Hammer v. Ribi

• Decision Date: 25 August 2017
• Docket Number: Docket No. 44447
• Citation: 401 P.3d 148,162 Idaho 570
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Sharon R. HAMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nils RIBI, Defendant-Respondent.

162 Idaho 570
401 P.3d 148

Sharon R. HAMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Nils RIBI, Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44447

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: August 25, 2017

James R. Donoval, Eagle, for appellant.

Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, for respondent. Kirtlan Naylor argued.

HORTON, Justice.

162 Idaho 572

Sharon Hammer appeals from the district court's order dismissing her complaint. Hammer's action against Nils Ribi alleges that he assaulted her during a city council meeting on September 15, 2011. The district court granted Ribi's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court denied Hammer's motion to require Ribi to undergo a mental examination and ruled that Hammer failed to plead facts which would show that Ribi was not immune from suit under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). We vacate the judgment dismissing Hammer's lawsuit and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises from events occurring during a city council meeting on September 15, 2011. Hammer was employed as City Administrator for Sun Valley, and Ribi was a member of the city council. Hammer's complaint alleges that, during a break in the meeting, Hammer left the council chambers to copy some documents. Ribi followed Hammer and demanded that she make certain changes to budget documents. Hammer refused to make the changes and told Ribi that she had to speak with the Mayor before she could make any changes. Ribi then raised his arms and told Hammer, "No! You will not talk to the Mayor!" Hammer was afraid that Ribi was going to hit her, and she stepped back and said, "Whoa!"

Hammer's complaint alleged that Ribi had committed a civil assault. Hammer's action was originally brought in federal court. In July of 2015, the federal court declined to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the civil assault claim. Hammer

401 P.3d 151

162 Idaho 573

then filed this case in state court. In the state court proceedings, Hammer filed a motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 35, seeking an order requiring Ribi to undergo a mental examination.

Ribi moved to dismiss the complaint. Hammer responded with a motion to amend her complaint. Following a hearing, the district court granted Ribi's motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to properly plead facts that would support a claim of civil assault but granted Hammer leave to amend her complaint. The court then denied Hammer's motion for a mental examination. Hammer filed a motion to reconsider which the district court denied without hearing.

On May 20, 2016, Hammer filed her amended complaint. Ribi filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), again arguing that Hammer had failed to plead facts necessary to support a finding of civil assault. Ribi also claimed that he was immune from the lawsuit under the ITCA. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The district court assumed, without deciding, that Hammer had properly pleaded the elements of civil assault but held that Hammer had failed to plead sufficient facts to show that Ribi was not immune under the ITCA. Hammer timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard of review we apply to a motion for summary judgment." Losser v. Bradstreet , 145 Idaho 670, 672–73, 183 P.3d 758, 760–61 (2008). "A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated." Young v. City of Ketchum , 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2001). "[O]n review of a dismissal this Court determines whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief." Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. State , 154 Idaho 716, 720, 302 P.3d 341, 345 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "In doing so, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Id.

"The decision to order psychological testing is within the discretion of the trial court." Navarro v. Yonkers , 144 Idaho 882, 887, 173 P.3d 1141, 1146 (2007). "A trial court acts within its discretion when it (1) recognizes the decision as one of discretion, (2) acts within the outer limits of that discretion and (3) reaches its conclusion through an exercise of reason." Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Hammer contends that the district court used the wrong legal standard for civil assault when it dismissed her original complaint, the district court erred when it dismissed her amended complaint based upon ITCA immunity, and the district court erred when it denied her motion for a mental examination. These will be discussed in turn.

A. Whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard for civil assault when it considered Hammer's original complaint.

Hammer argues that the district court erred when it dismissed her original complaint because it applied the wrong definition for a civil assault claim. As a threshold issue, we first consider whether this claim is an appropriate subject of appellate review.

Ordinarily, "[t]he amendment of the complaint supersedes the original complaint and all subsequent proceedings are based upon the amended complaint." Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. , 149 Idaho 299, 330, 233 P.3d 1221, 1252 (2010) (quoting W.L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc. , 103 Idaho 736, 739, 653 P.2d 791, 794 (1982) ). Thus, the general rule is that "the ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’ " Forsyth v. Humana, Inc. , 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Loux v. Rhay , 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) ). Therefore, we would not ordinarily review the district court's actions with regard to Hammer's original complaint.

However, in the limited context of an involuntary amendment of a plaintiff's complaint in response to a proposed order of

401 P.3d 152

162 Idaho 574

dismissal, the federal courts have recognized an exception to the general rule. See Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found. , 759 F.3d 601, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2014) ; Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty. , 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) ; In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc. , 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000).

The Lacey decision is particularly instructive. There, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that application of the general rule in the case of an involuntary amendment not to be "prudent or sufficiently just." Lacey , 693 F.3d at 927. Rather, the Court characterized application of the rule in such circumstances as "formalistic and harsh." Id . The Court reasoned that the "rule is unfair to litigants" as it creates a " ‘patently coercive predicament’ " for plaintiffs. Id . (quoting In re Atlas Van Lines , 209 F.3d at 1067 ). The "coercive predicament" plaintiffs' counsel face is that "counsel is between failing to preserve issues for appeal and risking sanctions by realleging dismissed claims." Id . "The Court further found that ‘the rule is unfair to district courts.’ We see no benefit in requiring plaintiffs to reallege claims that the district courts have already dealt with on the merits and dismissed with prejudice." Id . at 928. Finally, the Court concluded that there is no "countervailing reason for keeping the current rule.... in practical terms we think there is little benefit to the orderly administration of justice." Id . As we find the Lacey analysis to be persuasive, we will consider the merits of the district court's decision dismissing Hammer's original complaint.

When it dismissed her initial complaint, the district court expressed skepticism that Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 properly states the elements of civil assault. Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 provides as follows:

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