Hamrick v. State ex rel. Hamrick

• Decision Date: 27 April 1893
• Docket Number: 16,812
• Citation: 34 N.E. 3,134 Ind. 324
• Parties: Hamrick v. The State, ex rel. Hamrick
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

34 N.E. 3

134 Ind. 324

Hamrick v. The State, ex rel. Hamrick

No. 16,812

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 27, 1893

From the Hendricks Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed, and the circuit court is directed to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial.

T. J Cofer, C. C. Hadley, W. N. Harding, A. R. Hovey and D. W Howe, for appellant.

G. W Brill and G. C. Harvey, for appellee.

OPINION

Hackney, J.

This appeal is from an adjudication that the appellant is of unsound mind and incapable of managing her estate. The proceeding in the circuit court was for the appointment of a guardian.

In the course of the trial the court permitted the following questions and answers of witnesses on behalf of the appellee:

"From your acquaintance with Mrs. Hamrick, and the facts you have related to the jury, state whether or not, in your opinion, she is, or is not, a person of unsound mind to that degree as to render her incapable of conducting the ordinary affairs of life, and render her subject to her own folly or the fraud of others? Ans. To that extent I will answer yes."

On the cross-examination by the appellee of a witness for appellant, this question and answer were permitted:

"I will ask you if you don't believe this woman is liable to be euchred out of her property by being imposed upon by her children or others, if she is left without any one to assist her in managing her property? Ans. I think such thing might be."

It is no longer an open question in this State, that a non-expert witness may express an opinion as to the soundness of mind of the person under inquest, but we have found no case in the reports of this State permitting the opinion of a witness upon the capacity of such person to conduct the ordinary affairs of life.

The issue in a case like this, under section 2545, R. S. 1881, is that the defendant is "of unsound mind and incapable of managing his own estate." Mere unsoundness of mind is not sufficient, but it must include, or be of that degree, that the subject is not capable of managing his estate.

The court has permitted these witnesses to state to the jury that, in the case of this subject, the degree of incapability required has been reached.

In permitting an opinion by a non-expert witness as to sanity or insanity, the rule is said to grow out of the necessity arising from an inability of the witness to describe the appearance, the action, the language, and the manner of the subject with such precision and minute detail as to possess the jury of all the knowledge of the witness, and thereby enable the jury to form that opinion instead of receiving the opinion of the witness. In this state it is so well and so often decided, as to need no citation of the cases, that this opinion of the witness must proceed from the facts and circumstances which the witness shall have given to the jury of his acquaintance with and observation of the subject, not including, of course, those observations not susceptible of description.

The ordinary affairs of life, and the capacity essential to transact them, are not subjects involving any rule of science or art. They are within the comprehension and common observation of that class of men who constitute the jury. They do not require a particular knowledge of the person whose capacity is under investigation. Whether that capacity exists or not is peculiarly a question for the jury. It is the very question to be passed upon by the jury. When the particular phases of unsoundness of mind, the special characteristics of the individual, are given, the jury must raise the standard, and determine whether the essential capacity exists. It would hardly be contended that the abstract question of what is sufficient mental capacity to transact the ordinary affairs of life, could be made the subject of testimony. Much less can it be made the subject of opinion evidence from those whose station in life and business occupations give them no better means of knowledge than the jurors possess. The character of the derangement being made known to the jury by the witnesses, it then becomes the privilege and the duty of the jury to determine whether that degree of capacity remains which is essential to the demands of the ordinary business affairs.

An opinion may not be given upon the point which it is the duty of the jury to determine. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Modesitt, 124 Ind. 212, 24 N.E. 986; Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464.

We would not be understood as holding that the opinion of the witness as to the unsoundness of mind may not be given; nor do we say that it is improper to inquire as to the form of insanity and the peculiarities of the derangement, but what we do say is that it is an issue in this case as to whether--from the form of insanity, or the peculiar characteristics of derangement, if any, under which this lady suffers--she is "incapable of managing her estate." We have said that this issue was for the jury, and that opinion evidence was not competent to go to the jury upon which to make a decision of this issue. The authorities sustain this view.

In Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550, a prosecution for murder, it was proposed to prove by a non-expert witness that the accused could not control his appetite for intoxicating liquor, the question of insanity being an issue. The court said: "It is not competent to ask a witness whether a man has capacity to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing. It is proper to inquire generally as to mental capacity, but it is not proper to inquire whether there is or is not capacity to do a specific act, as, for instance, to execute a will, make a contract, or commit a designated crime."

In Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207, 21 N.E. 911, involving testamentary capacity, the witness was called to prove that the testator, acting as an attorney, had tried a cause "well and shrewdly." The court rejected the offer, and this court said the action was not error, that "it called for the mere opinion of the witness. The witness was allowed to detail all that the deceased did in the management of the cause, and to give his opinion as to the condition of the testator's mind at that time. This was all the appellants were entitled to." See 2 Taylor on Ev., 1229; Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 13.

In Farrell's Admr. v. Brennan's Admx., 32 Mo. 328, the question asked was: "From your knowledge of him, would you think his mind sound enough to make a will?" The court said: "The question is objectionable as tending to elicit from the witness his opinion of the quantum of intelligence, or mental...