Hancock County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Greenfield, 2-1085A314
Decision Date | 08 July 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 2-1085A314,2-1085A314 |
Citation | 494 N.E.2d 1294 |
Parties | HANCOCK COUNTY RURAL ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, Respondent-Appellant, v. CITY OF GREENFIELD, Indiana, Petitioner-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William H. Wolf, Wolf, Robak & Murphy, Greenfield, for respondent-appellant.
Michael B. Cracraft, Vicki L. Anderson, Smith, Morgan & Ryan, Indianapolis, C. Thomas Billings, Williams Cone & Billings, Greenfield, for appellee, City of Greenfield, Ind.
Ronald L. Dyer, Indianapolis, for appellee, Office of Utility Consumer Counselor.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Robert K. Johnson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee, Public Service Com'n of Ind.
Hancock County Rural Electric Membership Corporation (REMC) appeals from the Public Service Commission's (Commission) orders which granted the City of Greenfield, Indiana (City) the right to provide electrical service to two areas annexed by City. We affirm.
City filed its petitions within the sixty (60) day period, but Commission failed to rule on them within ninety (90) days after submission. REMC filed motions to dismiss, claiming that Commission lost subject matter jurisdiction after the ninety (90) days expired. Commission denied the motions and ruled that, in the interests of public convenience and necessity, the service areas previously assigned to REMC be changed so that City's municipally-owned electric utility would service those areas.
The sole issue presented for review is whether the word "shall" is mandatory or directory.
In Indiana, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including on appeal. Lindower v. City of South Bend (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 123, 125. Therefore, REMC could raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.
A statute containing the term "shall" generally connotes a mandatory as opposed to a directory import. State ex rel. City of Indianapolis v. Brennan (1952), 231 Ind. 492, 498, 109 N.E.2d 409, 411; State ex rel. De Armond v. Superior Court of Madison County (1940), 216 Ind. 641, 643, 25 N.E.2d 642, 642; Johnson v. Johnson (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 978, 979-80. However, "shall" may be construed as directory instead of mandatory "to prevent the defeat of the legislative intent." Wysong v. Automobile Underwriters (1933), 204 Ind. 493, 504, 184 N.E. 783, 787. See also Sharton v. Slack (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 856, 859, trans. denied, (presumption of "shall" as mandatory is rebutted if "it appears from the context or the manifest purpose of the act that the legislature intended a different construction").
The state supreme court upheld the construction of "shall" in a directory sense in a case very similar to the one at bar. In Allen County Department of Public Welfare v. Ball Memorial Hospital Association (1969), 253 Ind. 179, 252 N.E.2d 424, the court interpreted a statute stating that a hospital "shall within seventy-two hours" report the admission of an indigent to the county welfare department. The court clarified the importance of interpreting "shall" as either mandatory or directory. "The distinction between directory and mandatory provisions in a statute is that violation of the former is not usually fatal to the procedure, while a departure from the latter is fatal to any proceeding to obtain the benefit of the statute." Id. at 185, 252 N.E.2d at 427. The court recognized that its role in interpreting a statute was to ascertain legislative intent. To do this, the court examined not only the statute's phraseology but also the statute's design and nature, and the consequences flowing from different interpretations. Id. at 184, 252 N.E.2d at 427.
The court in Ball Memorial held that time provisions in a statute were not to be regarded "as of the essence, but [were] regarded as directory merely." Id. at 185, 252 N.E.2d at 427, quoting 50 Am.Jur. Statutes Sec. 23 (1944). After analyzing the absurd consequences of a mandatory interpretation and recognizing "the harshness and mischief caused by strict adherence to a [mandatory] rule," the court held that the statute was directory, not mandatory. Ball Memorial, 253 Ind. at 186, 252 N.E.2d at 428. "We hold that inasmuch as the statute contains no negative or prohibitive words nor provides for penalties on the consequences of notice given beyond the seventy-two hour period, it is directory with respect to the time limitation." Id. at 187, 252 N.E.2d at 428.
Our supreme court reiterated Ball Memorial nine years later. In Hawley v. South Bend Department of Redevelopment (1978), 270 Ind. 109, 383 N.E.2d 333, a redevelopment commission obtained only one independent appraisal of property to be acquired although the statute required two appraisals. The court, quoting extensively from Ball Memorial, concluded that the requirement of two appraisals was directory, not mandatory. Id. at 116-17, 383 N.E.2d at 338-39. The court said that if it were to rule otherwise, the statutory purpose would have been frustrated. Even though Hawley did not concern statutory time limits, it is indicative of our supreme court's continued utilization of the Ball Memorial analysis in determining whether a statute is mandatory or merely directory.
Other jurisdictions propound a directory approach to statutory time limits if to do otherwise would contradict legislative purpose. Usery v. Whitin Machine Works, Inc. (1st Cir.1977), 554 F.2d 498, 501 (); Lomelo v. Mayo (1967), Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 204 So.2d 550, 553 (); Hartman v. Glenwood Telephone Membership Corp. (1977), 197 Neb. 359, 371-72, 249 N.W.2d 468, 475 ( ); Omaha Public Power Dist. v. Nebraska Public Power Project (1976), 196 Neb. 477, 479, 243 N.W.2d 770, 772 ( ); Commonwealth v. General Foods Corp. (1968), 429 Pa. 266, 271, 239 A.2d 359, 362 ( ); Chisholm v. Bewley Mills (1956), 155 Tex. 400, 403, ...
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