Yost v. Conroy

• Decision Date: 30 October 1883
• Docket Number: 9991
• Citation: 92 Ind. 464
• Parties: Yost et al. v. Conroy
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

92 Ind. 464

Yost et al. v. Conroy

No. 9991

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 30, 1883

Rehearing: January 5, 1884.

Petition for a Rehearing Overruled, Reported at: 92 Ind. 464 at 473.

From the Cass Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed.

D. C Justice, S. T. McConnell and R. Magee, for appellants.

M. Winfield and Q. A. Myers, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

There is much confusion and some conflict in our cases upon the subject of proving benefits and damages to land affected by the construction of ditches, turnpikes and ways, and this case requires an examination of that subject. In cases of confusion and conflict, the better way is to search for principle and adopt that view which stands most firmly on sound principle.

It is an elementary doctrine, that witnesses who are acquainted with the value of property may express an opinion as to the value. Thus far all is plain and free from doubt. AEtna L. Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347 (43 Am. R. 91); Bowen v. Bowen, 74 Ind. 470; Johnson v. Thompson, 72 Ind. 167 (37 Am. R. 152); Ferguson v. Stafford, 33 Ind. 162; Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30; Sinclair v. Roush, 14 Ind. 450; 1 Greenl. Ev. (13th ed.), section 440, n.; 1 Whart. Ev., section 447; Abbott Trial Ev. 310. The opinions of witnesses as to value are competent in prosecutions for crimes. Printz v. People, 42 Mich. 144; S. C., 36 Am. R. 437.

Opinions of witnesses as to the amount of benefits or damages sustained by a party are not competent. Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120; Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stringer, 10 Ind. 551; Mitchell v. Allison, 29 Ind. 43; Kirkpatrick v. Snyder, 33 Ind. 169; Bissell v. Wert, 35 Ind. 54; City of Logansport v. McMillen, 49 Ind. 493; Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ind. 247; Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Stoner, 59 Ind. 579; Noah v. Angle, 63 Ind. 425; Ohio, etc., R. W. Co. v. Nickless, 71 Ind. 271. It may well be held that these cases declare the general rule correctly, since to hold otherwise would put the witnesses in the place of the jurors, and commit to them the decision of the amount of recovery. A contrary doctrine would also violate the rule that witnesses can not express an opinion upon the precise point which the issues present for the decision of the jury.

There is not, however, the slightest conflict between the two propositions stated. It is one thing to prove the value of property, and quite another to prove what damages have been sustained by a party, or how much benefit has accrued to a litigant. This obvious distinction was noted in one of the earliest cases, where the court said: "There is manifestly a difference in stating the value of an article as a fact, and giving an opinion as to the amount of unliquidated or consequential damages." Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 560. The distinction is pointed out in the late case of Johnson v. Thompson, supra, and it was there said: "The authorities recognize a well defined distinction between the opinion of a witness as to the amount of damages sustained in a given case and his opinion as to the value of a service or commodity, concerning which he has been called upon to testify."

Many things enter into the estimate of benefits and damages besides the value of the land taken, and the value of the residue with and without the improvement, so that in expressing an opinion as to the value a witness does not give an opinion as to the amount of the benefit or damages; he does no more than furnish evidence upon one of the elements of the estimate.

It is impossible to conceive that juries or courts can justly estimate benefits and damages without the aid of opinions of values from competent witnesses, unless, indeed, it be assumed that courts and juries have knowledge of the values of all kinds of property. If this assumption were just, then, no doubt, all that would be needed would be an accurate description of the property; but every one knows that in the very great majority of cases neither courts nor juries possess such knowledge as would enable them, unaided by opinions, to affix just values to property.

It is the purpose of evidence to place jurors in possession of such facts as will enable them to award the litigant that which he is justly entitled to recover. In order to justly measure the amount of recovery, the jury must, where property rights alone are concerned, know the value of the thing of which the plaintiff is deprived, and whatever evidence tends to place them in possession of this knowledge should be regarded as competent. Opinions from witnesses of integrity and knowledge must always be of service to impartial triers upon such a question. The weight of a witness' opinion depends upon his knowledge, his integrity, and the facts which he states as constituting the basis of his judgment. It is, therefore, not correct to assume that wild or ill considered opinions will control; on the contrary, the presumption of the law is exactly the reverse. It is to be presumed that only the opinions of honest witnesses, possessed of competent knowledge, and assigning sufficient grounds for their judgment, will prevail.

The question which here directly faces us is this: Is it competent to prove the value of land before a ditch is constructed, and what its value will be after the construction of the ditch? It can not be doubted that such evidence tends to assist in determining the question of damages and benefits, nor is there reason for supposing that it is not material. The situation of the land and the location and capacity of the ditch may be described with perfect accuracy, and yet a jury be utterly unable to form a just estimate of the amount of benefits or damages. Of what assistance to a jury composed of clergymen, merchants, and bankers would be a description of the minutest accuracy, without some estimate of values by competent witnesses? Possibly, it would enable such a jury to form a crude conjecture; it could do but little more. In such a case as that supposed, the testimony of witnesses possessed of knowledge and honesty, expressing their opinion of the value of the land with and without the ditch, would go very far in assisting the jury to a safe and just conclusion. It is no doubt true that such evidence is subject to some objections, but is there any class of human evidence entirely free from imperfections? If it be subject to objection greater in degree than evidence of facts, is it not true that the same objections will lie against opinions of values in every imaginable case? If we should declare the evidence incompetent upon this ground, then we must close the door against the admission of opinions in all classes of actions, for if the objections are valid in the one instance, so they are in all. But they are valid in none.

The latest case in our reports upon this question is that of Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pugh, 85 Ind. 279, and that sustains the competency of evidence of the value of the land before and after the construction of a railroad. The question was considered in the case of Frankfort, etc., R. R. Co. v. Windsor, 51 Ind. 238, and the ruling was in favor of the admissibility of the evidence. There are other cases which declare the same general principle. The case of Ferguson v. Stafford, 33 Ind. 162, is one of them. It was there held that it was proper to permit a witness to express an opinion as to the value of land before and after waste had been committed upon it by the defendant. Another is that of Sidener v. Essex, 22 Ind. 201, where it was held that the measure of damages for injuries arising from the location of a highway is the difference of value between the land with the highway and without it. The cases cited upon the first proposition stated tend in the same direction. Against this doctrine we have the cases of Hagaman v. Moore, 84 Ind. 496, and Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ind. 247. The cases of Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stoner, supra, and Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ind. 480, can not be regarded as in point. The question asked the witness in the latter case, independent of the consideration of the right to an opinion upon the value of the land, was improper, and that is all that was decided. In the former of these last named cases, the question asked the witness was: "What, in your judgment, is the damage to the farm by the railroad cutting it in that shape?" and this brought the case fully within the rule declared in Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, and cases of that class. It may possibly be correct to hold that where benefits can not be taken into consideration, as in cases of appropriations for railroad purposes, the question can not be asked a witness as to the value of the land without the railroad, and what it would be with it, and on that ground, perhaps, the cases of Hagaman v. Moore, supra, and Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Johnson, supra, may be sustained. White Water Valley R. R. Co. v. McClure, 29 Ind. 536; Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Horn, 41 Ind. 479. But this point we do not decide, for a decision is not now required.

A careful examination of the books and cases has satisfied us that where there is no law excluding benefits from consideration in estimating damages, or where the question is one affecting the right to assess benefits, a witness may state his opinion of the value of the land without the proposed ditch or highway, and what its value would be with the highway or drain. This requires of us a disapproval of much of the reasoning in Hagaman v. Moore, supra, and Baltimore, etc, R. W. Co. v. Johnson, supra.

There seems to be, elsewhere than in Indiana, very little diversity of judicial opinion upon the proposition that a witness...