Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 February 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:09–cv–2032–T–30MAP.
• Citation: 764 F.Supp.2d 1297
• Parties: Dorothy HALL and William Hall, Plaintiffs,v.SUNJOY INDUSTRIES GROUP, INC. and Kmart Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

764 F.Supp.2d 1297

Dorothy HALL and William Hall, Plaintiffs,

v.SUNJOY INDUSTRIES GROUP, INC. and Kmart Corporation, Defendants.

Case No. 8:09–cv–2032–T–30MAP.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida,Tampa Division.

Feb. 18, 2011.

Daniel F. Pilka, Pilka & Associates, PA, Brandon, FL, for Plaintiffs.William F. Jung, Jung & Sisco, PA, Michael L. Forte, Westley Frank Lockwood, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, PA, Tampa, FL, Hillary Jacey Kaps, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

JAMES S. MOODY, JR., District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Sunjoy Industries Group, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 34), Defendants' Dispositive Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37), Plaintiffs' Motion to Establish Rebuttal [sic] Presumption of Negligence (Dkt. 38), and Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss All Claims against Defendant Sunjoy Industries, Group, Inc. without Prejudice (Dkt. 40). The Court, having considered the motions, responses, and record evidence, concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law, and Plaintiffs' motions, requesting a rebuttable presumption of negligence and dismissal, without prejudice, of Defendant Sunjoy Industries Group, Inc., must be denied.

BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff Dorothy Hall, was injured in Defendant Kmart Corporation's (“Kmart”) store when she sat on a metal patio chair allegedly manufactured or distributed by Defendant Sunjoy Industries Group, Inc. (“Sunjoy”), and the chair collapsed. Plaintiff weighed approximately 350–360 pounds at the time of the incident. According to Plaintiff, the chair collapsed and she landed flat on her back. Plaintiff claims that the fall caused various injuries, including a painful back condition.

Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against Defendants as follows: Count I—strict liability against both Defendants for a manufacturing defect; Count II—negligence against both Defendants for failing to test and inspect the chair; Count III— res ipsa loquitur against Kmart for displaying the chair; and Count IV—negligent failure to warn against both Defendants for not affixing a warning label to the chair. Her husband asserted a loss of consortium claim.

Sunjoy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not manufacture or distribute the chair. Sunjoy and Kmart filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment based on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, i.e., that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a strict liability or failure to warn claim as a matter of law. Defendants also filed a joint motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice based on Plaintiffs' dishonesty during their depositions.¹

After Sunjoy filed its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss all claims against Sunjoy without prejudice. Plaintiffs claim the dismissal motion was in response to Sunjoy's Rule 11 Motion, which it served on Plaintiffs in compliance with the 21–day waiting period, and which was premised on the fact that it was neither a manufacturer nor distributor of the chair.

Plaintiffs also filed a motion to establish a rebuttable presumption of negligence based on the fact that the chair was not preserved.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).

This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir.1990). “[I]f factual issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). A dispute about a material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir.1990). However, there must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question. Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir.1989).

II. Sunjoy's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs' claims against Sunjoy (Counts I, II, and IV) fail as a matter of law because the record is undisputed that it did not design, manufacture, or distribute the chair. This point is well-established under Florida law. Mahl v. Dade Pipe & Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 546 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (defendant could not be held liable where plaintiff could not prove that defendant's products caused his injuries); Vecta Contract, Inc. v. Lynch, 444 So.2d 1093, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (reversing jury verdict where plaintiff “did not offer sufficient evidence that defendant manufactured the defective chair” that caused plaintiff's injuries); Matthews v. GSP Corp., 368 So.2d 391, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (defendant could not be held liable where “[a]ppellant failed to present evidence showing the identity of the manufacturer of the cable which broke”).

Plaintiffs concede the fact that Sunjoy did not design, manufacture, or distribute the chair, but appear to attempt to avoid Sunjoy's summary judgment motion by filing a motion to dismiss Sunjoy without prejudice. But Plaintiffs enjoy no absolute right to dismiss an action without prejudice. And the decision to grant or deny such a motion is within the Court's broad discretion. McBride v. JLG Indus., Inc., 189 Fed.Appx. 876, 878 (11th Cir.2006); Mosley v. JLG Indus., Inc., 189 Fed.Appx. 874, 876 (11th Cir.2006). Where the parties have expended considerable resources to fully develop a case, a court may infer that a plaintiff seeks a voluntary dismissal solely to avoid a pending motion for summary judgment. Under these circumstances, a court generally denies a motion for voluntary dismissal. McBride, 189 Fed.Appx. at 878; Mosley, 189 Fed.Appx. at 876.

Here, it would be inappropriate to grant Plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal given the time that passed since this case was filed, Sunjoy's extensive participation in discovery, which included hiring experts, and, in consideration of the fact that Plaintiffs filed the motion for dismissal after Sunjoy moved for summary judgment and after Sunjoy served (but not filed) a Rule 11 motion.

Accordingly, Sunjoy's motion for summary judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal of Sunjoy without prejudice is denied.

III. Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants jointly move for summary judgment on the entirety of Plaintiffs' complaint.² As stated below, the Court concludes that Defendant Kmart is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. And, assuming, arguendo, that Defendant Sunjoy did manufacture or distribute the chair, it is also entitled to summary judgment for the same reasons.

Count I

Count I is a strict liability claim for a manufacturing defect. To prevail on such a claim, Plaintiffs must establish a defect in the subject product, i.e., the chair. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 87 (Fla.1976). And expert testimony is necessary to establish the existence of a latent defect. See Humphreys v. Gen. Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822 (N.D.Fla.1993).

The record is undisputed that the chair exhibited no obvious problems or defects. Accordingly, expert testimony is necessary. However, Plaintiffs did not present any expert testimony on this issue. And the record reflects that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a Cassisi inference of a defect. According to Cassisi, if a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference arises that the product was defective in manufacture under strict liability both at the time of the injury and at the time it was within the supplier's control. Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So.2d 1140, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). There are two essential predicate facts for the inference to apply: (1) a malfunction (2) during normal operation. Id. at 1151.

Here, the record indicates that Plaintiffs cannot prove the chair malfunctioned. As explained above, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of any defect in the chair. While the chair may have broken after Plaintiff sat on it, this does not automatically mean the chair “malfunctioned.” To establish that the chair malfunctioned, Plaintiffs must present evidence, through expert testimony, that it did not perform properly under the circumstances. See Edic v. Century Prods. Co.,...