Hammond v. United of Oakland, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 121694 |
| Citation | 193 Mich.App. 146,483 N.W.2d 652 |
| Parties | John HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED OF OAKLAND, INC., d/b/a Tribune/United Cable of Oakland County, and d/b/a United Cable Television of Oakland County; and Tribune Company Cable of Michigan, Inc., d/b/a Tribune/United Cable of Oakland County and d/b/a United Cable Television of Oakland County and d/b/a Independence Cable TV Company; and United Cable Television of Oakland County, Ltd., a limited partnership, d/b/a Tribune/United Cable of Oakland County and d/b/a United Cable Television of Oakland County, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants. 193 Mich.App. 146, 483 N.W.2d 652, 7 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 908 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[193 MICHAPP 147] Alan R. Miller, P.C. by Stephen B. Foley, Birmingham, for plaintiff-appellee.
Keywell & Rosenfeld by Gary W. Klotz, Troy, for defendants-appellants.
Before JANSEN, P.J., and SULLIVAN and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ.
This is a wrongful discharge case between plaintiff, John Hammond, and his former employers, defendants United Cable Television of Oakland County and others. Defendants appeal by leave granted from a circuit court order granting in part and denying in part their motion for summary disposition.
Defendants argue on appeal that plaintiff is precluded from bringing a breach of contract action, because he failed to tender back severance benefits he received upon resigning. They further contend that the trial court erred in finding a factual issue existed over whether plaintiff was constructively discharged. Lastly, defendants argue error in the court's recognition of a cause of action for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff was employed by defendants from February, 1983 to April, 1986. At the time he left, plaintiff was manager of programming services.
Plaintiff alleged that, when he was hired, Jim Anderson, defendants' then-general manager, promised him that he would be a long-term employee; he would have a position with defendants as long as he did a good job. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants' employee handbook established a [193 MICHAPP 148] policy under which he could be discharged only for just cause.
In October, 1985, Anderson was replaced by a new general manager, John Gash. Gash dismissed several managers hired by Anderson. On April 20, 1986, after hearing rumors that Gash might fire him, plaintiff asked Gash if his job was secure. According to plaintiff, Gash assured him that, because his performance was good, he would not be discharged.
However, the next day, Gash called plaintiff into his office and advised him that his position was being eliminated. Plaintiff alleged that Gash coerced him into signing a resignation document by "brandishing a knife." Plaintiff further alleged that, after he resigned, his position was not eliminated; other individuals later served as manager of programming services.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging multiple theories of liability including: breach of contract; breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; constructive discharge; discharge in violation of public policy; negligent discharge; fraud; and retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition except for the claims of breach of contract, constructive discharge and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). With respect to the good faith and fair dealing theory, the court explained:
[A]lthough Defendant cites numerous cases holding that Michigan does not recognize such a cause of action, all those cases refer to at will employment.
Thus, if Plaintiff can prove at trial that his employment was a just cause situation, he may also establish a breach of covenant of good faith and breach in the contract.
[193 MICHAPP 149] On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court should have dismissed all of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has not filed a cross appeal, and therefore review of the decision regarding those claims which were dismissed is not before us.
Defendants assert that plaintiff's breach of contract claim should have been dismissed; plaintiff failed to rescind his resignation by tendering back the severance pay and benefits he received as consideration. We disagree.
If an employee, upon leaving a job, releases his employer from liability in exchange for consideration, he must tender back the consideration before suing the employer. Stefanac v. Cranbrook Educational Community (After Remand ), 435 Mich. 155, 163, 458 N.W.2d 56 (1990); Leahan v. Stroh Brewery Co., 420 Mich. 108, 112, 359 N.W.2d 524 (1984). The employee must place the employer in the position it was in prior to the settlement. Stefanac, 435 Mich. at 164, 458 N.W.2d 56 (quoting Kirl v. Zinner, 274 Mich. 331, 334-335, 264 N.W. 391 (1936)). A plaintiff is not entitled to retain the benefit of an agreement and at the same time bring suit in contravention of it. Id., 435 Mich. at 177, 458 N.W.2d 56.
For example, in Stefanac, the plaintiff signed a release stating that in exchange for two weeks' severance pay, she would
fully and forever release, acquit and discharge Cranbrook, its agents, servants and representatives of and from any and all claims, demands, actions and causes of action of every kind, nature and description which Stefanac may have had, may now have or may hereafter have of any matter, cause, act or omission arising out of or in connection with Stefanac's employment with and/or resignation from Cranbrook. [Id. at 160, 458 N.W.2d 56.]
[193 MICHAPP 150] Since Stefanac did not tender back the severance pay prior to, or simultaneous with, the filing of her lawsuit, our Supreme Court held that her complaint was properly dismissed. Id. at 176-178, 458 N.W.2d 56. The other cases on which defendants rely contained similar settlement agreements releasing the employer from liability. See, e.g., Leahan, supra, 420 Mich. at 111, 359 N.W.2d 524; Davis v. Bronson Methodist Hosp., 159 Mich.App. 251, 406 N.W.2d 201 (1986).
In the instant case, the document that plaintiff signed on his last day of work did not release defendants from liability. It simply provided that plaintiff was submitting his resignation and that he understood that he would receive two months' severance pay plus extended insurance benefits. It stated:
I, John Hammond, hereby submit my resignation from United Cable Television of Oakland County, effective immediately.
I understand that I will receive two months severance pay....
Additionally, I understand that my insurance benefits will expire on June 30, 1986.
Since there was no provision in the document releasing defendants from a potential lawsuit, there was no requirement that plaintiff tender back the severance pay before filing a lawsuit. Defendants do not contend that the money was paid in exchange for an agreement that plaintiff not sue. Therefore, defendants remain in the position they were in prior to the signing of the document. Stefanac, 435 Mich. at 164, 458 N.W.2d 56. Furthermore, plaintiff is not bringing an action in contravention of the document; he never agreed not to sue. Stefanac at 177, 458 N.W.2d 56.
[193 MICHAPP 151] We also reject defendants' contention that the trial court erred in finding that a genuine issue of fact remained over whether plaintiff was constructively discharged. A constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation. Mourad v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 186 Mich.App. 715, 721, 465 N.W.2d 395 (1991).
In the instant case, plaintiff presented an affidavit stating that, at the time Gash fired him, Gash "was agitated and brandishing a knife and told me that I had no choice but to sign the [resignation] document." He further alleged that his resignation was not voluntary. Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a juror could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was forced to resign. MCR 2.116(C)(10); Farm Bureau Mutual...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bank of Am., NA v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co.
...effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract." Hammond v. United of Oakland, Inc., 193 Mich.App. 146, 151–152, 483 N.W.2d 652 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "However, Michigan does not recognize a cause of action for bre......
-
Walters v. PRIDE AMBULANCE CO.
...(quoting Mourad v. Auto. Club Ins. Ass'n, 186 Mich.App. 715, 721, 465 N.W.2d 395 (1991)); see also Hammond v. United of Oakland, Inc., 193 Mich.App. 146, 151, 483 N.W.2d 652, 654 (1992) (citing Mourad). Under the third element of a prima facie case, Michigan courts, starting with Kaufman & ......
-
Appalachian Railcar Services v. Boatright Enter.
...in every contract.'" People v. Vanreyendam, 2007 WL 1201832, *2 (Mich.App. Apr. 24, 2007) (quoting Hammond v. United of Oakland, Inc., 193 Mich.App. 146, 483 N.W.2d 652, 655 (1992)), app. denied, 480 Mich. 889, 738 N.W.2d 730 (2007). The covenant is a promise that "neither party shall do an......
-
City of Midland v. O'Bryant
...590 A.2d 152, 156 (Me. 1991); Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1076-77 (Md. App. 1991); Hammond v. United of Oakland, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. App. 1992); Michaelson v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 181 (Minn. App. 1991); Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So.......