Hampton v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 17 June 2019
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:16-CV-973-ECM-WC
• Parties: LAWRENCE HAMPTON, #197002, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN BALDWIN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

LAWRENCE HAMPTON, #197002, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN BALDWIN, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 2:16-CV-973-ECM-WC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

June 17, 2019

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Lawrence Hampton ("Hampton"), a state inmate, alleging violations of his constitutional rights at Draper Correctional Facility ("Draper") in December of 2016. The defendants remaining in this case are Warden Edward Ellington ("Warden Ellington"), Captain Jeffery Baldwin ("Captain Baldwin"), and Officer Clifton Sanders ("Officer Sanders"), correctional officials working at Draper on the date of the incident (collectively "the correctional defendants"), and Nurse Michelle Sagers-Copeland ("Nurse Sagers-Copeland").

In the complaint and amendments thereto, Hampton challenges the constitutionality of force used against him by Officer Sanders on December 13, 2016 at Draper during a shakedown by members of the Certified Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the failure of Captain Baldwin to protect him from this use of force. He also alleges Warden Ellington acted with deliberate indifference to his health by delaying his transfer to the healthcare unit for medical treatment for his injuries. Finally, Hampton complains Nurse Sagers-Copeland, the Health Services Administrator, provided inadequate medical treatment and denied him access to treatment for injuries suffered due to the challenged use of force.¹ Hampton seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, i.e., that the court order CERT members to utilize a camera or be equipped with full body cameras any time they are deployed, and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 4.

The defendants filed answers, special reports, supplemental special reports and supporting evidentiary materials, including affidavits, prison reports and medical records, addressing Hampton's claims for relief. In these documents, the defendants deny they acted in violation of Hampton's constitutional rights. After receipt of all the defendants' reports, the court issued an order directing Hampton to file a response to the reports, including affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. Doc. 144 at 2. The order specifically cautioned Hampton that "unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a . . . motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law." Doc. 145 at 3. Pursuant tothis order, the court deems it appropriate to treat the special reports and supplemental special reports filed by the correctional and medical defendants as motions for summary judgment.

Upon consideration of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint, and Hampton's affidavit in response to the special report, the court concludes that the correctional defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Hampton's allegations of excessive force and deliberate indifference to health and safety lodged against Captain Baldwin and Officer Sanders in their individual capacities is due to be denied. The motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining claims against the correctional defendants, including the deliberate indifference claim against Warden Ellington, is due to be granted. In addition, the motion for summary judgment as to the claims against the medical defendant, Nurse Sagers-Copeland, is due to be granted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for itsmotion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (holding that court "must examine the record to see whether the [party moving for summary judgment], in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits and the like, has demonstrated the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact, and his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that moving party discharges his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial).

At this juncture, the court "must determine whether [the plaintiff], who bears the burden of persuasion has by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 . . . set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute of material fact] for trial." Beard, 521 U.S. at 529 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (holding that, once a moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty ofperjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when a party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor such that summary judgment is not warranted. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question." Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011). "[T]he judge's function [when addressing summary judgment motion] is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine [dispute] for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

However, at the summary judgment stage, the law requires that this court accept as true "statements in [the plaintiff's] verified complaint, sworn response to the officers' motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit attached to that response[.]" Sears v. Roberts, 2019 WL 1785355, *3 (11th Cir. April 24, 2019); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (holding that when deciding whether to grant summary judgment a court must draw "all justifiable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor."). "That [a plaintiff's] evidence consistsmainly of his own testimony in his verified complaint, sworn response, and sworn affidavit does not preclude a finding that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. 'As a general principle, a plaintiff's testimony cannot be discounted on summary judgment unless it is blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law, meaning it relates facts that could not have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature.'" Sears, 2019 WL 1785355 at *5 (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013)). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a direct contradiction occurs where a videotape of the incident at issue clearly contradicts the plaintiff's version of events. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-79 (2007).

The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After this review, the court finds that Hampton, through the submission of his sworn complaint, affidavits in response to the defendants' special reports, and sworn response has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment on his claims of excessive force presented against in their individual capacities.² However, the correctional defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the remaining claims for monetary damages in their official capacities and the request for injunctive relief. Finally, Nurse Sagers-Copeland and...