Hamza v. United Cont'l Holdings
| Decision Date | 28 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-8971 (FLW) (TJB) |
| Parties | AMIR M. HAMZA, Plaintiff, v. UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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Pro se Plaintiff Amir M. Hamza ("Plaintiff") has filed an Amended Complaint against Defendant United Continental Holdings, LLC ("Defendant" or "United"),1 bringing claims of negligence, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination, and delay in investigation of discrimination. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's negligence and delay in investigation claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff's remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is given leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty days of the date of the Order accompanying this Opinion.
For the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes as true all allegations of theAmended Complaint. From September 2011 to December 2018, Plaintiff was employed by United as a Flight Attendant. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that at on April 14, 2018, he was the victim of sexual assault and arrived for work at Dulles International Airport in "dire medical and psychological condition" as a result of the assault.2 (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff claims that he "was slurring his speech, falling unconscious, making unintelligible conversations, making gestures with his hands, and his eyes were rolling back in his head." (Id. ¶ 15.) Another flight attendant, Nelson Segovia, observed Plaintiff's condition and allegedly discussed the matter with Captain Oktay Basaran. (Id.) Thereafter, Defendant Alex Barreto ("Barreto"), the Inflight Supervisor, approached Plaintiff to determine his condition and escorted him to the Inflight Base to be evaluated by Sandra Sales, a supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that, despite his condition, he was not taken to the United Medical Clinic and instead "testing was completed in a bathroom stall" more than 4 hours after he was escorted to the Inflight Base.3 (Id. ¶ 21.) Shortly after testing was completed, Plaintiff apparently left the terminal and "jump[ed] on a Hertz bus." (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff asserts that Barreto and Sales were "negligent in allowing the Plaintiff to remain untreated by medical personnel for over four hours," for not properly monitoring his condition, and permitting him to leave the airport. (Id. ¶ 23.)
It appears that following the April 14, 2018 incident, Plaintiff was continuously absent from work. Plaintiff alleges that, to support his absences, he provided letters to Mark Di Carlo ("Di Carlo") and Mary Sturchio ("Sturchio") "toverify he was in the care of a Health Care Professional." (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) In that connection, Plaintiff references four letters that his treating health care professional, a licensed clinical social worker, addressed to Di Carlo and Sturchio. (Id.) In or around November 28, 2018, it appears Plaintiff was made aware that he was required to provide letters of treatment directly to United Medical to support his absences. (Id. ¶ 27.) Thereafter, his treating health care professional completed the United Medical Absence Certificate and Plaintiff submitted it to United Medical. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff claims that after the Absence Certificate was submitted, he was informed that a licensed clinical social worker did not qualify as a health care professional and he was required to obtain an Absence Certificate from his primary care physician. (Id. ¶ 31.) At some point after November 2018, Plaintiff was informed that he had been approved for medical leave through January 31, 2019. (Id. ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Di Carlo "believed the Plaintiff was falsifying information to [United] and the police and took it upon himself to label the Plaintiff a liar." (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) In that regard, Plaintiff alleges that Di Carlo told the detective who was investigating Plaintiff's sexual assault that Plaintiff was enrolled in a substance abuse program with the hope that the Detective "would view the Plaintiff as a liar." (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff claims that the investigating detective thereafter shared that information with the New York State Police, who began "targeting" Plaintiff and constantly monitoring him. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff contends that "Di Carlo knew the level of emotional distress the Plaintiff would face due to his lies . . . [and] hoped if the Plaintiff was charged with a crime it would be easier to terminate the Plaintiff." (Id. ¶ 40.)
On December 5, 2018, Plaintiff's employment was terminated. (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully terminated by United despite a successful eight-year career and alleges that "Di Carlo knew Plaintiff had a successful career at United and aimed to destroy the Plaintiff'sreputation to ensure his termination." (Id. ¶ 44-45.) Further, Plaintiff claims that, following his termination, Mark Hassel of United Human Resources "emailed the Plaintiff and told him an investigation would be initiated to determine if there were any issues related to the Plaintiff's termination." (See id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff also alleges that, in December 2018, he contacted Oscar Munoz regarding his claims of wrongful termination and discrimination. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff was assured that an investigation would be conducted, but it appears that an investigation was not allegedly initiated until five months after Plaintiff was terminated. (Id. ¶ 50.)
On March 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants that set forth factual allegations related to his April 14, 2018 sexual assault. (See Am. Compl.) Following service of the Complaint upon United, it filed a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) and to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 15.) On December 30, 2019, the Honorable Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.,4 granted Defendant's motion for a more definite statement. (See ECF No. 18.) Rather than dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of the Order granting Defendant's motion. (Id.) Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on January 28, 2020. (See Am. Compl.) This Motion to Dismiss followed.
In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under Rule 12(b)(6), "courts accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Zimmerman v. Corbett,873 F.3d 414, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018); Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is entitled to liberal construction of his complaint. See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
Before addressing the merits of Defendant's motion, the Court notes that Plaintiff, in his 93-page Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, asserts eight new causes of action that were not set forth in the Amended Complaint, as well as new factual allegations not appearing in the Amended Complaint in support of his pleaded claims.5 Plaintiff's Opposition additionally includes new factual allegations in support of his claims that are not included in the Amended Complaint. It is well established that a plaintiff may not amend his complaint in a brief in opposition in a motion to dismiss. See Com. of. Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss." (alteration in original) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)); Li v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 16-1845, 2016 WL 5477994, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2016) (); Eli Lilly & Co. . Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460, 493 (D.N.J. 1998) (). Nevertheless, where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, courts have construed additional allegations made in "opposition papers as a motion to amend the complaint, or have granted leave to amend a pro se plaintiff's complaint where the plaintiff has introduced new facts in his opposition papers but has not requested leave to amend." Gordon v. Kartri Sales Co., Inc., No. 17-320, 2018 WL 1123704, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2018); see also Miles v. Ansari, No. 10-6179, 2011 WL 2974709, at *3-4 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011) (). Here, the Court declines to consider Plaintiff's new claims on this Motion as Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend the Amended Complaint to include these new claims. Moreover, the allegations in the Plaintiff's Opposition are...
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