Hammad v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 27 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:20-CV-568 |
| Parties | SAED HAMMAD, Plaintiff v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI[1] Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Saed Hammad (“Plaintiff”), an adult individual who resides within the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
This matter is before me, upon consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 14). After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Commissioner's final decision, and the relevant portions of the certified administrative transcript I find the Commissioner's final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein, the Commissioner's final decision will be VACATED and this case will be REMANDED for further proceedings.
On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff protectively filed an an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 21). In this application, Plaintiff alleged he became disabled as of February 23, 2015, when he was forty-five (45) years old, due to the following conditions: severe depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety and memory loss. (Admin. Tr. 82-83, 184). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects his ability to concentrate, memorize, understand, complete tasks, follow instructions, and get along with others. (Admin. Tr. 216). Plaintiff completed 2 years of college in 1989. (Admin. Tr. 58, 184). Before the onset of his impairments, Plaintiff worked as a soccer coach from 2001-2010. (Admin. Tr. 58). From 2010 through 2013 Plaintiff worked as a soldier in the United States Army with an MOS of gun mechanic and interpreter. Id. Following discharge from the U.S. Army Plaintiff worked from January of 2014 through December of 2014 as a laborer in a flooring company. (Admin. Tr. 59). Plaintiff worked briefly as a deli slicer in a grocery store both before and after his date of alleged onset. (Admin. Tr. 59-60).
On May 26, 2017, Plaintiff's application was denied at the initial level of administrative review. (Admin Tr. 98-102). On June 1, 2017, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (Admin. Tr. 105-106) . On July 30, 2017, Plaintiff, assisted by his counsel, appeared and testified during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Mike Oleyar (the “ALJ”). (Admin. Tr. 21). On December 27, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's applications for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 21-32). On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”). (Admin. Tr. 156-158)
On February 12, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Admin. Tr. 1-7). On April 4, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision denying the application is not supported by substantial evidence, and improperly applies the relevant law and regulations. (Doc. 1). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the decision at the administrative level, and award a period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits based on his disability with an onset date of February 23, 2015, and continuing without cessation to the present. (Doc. 1).
In the alternative, Plaintiff requests that this case be remanded to the Commissioner for a new hearing on the question of whether the Plaintiff's medical condition renders him disabled. Plaintiff further requests that the Court grant such relief as it deems justified, including, but not limited to, the award of attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 1).
On October 13, 2020, the Commissioner filed an Answer. (Doc. 11). In the Answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits was made in accordance with the law and regulations and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11). Along with his Answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 12).
Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 15), the Commissioner's Brief (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 19) have been filed. This matter is now ripe for decision.
When reviewing the Commissioner's final decision denying a claimant's application for benefits, this Court's review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 u.s.C. § 405(g); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
“In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) () (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary's determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (); Ficca, 901 F.Supp.2d at 536 ().
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).[2] To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant's RFC. RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2).
At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to...
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