Hamlet v. Hook
| Decision Date | 16 October 1951 |
| Citation | 236 P.2d 196,106 Cal.App.2d 791 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | HAMLET v. HOOK. Civ. 18236. |
Gray, Binkley & Pfaelzer, Los Angeles, by John T. Binkley and William G. Robertson, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Bauder, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly, Los Angeles, for respondent.
The only question we are called upon to determine in this case is whether the court erred in giving to the jury an instruction which was requested by the defendant and in refusing to give two instructions requested by the plaintiff, who is the appellant here. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant below, respondent here.
The record discloses that in broad daylight the automobiles driven by plaintiff and defendant collided at a street intersection in a residential district in Pittsburg, Kansas. At the time the plaintiff was proceeding northerly and the defendant westerly on streets which intersected. The intersection was 30 feet in width from west to east and south to north.
The evidence is that the plaintiff observed the defendant's automobile approaching the intersection from his right when his own automobile was 25 feet distant from the intersection, but that the defendant did not observe the car of the plaintiff until he was 10 feet from the intersection at which time he applied his brakes and thereupon skidded a distance of 14 feet to the point of impact. The plaintiff initially testified that he looked to his right a second time as he entered the intersection, but later stated he was not sure whether he had looked or not. The details of the collision are not of any importance to a consideration of the question before us.
The statutory law of Kansas provides that 'No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.' G.S.1949, 8-532. The statute then goes on to provide that in a residential district a speed of 30 miles per hour is lawful, unless some special hazard exists, but that any speed in excess of that limit shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that it is unlawful.
It is at once apparent from a reading of the statute that driving a car in excess of thirty miles per hour in a residential district is not negligence per se, but merely prima facie evidence of negligence. Nevertheless, the plaintiff requested an instruction which not only embodied the provision we have quoted above from the law of Kansas, which the court gave, but in addition the instruction recited the speed limits as set forth in the statute and, moreover, it advised the jury that a violation of the applicable speed limit was 'negligence as a matter of law.' The court declined to give this part of the instruction. In so ruling the court was correct for at least two reasons. First, because the requested instruction did not correctly state the law, in that, a violation of the speed limit is not 'negligence as a matter of law' under the Kansas statute, but only prima facie evidence of negligence. Second, because the statute merely creates an evidential presumption sufficient to make a prima facie case on the issue of negligence, without the necessity of supplying additional evidence. In short, by reason of the statute the court could not grant a non-suit solely on ground that there was no evidence of negligence where the evidence disclosed the defendant had exceeded the speed limit pertinent to the case. In other words, on an issue of negligence, the statute creates a statutory rule of evidence with respect to the sufficiency of evidence to carry the case to the jury. If the presumption is not rebutted the issue of negligence is proved, but if the presumption is rebutted it is for the jury to say whether there was or was not negligence in fact. The substantive common law of Kansas gives to one injured by the negligence of another a right of action against him which is not expanded or cut down by the provision of the statute which makes a violation of the statute prima facie evidence of negligence. Accordingly, the provision being no part of the substantive law it lies in the...
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...presumptions and inferences to be drawn from evidence. Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39 Cal.2d 12, 244 P.2d 395 (1952); Hamlet v. Hook, 106 Cal.App.2d 791, 236 P.2d 196 (1951); Estate of Winder, 98 Cal. App.2d 78, 219 P.2d 18 (1950). Dealing with an identical posture of New York law, the court ......
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