Hammel v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 20.)
• Citation: 168 S.W. 144
• Parties: HAMMEL v. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. R. CO.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

168 S.W. 144

HAMMEL v. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. R. CO.

(No. 20.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 1, 1914.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Drew County; Henry W. Wells, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Mary Hammel against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Patrick Henry, of Monticello, for appellant. E. B. Kinsworthy and T. D. Crawford, both of Little Rock, and Jas. C. Knox, of Monticello, for appellee.

SMITH, J.

Appellant was a passenger on one of appellee's trains, and was injured as she attempted to alight from the train at her destination. She alleged in her complaint, and offered proof tending to show, that when the train had stopped at the station she arose for the purpose of getting off, when, suddenly and without warning, the operatives of the train carelessly and negligently caused the coach in which she was riding to jerk or bump with great force and violence, whereby she was thrown against a seat in said coach and sustained serious injuries. Appellant testified that she incurred expenses for medical attention in the sum of $45, and that she suffered much pain for a period of four months after her injuries, and one of her symptoms of illness was nausea and a dizziness, accompanied by fever at nights. At the trial a Dr. Harris was called as a witness on behalf of appellee and testified that he had formerly been appellee's physician and had attended her in a professional capacity at intervals covering a period of three or four years, and that during this time had treated her for nausea and fever; and he testified that she was always bothered with a sick stomach when she took medicine. The effect of this evidence was to show that appellant had practically the same ailment and symptoms prior to her injury as those she testified about subsequent to her injury. When this witness was interrogated in regard to appellant's previous illness, appellant's attorney objected to this evidence, and his objections were overruled, and exceptions were saved at the time. But the objection made was a general one, and the point was not made that the witness was testifying about matters that were privileged. The case appears to have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and the jury returned a verdict for appellant in the sum of $375, and she appealed from that judgment.

Practically the only question urged for reversal of the judgment is the action of the court in admitting the evidence of the witness Dr. Harris, over appellant's objection.

It appears from the evidence of the witness Harris that he acquired the information concerning appellant's condition while attending her in a professional capacity, and this information was evidently disclosed to him to enable him to prescribe as a physician, and it was therefore privileged. Section 3098, Kirby's Digest; Mo. & North Ark. R. Co. v. Daniels, 98 Ark. 352, 136 S. W. 651.

But the objection offered to this evidence was a general one, and the attention of the court was not called to the fact that the evidence was within the inhibition of the statute which precludes a physician from disclosing information which he acquired in a professional capacity and which was necessary for him to possess to prescribe as a physician. This evidence was not incompetent, nor was it irrelevant or immaterial, and a general objection to evidence only raises the question of competency or relevancy.

Discussing the method and form of objection to the admission of privileged communications, the rule...