Hammond v. Department for Human Resources Bureau for Social Ins., 82-CA-848-MR

Decision Date04 March 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-CA-848-MR,82-CA-848-MR
Citation652 S.W.2d 91
PartiesBarbara F. HAMMOND, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT FOR HUMAN RESOURCES BUREAU FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE, Appellee.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

F. Larkin Fore, Louisville, for appellant.

Paul F. Fauri, Gen. Counsel, James F. Perkins, Atty., Dennis McKiernan, Atty., Dept. for Human Resources, Frankfort, for appellee.

Before WHITE, HOWERTON and McDONALD, JJ.

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

WHITE, Judge.

This is an appeal from the Franklin Circuit Court's judgment affirming the Department for Human Resources and the State Personnel Board's discharging the appellant.

The appellant contends that the Circuit Court erred in not finding that the decision of the State Personnel Board upholding the dismissal is not supported by substantial evidence and is not supported by law.

The appellee, Department for Human Resources, has challenged this appeal by a Motion to Dismiss because of the appellant's failure to join as an appellee the State Personnel Board as a necessary party.

We will first address this procedural question. The appellant contends that although KRS 18.272(3) [now 18A.100] provides for the joining of the State Personnel Board as a party to the appeal from the Board's ruling to the Circuit Court, that the provisions of subsection (7) of such statute regarding further appeals to this Court from the Circuit Court do not mandate that the Personnel Board is a necessary party.

This is not a new question; it has been held that in workers' compensation cases the Workers' Compensation Board is a necessary party in all appeals to the Circuit Court and the appellate Court. See Milligan v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., Ky.App., 584 S.W.2d 751 (1979). Appellant contends that in workers' compensation cases the statute there requires joinder of that Board while here it does not. We cannot agree with that contention.

KRS 342.285 provides in subsection (1) concerning appeal to the Circuit Court that "... the board and the adverse party be[ing] made respondents. The board shall be named respondent as the workmen's compensation board, and service shall be had on the director." Correspondingly, in cases on appeal to the Circuit Court from hearings before the State Personnel Board KRS 18.272 [now 18A.100] in subsection (3) states: "The board, the employe, and the appointing authority [here Department for Human Resources] shall be necessary parties to such appeals." Thus, by comparison we see that in appeals to the Circuit Court both of the statutes require the respective boards to be made parties.

It is argued here that although the Workers' Compensation Board has been held to be a necessary party in further appeals, the Personnel Board is not. However, we cannot help but note that insofar as the applicable statute in workers' compensation cases relating to further appeal did not mandate joining the Workers' Compensation Board as a party, the courts have held it is a necessary party. Milligan, supra, citing Scott Brothers Logging and Lumber Co. v. Cobb, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 241 (1971).

KRS 342.290, in dealing with appeals beyond the Circuit Court, makes no positive statement about who shall be named as parties. In fact, after asserting that the judgment of the Circuit Court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals, it goes on in subsection (2) simply to state: "The procedure as to appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil actions ...." Again by comparison, KRS 18.272(7)...

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12 cases
  • Mcbrearty v. Kentucky Commu. Tech. College
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • August 22, 2008
    ...in the circuit court if the judgment were reversed. Land v. Salem Bank, 279 Ky. 449, 130 S.W.2d 818 (1939); Hammond v. Department for Human Resources, 652 S.W.2d 91 (Ky.App.1983). We agree with KCTCS that the individual defendants are indispensable parties, as a remand back to the trial cou......
  • Fournier v. City of Lawrenceburg, No. 2007-CA-000490-MR (Ky. App. 4/11/2008)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 2008
    ...in the circuit court if the judgment were reversed. Land v. Salem Bank, 279 Ky. 449, 130 S.W.2d 818 (1939); Hammond v. Department For Human Resources, 652 S.W.2d 91 (Ky.App. 1983). In the case at bar, Fournier only named the City of Lawrenceburg as an appellee; therefore, the Court of Appea......
  • Sublett v. Staniford, No. 2008-CA-000812-MR (Ky. App. 11/7/2008)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • November 7, 2008
    ...Land v. Salem Bank, 279 Ky. 449, 453, 130 S.W.2d 818, 821 (1939); Murphy v. O'Reiley, 78 Ky. 263, 264 (1880); Hammond v. Dep't for Human Res., 652 S.W.2d 91 (Ky.App. 1983). Here, Staniford was merely the investigating officer. This matter became final as to any other possible parties, such ......
  • Flint v. Stilger, No. 2009-CA-000475-MR (Ky. App. 1/22/2010)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • January 22, 2010
    ...court if the judgment were reversed. Land v. Salem Bank, 279 Ky. 449, 130 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1939); Hammond v. Department for Human Resources Bureau for Social Ins., 652 S.W.2d 91 (Ky.App. 1983). Flint's usage of "Jane and John Does" is certainly tantamount to the usage of "et al" in CR 73.03.......
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