Hammond v. Kunard
| Decision Date | 22 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1331.,94-1331. |
| Citation | 889 F. Supp. 1084 |
| Parties | Travis S. HAMMOND, Plaintiff, v. Randall KUNARD, Bruce Harmening and Lawrence Wait, Officers and Agents of the United States Marshal Service, Internal Revenue Service and Adjunct Officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Their Official Capacities, and Tom Clayton, Bill Clayton, and Jim Clayton, Surviving Heirs of Velma A. Clayton, Deceased, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
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John H. Bisbee, Macomb, IL, for plaintiff.
James A. Lewis, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Terrence J. Corrigan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Springfield, IL, for Randall Kunard, Bruce Harmening and Lawrence Wait.
Jim D. Lucie, Macomb, IL, for Tom, Bill and Jim Clayton.
This matter comes before the Court on Mr. Hammond's Complaint 1, filed August 11, 1994, the Notice of Removal 3, filed on August 16, 1994, the First Amended Complaint 5, filed August 19, 1994, and the Amended Notice of Removal 12, filed September 19, 1994. The Defendants, Tom Clayton, Bill Clayton, and Jim Clayton, (hereinafter "the Claytons") filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & (6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and an Objection to the Notice of Removal 13. For the reasons set forth herein, the Claytons' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the foreclosure action is REMANDED to Illinois Circuit Court, Schuyler County.
On January 30, 1986, Travis Hammond and Dwight Bookout signed an Installment Agreement to purchase a 329-acre farm located in Schuyler County, Illinois. (First Amend.Complaint, Exhibit C at 1). At some point, Mr. Hammond became the sole owner of the property by purchasing Mr. Bookout's undivided interest in the farm. (First Amend.Complaint, Exhibit C at 3).
On December 18, 1991, Mr. Hammond was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with conspiracy to deliver marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Mr. Hammond's Notice of Removal indicates that the indictment was amended on March 17, 1993, to include counts of illegal manufacture of marijuana and money laundering. (Notice of Removal at 1-2). Subsequently, the United States allegedly seized the property, although the Claytons contend Mr. Hammond has been in possession of the property at all times since the purchase in 1986. (Obj. to Notice of Removal at 2). Nevertheless, the Government instituted a forfeiture action against Mr. Hammond's farm in Case No. 92-3305, United States v. Real Property, filed in the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division, on November 17, 1992. (Notice of Removal at 2). Plaintiff alleges the Government's forfeiture action was a purposeful and knowing violation of his constitutional rights and, therefore, not supported by probable cause to believe the real estate was used or intended to be used as an instrumentality in violation of federal narcotics laws. (First Amend.Complaint at 11-13).
The Claytons filed a foreclosure action in the Illinois Circuit Court, Schuyler County, No. 93-CH-3, on May 17, 1993, as Mr. Hammond was in default and arrears totaling $21,036.45 as of May 1, 1993. (First Amend.Complaint, Exhibit C at 3).1 The Claytons' foreclosure action was removed to federal court on or about June 17, 1993 and became civil action No. 93-3149. This action and the federal forfeiture action, No. 92-3305, were stayed pending resolution of the criminal charges against Mr. Hammond.
After the trial on the three-count indictment, a jury acquitted Mr. Hammond of the counts of illegal manufacture and money laundering. (First Amend.Complaint at 13). The court declared a mistrial as to the conspiracy to deliver marijuana count. Id. On July 12, 1994, the District Court, Springfield Division, dismissed the federal forfeiture action, No. 92-3305, pursuant to the Government's motion. Id. The Schuyler County foreclosure action was remanded to state court, effective August 12, 1994. A mere four days later, on August 16, 1994, Mr. Hammond filed a Notice of Removal of this same action, No. 93-CH-3, in this Court.
In Mr. Hammond's Notice of Removal and First Amended Complaint, he alleges, in short, that he was prevented from making payments under the real estate installment agreement because of the unconstitutional actions of Government agents Harmening, Kunard, and Wait. Plaintiff asserts that the indictment and subsequent prosecution were false and malicious, and he argues that the seizure of the farm and the filing of the forfeiture suit occurred under objectively unreasonable and fraudulent circumstances.
In Count I of his First Amended Complaint, Mr. Hammond asserts that "as a direct and proximate result of defendants subjecting plaintiff to a deprivation of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments to the United States Constitution ..." he was (1) forced to defend himself against false and malicious charges to the tune of $150,000; (2) deprived of liberty, as the conditions of his bond required that he report to the United States Probation Office on a monthly basis and submit urine samples; (3) deprived of property, namely the farm in Schuyler County, without notice or a pre-termination hearing; and (4) injured to the extent that "public disgrace and scandal among his neighbors ..." has irreparably damaged his reputation in the community. Plaintiff argues that under the logic of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), Defendants Harmening, Kunard, and Wait are liable to him for general and special damages, according to proof, and punitive damages in the amount of $2,000,000.
Count II of the First Amended Complaint alleges that the Claytons are necessary parties to the Bivens action against Defendants Harmening, Kunard and Wait, as any liability owed to the Claytons by Mr. Hammond should be borne by the federal agents. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that as a result of having to raise money to defend himself against the "false and malicious criminal charges," he was left unable to make the payments under the installment contract. (First Amend.Complaint at 18). Additionally, he asserts that it would have been "objectively unreasonable" for him to continue to pay on the agreement as the federal agents had "disseized" him of his ownership interest. Id. Mr. Hammond prays that, if he is found liable in default to the Claytons, the Court order Defendants Harmening, Kunard, and Wait to fully indemnify any obligations to the Claytons.
The crux of this matter is whether this Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the parties. It is clear that if this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Claytons, their Motion to Dismiss must be granted and the case remanded to state court. If, on the other hand, the state foreclosure action is within the Supplemental Jurisdiction of federal court, the Motion to Dismiss must be denied, and the case will continue in this Court.
In his Notice of Removal, Count II of First Amended Complaint, Amended Notice of Removal, and Memorandum in Response to the Claytons' Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Hammond asserts a variety of grounds to support this Court's jurisdiction over the Claytons' foreclosure action, including 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as interpreted by Bivens, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and F.R.Civ.P. 19.
The Claytons argue, on the other hand, that they are not necessary parties, as Count II names them "for the sole purpose of their indemnification" by Defendants Harmening, Kunard, and Wait. (Motion to Dismiss at 1). The Claytons assert that if Mr. Hammond is found liable to them for the defaulted real estate contract, he could be compensated by damages assessed against the federal agent defendants, presumptively in the event the Government agents are found liable in a separate Bivens action. The Claytons argue that removing this action to federal court places their ability to collect on the debt in jeopardy. They also submit that a bifurcation of the proceedings will allow them to collect on the debt owed in a more timely manner. Finally, the Claytons submit that the subject matter of their state foreclosure action is outside the jurisdiction of this Court as no legal claims between the Claytons and the federal agents exist to give rise to a right of indemnification against the government agents.
In determining whether the Claytons' state action can be brought before this Court, it is necessary to closely scrutinize any exercise of jurisdiction. As the Seventh Circuit held in Krueger v. Cartwright, the federal courts "... are obliged to police the constitutional and statutory limits on their subject-matter jurisdiction." 996 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1986)). There is no doubt that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only that power granted by the Constitution or authorized by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)). The long-standing presumption against jurisdiction was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Turner v. President of Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799). Accord Grace v. American Central Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 109 U.S. 278, 283, 3 S.Ct. 207, 210, 27 L.Ed. 932 (1883); Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.1982) () (citations omitted). The burden of establishing jurisdiction lies with the party asserting federal jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 182-183, 56 S.Ct. 780, 782, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908,...
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