Hammer v. State
| Decision Date | 07 February 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 198,198 |
| Citation | 238 A.2d 567,3 Md.App. 96 |
| Parties | Paul Martin HAMMER v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
James B. Berry, Jr., Mt. Rainier, for appellant.
H. Edgar Lentz, Asst. Atty. Gen., and on brief were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Dickee M. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Arthur A. Marshall and Joseph J. Bonner, State's Atty., and Asst. State's Atty., for Prince George's County, respectively, Upper Marlboro, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.
The appellant was 16 years of age when he was arrested on April 10, 1967 in Prince George's County, Maryland driving an automobile which had been reported as stolen. After a hearing on April 14, 1967 the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, sitting as a juvenile court, waived jurisdiction and ordered the appellant held for action under 'the regular Criminal Procedure,' pursunt to the provisions of 'Section 54 of Article 26 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957, edition.' The appellant was not represented by counsel at this hearing. On June 5, 1967, he was tried in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County by a jury under a warrant charging him with the larceny of the use of a motor vehicle, found guilty and, after a pre-sentence investigation, sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term not to exceed 4 years. On June 26, 1967 the court ordered him to be confined to Patuxent Institution 'for the purpose of determining whether or not he is a defective delinquent.'
On appeal the appellant contends that 'there was such a denial of due process of law as to void the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction so that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the case.'
The statement of facts in the appellant's brief contains the following:
'On April 14, 1967, the Juvenile Courts for Prince George's County had a preliminary hearing in which the Master made his recommendation for a waiver of jurisdiction and the court then waived jurisdiction and bound the defendant over for trial as an adult.
No counsel was present at this waiver proceeding and the defendant did not testify, produce witnesses in his own behalf nor was he advised that he could request counsel.'
The waiver order is a part of the record before us, but none of the proceedings regarding the hearing resulting in the order are therein contained. However, the State, although pointing this out, adopted the appellant's statement of facts and, for the purposes of decision, we assume the facts as to the waiver hearing to be correct. The appellant concludes from these facts that he was denied due process of law and bases his conclusion on Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, decided March 21, 1966 and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, decided May 15, 1967. Kent was clearly concerned with the interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia and its effect, therefore, is limited to that jurisdiction. State v. Hance, 2 Md.App. 162, 167, 233 A.2d 326. The Supreme Court declined to rest its decision on constitutional grounds. 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045. Gault is a constitutional decision, limited to proceedings which determine juvenile delinquency. We stated in Hance that it is unclear whether it establishes constitutional principles applicable to waiver of jurisdiction proceedings (2 Md. App. at 167, 233 A.2d 326), but we assume for the purpose of decision here, without deciding, that the rules articulated in Gault are applicable in such state proceedings. We held in Hance that Gault is not retroactive. The appellant recognizes that his waiver hearing preceded the decision in Gault but urges that the Gault rules are applicable to him because his criminal trial was subsequent to that decision. Thus it is necessary that we determine the standard of retroactivity, mindful of the rule that the federal constitution neither requires nor prohibits retroactivity, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, and that the courts may, in the interest of justice, make a rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation require. Various standards of retroactivity have been determined by the Supreme Court. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453. Conscious of the integrity of juvenile procedures as have been followed in this State, aware of the reliance on pre-Gault rules in juvenile...
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...v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky.Ct.App.1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 873, 88 S.Ct. 162, 19 L.Ed.2d 155 (1967); Hammer v. State, 3 Md.App. 96, 238 A.2d 567 (Ct.App.1968); Neller v. State, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (Sup.Ct.1968); Bouge v. Reed, 254 Or. 418, 459 P.2d 869 (Sup.Ct.1969); State ......
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...we observe that there is no constitutional provision either requiring or prohibiting retroactivity in this regard. Hammer v. State, 3 Md.App. 96, 238 A.2d 567. II Young questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. The question is before us on the denial of a motion f......
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Brumley v. Charles R. Denney Juvenile Center of Snohomish County
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