Hampton v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 10 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. M2013-00864-COA-R3-CV,M2013-00864-COA-R3-CV
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals
• Parties: DAN HAMPTON v. MACON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

DAN HAMPTON v. MACON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

No. M2013-00864-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

November 19, 2013 Session

Filed January 10, 2014

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Macon County

No. 2012-cv-81

John D. Wooten, Judge

A school administrator filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that his employment was terminated in violation of both the Open Meetings Act and his contract of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant school board on the Open Meetings Act claims on the basis of laches, finding that the school administrator failed to bring his claim in a timely manner. The trial court also granted summary judgment as to the contract claim, finding that the school administrator could not prove damages. We reverse the trial court's ruling with regard to the school administrator's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Open Meetings Act, but affirm as to the remainder of the trial court's decision. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in

part; Reversed in part; and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., and DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined.

Fletcher W. Long and John E. Herbison, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dan Hampton.

Kenneth S. Williams, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Macon County Board of Education.

OPINION

I. Background

Plaintiff/Appellant Dan C. Hampton, who has worked in education since 1973, was employed by the Defendant/Appellee Macon County Board of Education ("the SchoolBoard") as Director of Schools. According to Mr. Hampton's contract with the School Board, executed on August 24, 2009, Mr. Hampton was employed for a fixed term from September 1, 2009 to June 30, 2011. Part of Mr. Hampton's job was to prepare the agenda for the School Board meetings, which are held on the second Thursday of every month.

On November 17, 2010, Mr. Hampton was informed by the Chairman of the School Board that a specially called meeting of the School Board was to be held on Friday, November 19, 2010. When asked, the Chairman allegedly refused to divulge the purpose of the meeting. The November 19 meeting occurred, with no written agenda, despite the fact that the preparation of a written agenda was the usual practice at the meetings. At the meeting, Mr. Hampton's employment was terminated by a vote of 4 to 1. According to the School Board's brief, the School Board voted to pay the remainder of Mr. Hampton's salary and benefits over the term of his employment contract, ending in June 2011. It is undisputed that Mr. Hampton received all salary and benefits under his contract of employment, notwithstanding the termination of his employment. According to Mr. Hampton, during his tenure with the School Board, he was never accused of criminal or professional misconduct. Also according to Mr. Hampton, the School Board gave no indication concerning the reason for the termination of his employment. The School Board then voted to rehire the School Board's prior Director of Schools, as the Interim Director, without publicly posting the vacancy in accordance with their usual custom.

According to Mr. Hampton's brief, after his employment was terminated, he diligently searched for replacement employment, but the fact that he was fired operated as a blemish on his record that prevented him from obtaining suitable full-time replacement employment. According to Mr. Hampton, he never had difficulty obtaining employment prior to his termination. Mr. Hampton's only work subsequent to his termination was that of a part-time consultant.

On January 24, 2012, Mr. Hampton filed a Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Damages, asserting that the Open Meetings Act had been violated, and that the School Board had breached Mr. Hampton's contract of employment. Specifically, the Complaint asked:

d) That the Court declare the actions of the [School Board] in its special [sic] called meeting of November 19, 2010 to be void and of no effect under Tenn[essee] Code Ann[otated] § 8-44-105.

e) That the Court order the [School Board] to reinstate Plaintiff in his employment as Director of Schools;

f) That the Court permanently enjoin members of the [SchoolBoard];

g) That he be awarded compensatory damages in an amount appropriate according to the proof in this cause;

h) That the costs of this action, including discretionary costs, be assessed against [the School Board]:

i) That he have further or general relief as may be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case.

On October 25, 2012, the School Board filed an answer, denying that Mr. Hampton was entitled to relief and specifically raising the defense of laches. Thereafter, on December 6, 2012, the School Board filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a statement of undisputed facts, affidavits, and exhibits. With regard to the Open Meetings Act claims, the School Board asserted that Mr. Hampton's action was barred by the doctrine of laches due to his delay in filing. The School Board further argued that there was no breach of contract because Mr. Hampton had been paid the full amount to which he was entitled under his employment contract. Finally, the School Board argued that as to any defamation or damage to reputation claims that may be fairly read from the Complaint, those actions sounded in tort and were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Mr. Hampton filed a response on February 19, 2013. With regard to the laches argument, Mr. Hampton asserted that he delayed filing his case because he believed that pending litigation would prevent him from obtaining replacement employment. In addition, Mr. Hampton stated that had he been able to obtain appropriate employment, he would not have felt the need to file his Complaint; however, because he was unable to obtain replacement employment, he filed his Complaint for damages and, essentially, to clear his name. After arguments of counsel, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to the School Board on March 7, 2013. Specifically, the trial court stated:

1. With regard to [Mr. Hampton's] claims of damage to reputation and for compensatory damages as set out in the Complaint[,] the Court finds that these claims sound in tort, and are barred by the provisions of the Governmental Tort Liability Act[,] as well as the statute of limitations applicable to damage to reputation claims.

2. Concerning [Mr. Hampton's] contract claim[], the Court finds that [Mr. Hampton] received all the benefits to which he was entitled, and so has failed to establish the existence of any damages which are an essential element of his contractual claims.

3. As to [Mr. Hampton's] Open Meetings Act violation claims, the Court further finds that [Mr. Hampton] accepted hiscontractual payments and waited quietly and without excuse, from the date of his termination until after his contract expired, without filing suit seeking to void any actions taken by the School Board in violation of the Open Meetings Act. The Court finds that laches applies under these facts, and that the plaintiff is equitably estopped from asserting violations of the Open Meetings Act.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the [School Board's] motion to be well taken and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the [School Board] as to all theories and claims, with costs to the [School Board] for which execution may issue. This is a final order.

From this order, Mr. Hampton now appeals.

II. Issues Presented

Mr. Hampton raises one issue for review, which is taken from his brief:

1. Whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to the Appellee where uncontested facts showed a violation of the Open Meetings Law by the Appellee Board of Education, in contravention of Mr. Hampton's contract of employment and that the Mr. Hampton has sustained damages resulting from such breach

However, as we perceive it, there are two issues in this case:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Mr. Hampton's claims under the Open Meetings Act?

2. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Mr. Hampton's contract claim?

We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Hampton's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Open Meetings Act on the basis of laches. However, we affirm summary judgment as to Mr. Hampton's request to be reinstated/returned to duty, as well as to Mr. Hampton's contract claim.

II. Standard of Review A trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law. Our review is therefore de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court's determination. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). This Court must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn. 2010).

When a motion for summary judgment is made, the moving party has the burden of showing that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. According to the Tennessee Legislature:

In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in Tennessee, the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail on its motion for summary judgment if it:

(1) Submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or

(2) Demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (effective on claims filed after July 1, 2011).

IV. Analysis

Open Meetings Act Claims

We begin first with Mr. Hampton's claims based on alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act. The Open...