Hampton v. Director Of Revenue
| Decision Date | 18 July 2000 |
| Citation | 22 S.W.3d 217 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) . Roy Hampton, Respondent, v. Director of Revenue, Appellant. Case Number: WD57123 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Henry County, Hon. Wayne Patrick Strothmann
Counsel for Appellant: James Kelso Journey
Counsel for Respondent: Evan Joseph Buchheim
Opinion Summary:
Respondent Roy Hampton was arrested for driving while intoxicated and, pursuant to Section 302.505 RSMo. Cum. Supp. 1996, the Director of Revenue suspended his driving privileges. Mr. Hampton appealed that suspension. Following a trial at which the Director attempted to prove that Mr. Hampton was arrested upon probable cause to believe that he was driving while intoxicated, the trial court entered judgment for Mr. Hampton, finding that the State had failed to prove that he was in fact driving the car while intoxicated. The Director appeals, arguing that the uncontroverted evidence permitted only one conclusion -- that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that Mr. Hampton was driving while intoxicated, that he had a blood alcohol level above the legal limit, and that this Court should reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment for the Director.
AFFIRMED.
Division One holds: The evidence was sufficient for the court below to conclude that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that he was driving while intoxicated and to conclude that the state failed to prove at trial that he was, in fact, the driver of the automobile. The evidence supporting the court's ruling was that Mr. Hampton was not found in the truck but next to a porch 40 yards away, that he denied he had been driving the truck, that the police never asked whether it was his truck nor did they show at trial that it was registered to him, and that he said he had gone to talk with some friends but they had driven off. Based on this evidence, the court could have found that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Hampton was driving while intoxicated. Moreover, even had the evidence clearly showed probable cause, the State had to also show at trial that Mr. Hampton was in fact driving, for one cannot be convicted of driving while intoxicated if one was not actually the driver or operator of the vehicle, even if the officer wrongly believed at the time of arrest that one was the driver. The evidence supported the court's conclusion based on the facts set out above that Mr. Hampton was not shown to have been driving or operating the vehicle. For this reason, the judgment is affirmed.
Respondent Roy Hampton was arrested for driving while intoxicated and, pursuant to Section 302.505 RSMo. Cum. Supp. 1996, the Director suspended his driving privileges. Mr. Hampton appealed that suspension. Following a trial at which the Director attempted to prove that Mr. Hampton was arrested upon probable cause to believe that he was driving while intoxicated, the trial court entered judgment for Mr. Hampton. It found that, based on the circumstantial evidence before it, the Director had failed to prove that Mr. Hampton was the driver of the truck which the police found on the side of the road 40 yards from the porch where Mr. Hampton was standing, and, therefore, the Director had failed to make its case against Mr. Hampton. The Director appeals, arguing that the uncontroverted evidence permitted only one conclusion -- that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that Mr. Hampton was driving while intoxicated, that he had a blood alcohol level above the legal limit, and that we should reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment for the Director. Because we find that there was substantial evidence to support the court below's determination that the Director failed to meet its burden of proving that the officer had probable cause to believe that Mr. Hampton was driving the truck in question while intoxicated, or that he was in fact driving the truck at all, we affirm.
The facts adduced below, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, are as follows: On January 28, 1998, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Mark Pitts of the Windsor Police Department was on routine patrol when he noticed a red pick-up truck pull up behind him at the intersection of Tebo and Washington, in Windsor, Missouri. Officer Pitts kept driving on Tebo to the next intersection. As the officer began to make a left turn, he noticed the truck pull off to the side of the road. After completing the turn, the officer again proceeded to the next intersection, but waited there so he could look behind him to see whether the truck had pulled off the road because of alcohol use by the driver or because the driver was picking up someone at a nearby residence.
When the officer saw that the truck remained pulled off onto the side of the road, he went around the block and came back up Tebo and stopped next to the truck. He said that he lost sight of the vehicle for approximately 30 seconds as he went around the block. By the time he got back to the truck, there was no one in it. He got out of his patrol car and looked around, and saw Mr. Hampton just reaching the porch of a residence some 40 yards away from the pick-up truck. Not seeing anyone else in the area, the officer asked Mr. Hampton to come over and talk with him. Mr. Hampton did so.
Officer Pitts did not ask Mr. Hampton whether he lived in the house with the porch where the officer had first seen him, whether he was the owner of the truck, or whether he had been driving the truck. Instead, according to the officer's trial testimony:
I asked why he went in the ditch, if he was going to talk to somebody. Mr. Hampton said,
Mr. Hampton said nothing else indicating whether he had been driving the red truck in particular or whether it was his truck, and the officer had not seen another vehicle or pedestrian leaving the area of the red truck. But, believing Mr. Hampton had been driving the truck, smelling alcohol on Mr. Hampton and noticing his eyes were dilated, glassy, and bloodshot, Officer Pitts believed Mr. Hampton had been driving while intoxicated. He radioed for the assistance of Officer Monte Crain, who was certified to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Mr. Hampton failed the field sobriety tests administered by Officer Crain. At that point, the officers arrested him for driving while intoxicated and took him to the police station. At the station, the police completed an Alcohol Influence Report. As a part of that report, they for the first time asked Mr. Hampton whether he was operating the red pickup truck, and he answered "no." They gave him a breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol level of .15%.
Pursuant to Section 302.505 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1996, the Director of Revenue suspended Mr. Hampton's driving privileges. Subsequent to that revocation, on June 4, 1998, Mr. Hampton timely filed his Petition for Trial De Novo in the Circuit Court of Henry County. After the presentation of the Director's evidence, Mr. Hampton moved for judgment in his favor, arguing that the Director failed to meet his burden of showing that the officer had probable cause to believe that he was the driver of the vehicle, or that he was driving while intoxicated. Following consideration of the motion, the court entered judgment for Mr. Hampton, stating:
Well, if there--Quite honestly, Mr. Lashley, if there were any admissions that I felt had been made by the Petitioner, I'd look at it differently. But the only statement made by the Petitioner--and it was specifically outlined by the officer, and he agreed that exactly what the Petitioner said was--in response to the question, as I recall it--and I don't have the report in front of me--but, "Is the reason you drove off the road and into the ditch because you were going to stop and talk to someone?" And he said,
And I--You know, I think that that's a pretty vague admission in the face of the fact that he was some distance away from the vehicle. He had driven off and not come back for 30 seconds, which doesn't sound like very long, but I think we'll agree is more than enough time for somebody else to have been driving the vehicle. And I just--And then both officers agree that the Petitioner denied driving the vehicle when directly asked.
This appeal by the Director followed.
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless the trial court erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976); Endsley v. Director of Revenue, 6 S.W.3d 153, 161 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). If the evidence is uncontroverted or admitted, so that the real issue is a legal one as to the legal effect of the evidence, then we need not defer to the trial court's judgment, Kienzle v. Director of Revenue, 944 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997). But, where evidence is presented which, if believed, would support a finding in favor of one party, but contrary or inconsistent evidence is also presented, then it is up to the judge to resolve the factual issues, including determining the credibility of witnesses. So long as its determination is supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm, regardless whether we would have reached the same result. Endsley, 6 S.W.3d at 165, and cases cited.
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