Hampton v. City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois

Decision Date03 February 1972
Docket Number70 C 2371,70 C 3026,70 C 3029.,No. 70 C 1384,70 C 1384
Citation339 F. Supp. 695
PartiesIberia HAMPTON, Administratrix on behalf of the Estate of Fred A. Hampton, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants. Fannie Mae CLARK, Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Clark, deceased, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants. Verlina BREWER, by her next friend, William R. Brewer, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants. Deborah JOHNSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Dennis Cunningham, Francis E. Andrew, Jeffrey Haas, Jonathan M. Hyman, Kermit Coleman, Cornelius E. Toole, James D. Montgomery, Chicago, Ill., David Scribner, New York City, William J. Bender, Newark, N. J., Arthur Kinoy, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Richard L. Curry, Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago, and Benjamin E. Novoselsky, John V. Virgilio, Michael S. Jordan, Asst. Corp. Counsels, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., of Cook County, Ill., and Vincent Bentivenga, Nicholas Trovato, Gerald Mannix, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

PERRY, District Judge.

On October 22, 1971, cases numbered 70 C 1384, 70 C 2371, 70 C 3026 and 70 C 3029 were by agreement and order of this court consolidated. Said cases were ordered to proceed for all purposes thereafter under case numbered 70 C 1384.

These suits are civil actions for damages. Plaintiffs allege defendants committed acts under color of law which deprived plaintiffs of their rights, privileges and immunities as guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.

All four actions grow out of a "raid" by certain Chicago policemen (assigned as State's Attorney's Police) at an apartment located at 2337 W. Monroe Street in Chicago, Illinois, occupied by members of the Black Panther Party, and out of the aftermath of that raid. Plaintiffs allege certain of the defendants herein illegally entered said apartment on December 4, 1969 and assaulted them with deadly weapons, killing Fred Hampton in the presence of plaintiff Deborah Johnson, killing Mark Clark, and causing serious bodily harm to Verlina Brewer, Ronald Satchel, Blair Anderson and Brenda Harris. Plaintiffs Brewer, Johnson, Satchel, Anderson, Harris, Harold Bell and Louis Trueluck further charge they were illegally arrested, falsely imprisoned and prosecuted wrongfully and maliciously. Sued are the Chicago police officers who participated in the raid; certain other police officers assigned to the Crime Laboratory and Internal Inspections Division of the Chicago Police Department; the State's Attorney of Cook County and three Assistant State's Attorneys; the City of Chicago as employer of the police officers; the County of Cook as employer of the state's attorneys; the Mayor of the City of Chicago, and the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department.

The allegations made in these four suits are voluminous, and the court in this particular memorandum and order will not attempt here to set them forth in detail, nor further attempt to summarize them. The complaint in 70 C 1384 ("the Hampton case") covers 15 pages; in 70 C 2371 ("the Clark case"), 9 pages; in 70 C 3026 ("the Brewer case"), 42 pages; and in 70 C 3029 ("the case of Johnson, et al."), 68 pages.

Various defendants in the various cases have moved to dismiss the complaints wherein they are named for failure to state a cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. Other motions to extend time to plead and motions to stay discovery have been filed. Plaintiffs have responded to the various motions and defendants have made reply. Following consolidation of the actions, other motions were filed by defendants on November 17, 1971; and on December 15, 1971, plaintiffs filed further answer to various defendants' motions to dismiss in this consolidated cause.

The court has now reviewed the four complaints and has read and considered all the motions and all the briefs and/or memoranda of the parties in support of their respective positions. The court's memorandum and its orders follow:

As to the Motions to Strike and Dismiss of the City of Chicago:

The City of Chicago is a defendant in all four consolidated cases. Jurisdiction is alleged under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.) The City of Chicago is a municipal corporation and not a "person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Statute. It is now well established that an action for damages will not lie against a municipal corporation on these jurisdictional allegations. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States ex rel. Lee v. State of Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir., 1965); Fisher v. City of New York, 312 F.2d 890 (2nd Cir. 1963); Spiesel v. City of New York, 239 F.Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y., 1964); Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F.Supp. 754 (N.D.Cal., 1970).

The civil rights statutes are aimed at individuals who subject others to deprivation of their civil rights and personal involvement is contemplated. They are not aimed at the city which employs them. Plaintiffs seek to hold the city liable here for the acts of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The theory that a municipality is liable for the failure to properly train, discipline, supervise, etc. its employees has been advanced in numerous cases in this court and elsewhere. The theory has been struck down. Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F.Supp. 220 (D.Colorado, 1966); and in this court, Down v. Daley, 69 C 1789; Williams et al. v. Barnes et al., 69 C 1942; Sanberg v. Daley, Mayor of the City of Chicago et al., 306 F.Supp. 277. Additionally, governmental entities have defenses under Chapter 85, Ill.Rev. Stats. (1969).

All of the counts in all four complaints as they relate to the City of Chicago should be stricken and the City should be dismissed from all four suits as a party defendant. It is, therefore, Ordered that the City of Chicago be and it is hereby dismissed as a party defendant in this consolidated case.

As to the Motions to Strike and Dismiss of the County of Cook, Illinois:

As in the case of the City of Chicago, the county is not a "person" within the definition of the Civil Rights Act. Monroe v. Pape and other cases, supra, and Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 9th Cir., 393 F.2d 330.

Plaintiffs, likewise, seek to recover damages against the County of Cook under the doctrine of respondeat superior based upon the alleged negligent acts of the State's Attorney of Cook County and certain Assistant State's Attorneys. The Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stats.1969, Chap. 85, § 1-101 et seq.) affords the County, as a local public entity, immunity from civil liability because of the acts of its employees done in the execution or enforcement of any law or committed by employees serving in positions involving determination of policy or exercise of discretion. The acts alleged to have been committed by said employees were done in their capacities as persons serving in positions involving said policy and discretion. Fustin v. Board of Education of Community Unit District No. 2, 101 Ill.App.2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308; Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District No. 12, 102 Ill. App.2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780; Mills v. County of Winnebago, 104 Ill.App.2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65.

It is, therefore, Ordered that the County of Cook, Illinois be and it hereby is dismissed as a party defendant in the Hampton, Brewer and Johnson, et al. suits wherein it is named, and that the County of Cook be and it hereby is dismissed as a party defendant in this consolidated cause.

As to the Motions to Strike and Dismiss as to Richard J. Daley, Mayor of the City of Chicago, and James B. Conlisk, Jr., Superintendent of Police of the City of Chicago.

The Mayor of the City of Chicago and the City's Superintendent of Police are named as defendants in the Brewer and Johnson, et al. suits. These causes of action against these defendants cannot be maintained as they fail to state the personal, specific and factual involvement necessary to impose liability.

The civil rights statutes are premised on personal culpability, as aforesaid. The Mayor and Superintendent of Police are not charged here with any personal participation in the raid or direct infliction of injury on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek to hold them liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. There is a lack of specificity in the complaints as to the failure of said Mayor and Superintendent to train and supervise police employees and a lack of any showing that they had any immediate supervision, direction or control of the defendants executing the search warrant. To hold them liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior would be contrary to the law as decided in this District and elsewhere. Sanberg v. Richard J. Daley, Mayor of the City of Chicago, Down v. Daley and Salazar v. Dowd, all supra, and Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F.Supp. 731 (W.D.Mo., 1963).

The Mayor and the Superintendent of Police also are charged with conspiracy in allegations that there was a personal failure on their part to stop an alleged conspiracy they had the power to stop. This conclusory and general allegation is not well taken. Huey v. Barloga, 277 F.Supp. 864 (N.D.Ill., 1967).

In this court's opinion there is no showing of an act or an omission in dereliction of these defendants' public responsibility.

Accordingly, the motions of Richard J. Daley, Mayor of the City of Chicago, and James B. Conlisk, Superintendent, Chicago Police Department, to strike counts in the two complaints as to them are granted and it is Ordered that said defendants be and they hereby are...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Hampton v. Hanrahan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 12 de setembro de 1979
    ...of Fred Howard, one of the police officers, was suggested on the record and the cause was dismissed as to him.2 Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.Ill.1972).3 We summarized our action as follows:Insofar as the district court's order of February 3, 1972, dismissed the charges a......
  • Haugabrook v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 3 de agosto de 1982
    ...1981 cases as it is in section 1983 cases. 7 But see Boyden v. Troken, 358 F.Supp. 906, 907-08 (N.D.Ill.1973); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F.Supp. 695, 697 (N.D.Ill.1972), reversed on other grounds, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F.Supp. 277, 278 (N.D.Ill.1969)......
  • Delaney v. Dias
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 30 de junho de 1976
    ...(8th Cir. 1973); Love v. Davis, 353 F.Supp. 587, 592 (D.La.1972); Richardson v. Snow, 340 F.Supp. 1261 (D.Md.1972); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.Ill.1972), reversed and remanded on other grounds, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39......
  • Mathis v. Pratt, 73 C 67.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 17 de abril de 1974
    ...in civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ashenhurst v. Carey, 355 F.Supp. 1101 (N.D.Ill.1973); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.Ill.1972); Barrows v. Faulkner, et al., 327 F.Supp. 1190 (N.D.Okla.1971); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F.Supp. 277 (N.D.Ill.1969). Furthe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT