence in this action as to any agreed boundary line, other than is specified in the deed by which McCall Chamber of Commerce acquired ownership, and the deed by which McCall Chamber of Commerce disposed, of that real property immediately South of said vacated 3rd Street, as aforesaid.'
One of plaintiffs' principal contentions is that by reason of the assessment, levy, collection and receipt of taxes on the disputed property by the defendant Village of McCall, the elements of hostility and color or claim of right, necessary to the acquisition of title by adverse possession are lacking, and that defendant is estopped to claim such property because of its actions relating to the levy and collection of ad valorem taxes thereon.
During the trial plaintiffs introduced evidence relating to the levy, assessment and payment of municipal taxes on the disputed property for the year 1958 from which evidence the trial court found:
'22) That, in the year 1958, said Village of McCall fixed and certified the amount of ad valorem tax levy which was to be applied to all real property subject to ad valorem taxes of said Village of McCall for the year 1958;'
Following plaintiffs' introduction of the evidence relating to the levy, assessment and payment of taxes on the disputed property for the year 1958 the parties entered into a stipulation in open court, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:
'* * * it is hereby stipulated between parties to this action by and through their attorneys of record, that the Plaintiff's evidence regarding levy, assessment, any payment of taxes for the years 1941, 1946, 1951, and 1955 and all subsequent years, is stipulated to be identical with proof submitted for the year 1958, except for the differing amounts of taxes.'
In addition to the foregoing the court made the following quoted pertinent findings regarding the levy, assessment and payment of taxes on the disputed property, to-wit:
'23) That, solely because said Dewey-Davis Estate was then (and had been at all times from prior to 1939 through 1958) the record owner of the aforesaid real property title to which is in dispute in this action, all Valley County, Idaho, Officials concerned with the levy, assessment and collection of ad valorem taxes treated said disputed real property as being subject to ad valorem taxes of said Village of McCall (said disputed real property being located within the territorial limits of said Village of McCall) and, as a consequence, collected (without any specification of any improvements) ad valorem taxes (for 1958) for said Village of McCall from said Dewey-Davis Estate, the same being remitted to, and accepted by, said Village of McCall;
'24) That, for the same reason, and in like manner, ad valorem taxes of said Village of McCall were similarly collected, remitted and accepted from the private record owners of said disputed real property for and in the years 1941, 1946, 1951 and 1955 though in differing amounts;'
It should be noted that the last above quoted finding does not refer to the years subsequent to 1955; however the parties stipulated that plaintiffs' proof applied to '1955 and all subsequent years' and the parties are bound accordingly.
In this case defendant is seeking to have quieted in it title to real estate, the legal title to which is in plaintiffs. Defendant's claimed title rests upon adverse possession, and it claims such possession is sufficient to meet the requirements of I.C. § 5-210, which provides as follows:
'For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been...
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Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley
...cities had broad authority to "assess and collect [property] taxes for all purposes of such corporation." Hamilton v. McCall, 90 Idaho 253, 259, 409 P.2d 393, 397 (1965). Then, in Greater Boise Aud. v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 884, 684 P.2d 286 (1984), we overruled State v. Nelson and ......
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Gache v. Town of Harrison, NY
...of this position, plaintiff cites several state court decisions outside this jurisdiction. For example, in Hamilton v. Village of McCall, 90 Idaho 253, 409 P.2d 393 (1965), the court expressly held that adverse possession could not be established under the state statute unless the claimant ......
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Flynn v. Allison
...(1972); Fry v. Smith, 91 Idaho 740, 430 P.2d 486 (1967); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615, 428 P.2d 747 (1967); Hamilton v. Village of McCall, 90 Idaho 253, 409 P.2d 393 (1965); Dickerson v. Brewster, 88 Idaho 330, 399 P.2d 407 (1965); Eagen v. Colwell, 86 Idaho 525, 388 P.2d 999 (1964); Swa......
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Standall v. Teater
...The Teaters, who claim the property by adverse possession, had the burden of proof to establish their claim. Hamilton v. Village of McCall, 90 Idaho 253, 409 P.2d 393 (1965). See, Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 511 P.2d 294 (1973); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615, 428 P.2d 747 (1967). The ap......