Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc.
Decision Date | 22 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 201CV962.,Civ.A. 201CV962. |
Citation | 214 F.Supp.2d 575 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Wilbur K. HAMMAKER, Plaintiff, v. BROWN & BROWN, INC., Defendant. |
Brandon Harvey Zeigler, Stallings & Richardson, P.C., Judith M. Colfield, Judith M. Cofield, P.C., Kellam Thomas Parks, Stallings and Richardson PC, Virginia Beach, VA, for Plaintiff.
Thomas Michael Lucas, McGuireWoods LLP, Kristina H. Vaquera, Troutman Sanders LLP, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court upon defendant Brown & Brown, Inc.'s Motion to Strike Jury Demand. Having considered the parties pleadings, this matter is now ripe for judicial determination without the need of a hearing.
Plaintiff Wilbur K. Hammaker filed the instant action against Brown & Brown, Inc., ("Brown") and Riedman Corporation ("Reidman")1 on December 30, 2001, alleging wrongful termination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Hammaker was employed with Reidman as General Manager until Reidman sold its insurance-related operations to Brown on January 1, 2001. Hammaker then signed an Employment Agreement with Brown. On April 13, 2001, Brown terminated Hammaker's employment. Hammaker was seventy-three (73) years old at the time.
Hammaker alleges that up until his termination, Brown tried to force him to retire and to turn over his clients and accounts to younger members of the office. Brown allegedly reduced Hammaker's salary without just cause, despite the allegation that Hammaker worked longer hours and generated more business than most employees. Hammaker seeks back pay, pecuniary losses, and liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), and reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Brown filed its Answer on January 24, 2002. On January 24, 2002, Brown also filed its motion to strike Hammaker's jury demand and its supporting memorandum of law. On March 8, 2002, Hammaker filed its brief in opposition to Brown's motion to strike. On March 13, 2002, Brown filed its reply brief.
Brown moves to strike Hammaker's jury demand on the grounds that he waived his right to a jury trial by signing the Employment Agreement. Section 16 of the Employment Agreement provides "[e]mployee and Company hereby knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waive any right either may have to a trial by jury with respect to any litigation related to or arising out of, under or in conjunction with this Agreement." Brown contends that by executing the Employment Agreement, Hammaker waived his right to a jury trial. Hammaker argues that the waiver is not valid on two grounds. First, he argues that the Employment Agreement does not contemplate an ADEA action, and thus does not restrict Hammaker's right to a jury trial in this case. Second, the waiver does not conform to the requirements of the ADEA as amended by the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act of 1990 ("OWBPA"), Pub.L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630) , and is thus unenforceable. In rebuttal, Brown does not address the applicability of the waiver to this case, but rather only argues that the waiver requirements of the OWBPA is inapplicable to procedural rights, including the right to a judicial forum.
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether Hammaker's ADEA claim falls within the scope of the jury waiver provision. To do so, the Court must construe the terms of the Employment Agreement applying Florida state law.2 Under Florida rules of construction, the Employment Agreement must be construed against its drafter, Brown. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 641 (Fla.1999). World Vacation Travel, S.A., de C.V. v. Brooker, 799 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (internal citation omitted).
Hammaker brought this action seeking redress for wrongful termination of his employment with Brown for age discrimination. The parties' former employment relationship derived from the Employment Agreement. Although Hammaker's claim is statutory, Hammaker's employment had its "origin or genesis in the [employment] contract." See Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Universal Employment Agency, 664 So.2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (quoting Sweet Dreams Unlimited v. Dial-A-Mattress Int'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir.1993)) (the parties) hiring contract to contemplate tort claims where it concerns letters of employment that were indispensable to the operation of the agreement between . As such, the instant dispute can be said to "arise out of" or "relate to" the Employment Agreement within the meaning of the waiver provision. Id.
In making this determination, the Court reviewed numerous cases that interpret the relevant terms of the instant waiver provision. Although these cases generally address the scope of a mandatory arbitration agreement, the Court finds the analysis particularly instructive. For example, in Chase Manhattan Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Miranda, 658 So.2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), the court construed an employment agreement broadly to encompass tort claims. In that case, the relevant provision provided that "any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association, or arising out of the employment or termination of employment of associated person(s)" shall be subject to arbitration. In construing the term "arising out of," the court held that even without bias from the strong policy for arbitration, the tort claims were contemplated by the arbitration provision, reasoning that the challenged actions would not have occurred but for the employer-employee relationship. Id. at 182; see also Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Katz, 807 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) ( ); Sweet Dreams, 1 F.3d at 639; American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir.1996) ( ). In this case, Hammaker's ADEA claim would not exist but for the employer-employee relationship with Brown. Thus, the Court finds that the Employment Agreement contemplates Hammaker's ADEA claim.
Having determined that the waiver provision contemplates the instant ADEA claim, the Court must now determine whether the waiver provision is enforceable. Brown argues that the waiver provision is valid because it is not subject to the requirements imposed by the OWBPA as Hammaker contends on the grounds that the OWBPA applies only to the waiver of substantive rights as opposed to procedural rights such as the right to a judicial forum.
It is well settled that the ADEA confers the right to a jury trial. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582-83, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1293 (4th Cir.1979). The right to a jury trial is a procedural right. See Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 177-78 (4th Cir.1994) ( ); Jones Motor Co., Inc. v. Holtkamp, Liese, Beckemeier & Childress, P.C., 197 F.3d 1190, 1192 (7th Cir. 1999) ( ). Rights conferred under the ADEA may not be waived absent compliance with the procedures set forth in the OWBPA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). The OWBPA provides that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary." Id. A waiver is not knowing and voluntary unless, at a minimum, certain enumerated requirements are met, including that the waiver refers specifically to the ADEA, the individual is advised to consult with an attorney, and that there is a seven-day revocation period. Id. It is undisputed that the waiver provision at issue in this case does not conform to the requirements imposed by the OWBPA.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit") has not directly addressed the issue now before the Court. In arguing that the OWBPA does not apply to the waiver provision in this case, Brown relies upon cases in which other United States Courts of Appeal have held the OWBPA inapplicable to waivers of a judicial forum on the premise that Congress intended the waiver requirements to apply only to substantive rights. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir.1995) ( );3 Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1998) ( ); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1999) ( ).
These cases, however, are distinguishable for the following reasons. First, in Williams, Seus, and Rosenberg, the Fifth, Third and First Circuits, respectively,...
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