Hammond v. Carlyon

Decision Date28 June 1957
Citation96 So.2d 219
PartiesJoe F. HAMMOND, Joseph B. Mallard, Sr., Ray Greene, Julian Warren and Joe Burnett, as and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, and Arthur Sollee, as Zoning Director of Duval County, Florida, Appellants, v. George CARLYON and Fred Caddell, Appellees.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

J. Henry Blount, Thomas D. Oakley and Barnes, Barnes, Naughton & Slater, Jacksonville, for appellants.

Martin Sack, Jacksonville, and Ausley & Ausley, Tallahassee, for appellees.

HOBSON, Justice.

Plaintiffs, appellees here, own property fronting on the Jacksonville Expressway. The property consists of three blocks of irregular shape, each having a depth of only ninety feet, the odd shape of the blocks and their narrow depth having resulted from the cutting of the Jacksonville Expressway through the plaintiffs' subdivision. Further to describe the situation of the property, the findings of the chancellor, who heard all of the testimony and personally viewed the premises, read in part as follows:

'* * * the property, on the north, fronts on the Jacksonville Expressway, one of the main arterial highways connecting U. S. 1 and U. S. 17, as well as the two boulevards connecting Jacksonville and the Beaches, all of said highways carrying a very heavy and constantly increasing flow of motor traffic. To the east, the property fronts on Arlington Road, another heavily travelled highway connecting the well populated Arlington residential area with the Expressway and two of the bouleverds to the Beaches. On the South, the property fronts on Gould Road, which has a width of sixty-six feet, thereby creating a rather wide buffer strip between the property under question and the property lying directly south of Gould Road.

'Approximately one-half to three-quarters of a mile west of plaintiffs' property stands the John E. Mathews Bridge, a part of the Expressway over the St. Johns River, and said bridge during December, 1954, passed 501,408 vehicles through its tolls and in May of 1955 the volume of traffic over said bridge had increased to 581,199 vehicles. A traffic count for one hour on a normal day showed 1,164 vehicles passing in front of plaintiffs' property on said Expressway.

'According to defendants' Exhibit 1 the property directly in front of and across the Express Highway and extending in both directions for approximately 2000 feet from plaintiffs' property is all zoned Business A-1, except one parcel zoned Business A. Presently located or in the process of development on aforesaid properties are filling stations, a large motel and an expansive shopping center providing parking facilities for approximately 1000 cars. Further, defendants' Exhibit 1 and the evidence show that on the south side of the Expressway, on which plaintiffs' property is located and directly across from plaintiffs' property n Arlington Road a large tract was rezoned Business A in October 1954, and at the corner of Seabrook Parkway, approximately 179 feet to the east of plaintiffs' property two large parcels were rezoned to Business A-1 in August 1952 and in March 1955, one of said parcels having presently located thereon a Howard Johnson Restaurant and the other to have situated thereon a proposed motel. The conditions affecting these two said parcels of property appear to be substantially similar to those affecting plaintiffs' property. In fact, both of said parcels directly adjoin residential property to the south and one parcel adjoins a Lutheran Church. Both being without benefit of a buffer strip such as exists between plaintiffs' property and the property directly south.'

Plaintiffs sought to have the property rezoned by the defendants (the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, sitting as a Zoning Board, and the Zoning Director) from Residence A to Business A-1 to bring it into harmony with the zoning...

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6 cases
  • Dworkis v. Dworkis
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 19, 1959
    ...Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn., 229, 33 A.2d 124. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Hendry, 112 Fla. 391, 150 So. 598; Hammond v. Carlyon, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 219. Disbelief of the denials by one party, of facts which must be proved and corroborated, is not the equivalent of affirmative eviden......
  • Tarpley v. Hornyak
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • March 15, 2004
    ...trial, that judgment must be reversed unless there is other evidence of record sufficient to support the judgment. See Hammond v. Carlyon, 96 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla.1957); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Hendry, 112 Fla. 391, 150 So. 598 (1933); Russell v. Bartlett, 139 So.2d 770, 774 (La.App.19......
  • Harrison v. Savers Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 1989
    ...as an independent basis for judgment. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Hendry, 112 Fla. 391, 150 So. 598 (1933). See also Hammond v. Carlyon, 96 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla.1957) (while basing a judgment upon a view of the premises was error, it was not reversible error, provided there was evidence of r......
  • Edmondson v. Green
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 4, 1999
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