Hammett v. McIntire

• Decision Date: 29 November 1962
• Docket Number: No. 13977,13977
• Citation: 365 S.W.2d 844
• Parties: Mrs. Georgia L. Jones HAMMETT, Jr., et vir, Appellants, v. Mrs. Agnes McINTIRE et vir, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 844

365 S.W.2d 844

Mrs. Georgia L. Jones HAMMETT, Jr., et vir, Appellants, v. Mrs. Agnes McINTIRE et vir, Appellees.

No. 13977.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Houston.

Nov. 29, 1962.

Rehearing Denied March 28, 1963.

Herbert Finkelstein, Houston, for appellants.

Bernard Kay and Robert L. Jones, Houston, for appellees.

BELL, Chief Justice.

Appellees sued appellants to establish and foreclose a judgment lien against the East 60 feet of Lot Two in Block H of Houston Acreage Estates, an Addition in the City of Houston. On trial to a jury, the jury answered issues favorably to appellants, but the trial court, on appellees' motion, rendered judgment non obstante veredicto in favor of appellees establishing and foreclosing the judgment lien.

The pleadings of appellees and the evidence show that appellees obtained a judgment against a man named Frank Munger in the amount of $6,997.66 and interest from the date of judgment, which was November 23, 1951. On June 2, 1952 an abstract of the judgment was duly filed in the Judgment Records of Harris County. On such dates the legal title to the above property as shown by the Deed Records of Harris County was in Frank Munger.

On the basis of the above, appellees assert their judgment lien, they alleging, and it being shown, that they had no notice of a prior deed from Munger to the appellant, Georgia L. Jones Hammett, which was dated November 15, 1949. It was not filed for record, however, until February 15, 1958.

The appellants in their answer, after asserting a general denial, alleged facts, which if true, showed Mr. Munger merely held legal title for a man named Sanford Thomas and that Thomas was the beneficiary under a resulting trust. It is appellants' contention that the jury found facts on sufficient evidence that establish a resulting trust in Thomas and since Munger held purely naked legal title to the property he had not interest to which appellees' lien could attach. They allege a transfer in writing from Thomas of his interest. Alternatively, they say that Mrs. Hammett obtained title under the deed from Munger and though the deed was not recorded until subsequent to the recording of appellees' abstract of judgment, appellees were charged with notice of Mrs. Hammett's deed because her father, Mr. Jones, was at all times in possession of the property.

The evidence shows that in 1949 Mr. Jones, father of Mrs. Hammett, was in debt and wished to sell the above property. Sanford Thomas, who worked for Mr. Munger, wanted to buy the property. He was unable to obtain a loan because of the amount of his salary. Thomas asked Mr. Munger to purchase the property for him but in Munger's name and Mr. Munger did so. Mr. Jones conveyed the property to Mr. Munger. Mr. Munger had arranged for a $6,000.00 loan with Campbell Mortgage Company. The deed from Jones to Munger reserved a vendor's lien to secure the payment of the note. The money obtained from the loan was paid to Mr. Jones. The date of the deed from Jones to Munger was October 19, 1949. In addition, Thomas, on November 14, 1949, executed a note to Jones for $2,950.00. There was evidence that Thomas prior to the deed from Jones to Munger agreed with Munger to pay the indebtedness to Campbell Mortgage Company though Munger was the only maker of the note. In October, after the deed to Munger, Thomas went into possession of the property and remained in possession for a month or so. He had paid one installment of the note to Campbell Mortgage Company and had paid Mr. Jones $50.00. Sometime in November, just when is not clear, Mr. Thomas became dissatisfied or decided he could not handle the purchase, and moved off the property. He delivered possession to Mr. Jones and told Mr. Jones to get a deed from Mr. Munger. Mr. Jones then had Mr. Munger convey the property to Jones' daughter, Mrs. Hammett. The deed was dated November 15, 1949. Jones says he had the deed made to his daughter because he owed her $650.00. Thereafter Jones paid the balance owing Campbell Mortgage Company as it fell due.

The jury found as follows:

1. The purchase price was paid Jones by Munger with the funds borrowed from the Mortgage Company.

2. That Jones did not convey the property to Munger as a gift.

3. That prior to the execution of the deed from Jones to Munger, Thomas obligated himself to pay the full amount of the purchase price.

4. That Munger took title solely for the use and benefit of Thomas.

5. That Jones orally agreed with Mrs. Hammett to pay the mortgage company.

6. That Jones paid the mortgage company $5,950.00.

There were other findings not material to be noticed at this point.

The trial court disregarded the above answers of the jury on the ground there was no evidence to support them. We are of the view there was evidence to support these answers and that the effect of these answers was to show bare legal title in Munger and equitable title in Sanford Thomas.

If prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of a deed conveying property to one person, another person pays the purchase price or becomes legally obligated to do so, and it is agreed that the person to whom the property is conveyed shall hold the title for the use and benefit of the person paying or becoming legally obligated to pay the purchase price, the bare legal title is in the grantee in the deed and equitable title is in the person paying or agreeing to pay the purchase price. The payment of the purchase price or the obligation to pay it must arise prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of the deed. Vicars v. Quinn, 154 S.W.2d 947, C.C.A., no writ hist.; Patrick v. McGaha, 164 S.W.2d 236, C.C.A, no writ hist.; Wright v. Wright, 134 Tex. 82, 132 S.W.2d 847.

It is appellees' position, apparently adopted by the trial court, that the evidence showed nothing more than an agreement that Munger would purchase the property and then convey it to Thomas if and when Thomas paid the notes to Campbell Mortgage Company. If this were true, it would, in law, amount to nothing more than a purchase of the property by Munger with an agreement by him to sell to...