Hancock v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 1:13-CV-1184 (NAM/CFH)

• Decision Date: 05 August 2016
• Docket Number: 1:13-CV-1184 (NAM/CFH)
• Parties: KEITH HANCOCK, TAMERA THOMAS, and JASON DESSINGUE, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, JAMES KARAM, ANTHONY PATRICELLI, JACK MAHAR, ELAINE YOUNG, and DAVID HETMAN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

KEITH HANCOCK, TAMERA THOMAS, andJASON DESSINGUE, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, JAMES KARAM, ANTHONY PATRICELLI, JACK MAHAR,ELAINE YOUNG, and DAVID HETMAN, Defendants.

1:13-CV-1184 (NAM/CFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 5, 2016

APPEARANCES:

Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C.

Elmer R. Keach, III, Esq., of counsel

One Pine West Plaza - Suite 109

Albany, New York 12205

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Maloney & Laird, P.C.

James A. Resila, Esq., of counsel

William C. Firth, Esq., of counsel

20 Corporate Woods Boulevard

Albany, New York 12211

Attorneys for Defendants County of Rensselaer, David Hetman,

and Jack Mahar

Luibrand Law Firm, PLLC

Kevin A. Luibrand, Esq., of counsel

950 New Loudon Road

Latham, New York 12110

Attorney for Defendant Elaine Young

Hon. Norman A. Mordue, Senior U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

In this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 60) contains a single cause of action claiming that defendants, while acting under color of state law, infringed plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy in their medical records. The action has been discontinued against defendants James Karam and Anthony Patricelli (Dkt. Nos. 120, 141). The remaining defendants move for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 122, 123). As set forth below, the summary judgment motion by Elaine Young (Dkt. No. 122) is granted; the summary judgment motion by defendants County of Rensselaer, Jack Mahar, and David Hetman (Dkt. No. 123) is granted; and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

With respect to the remaining defendants, the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 60) states that at the relevant times, defendant David Hetman was a Lieutenant at the Rensselaer County Jail ("Jail"), which is overseen by the County Sheriff's Department. Defendant Jack Mahar ("Sheriff Mahar") was County Sheriff, and defendant Elaine Young ("Nurse Young") was a Registered Nurse employed at the Jail as Nursing Supervisor. In order to facilitate continuity of care for Jail inmates, nearby Samaritan Hospital ("Samaritan") provided Jail nursing staff with access to its electronic medical records via a computer terminal located at the Jail nurses' station. The nursing staff was authorized to access only inmate records and to view them only for authorized purposes. Nurse Young was responsible to secure the password that provided access to these records. Plaintiffs claim that she failed to keep this password secure and instead taped it to a computer console in her office or left it in a drawer.

At the relevant times, plaintiff Keith Hancock was employed at the Jail as a Corrections Officer and was a patient of a medical practice affiliated with Samaritan. The amended complaint states that in 2004, Sheriff Mahar instituted a policy governing the use of sick days by Jailemployees; that employees deemed to be in violation of the policy were placed on "sick abuse" status and were denied privileges and/or required to submit a physician's note to explain their absences; that the policy was not uniformly enforced; and that Sheriff Mahar targeted Mr. Hancock and placed him on sick abuse multiple times because he was a labor union official in the Sheriffs Employees Association of Rensselaer County. In March 2013, Mr. Hancock received a letter from Samaritan stating that information about his medical care may have been improperly accessed by Jail employees, and a report indicating that Jail staff had accessed his medical records on January 9, 2009. He alleges that he had not given permission for the access, which was accomplished through the account assigned to Nurse Young. He claims that Sheriff Mahar personally directed other employees of the Sheriff's Department to access his medical records to determine whether he received treatment on the dates he was absent from work.

The amended complaint further states that plaintiff Tamera Thomas injured her hand in January 2007 in the course of her duties as a Corrections Officer at the Jail; that she sought treatment at the Samaritan emergency room; and that she missed two or three days of work due to the injury. When she applied to the County for payment of medical expenses and lost pay due to the injury, her application was denied. In March 2013, she received a letter from Samaritan stating that information about her medical care may have been improperly accessed by Jail employees, and a report indicating that Jail staff accessed her medical records on January 26, 2007, shortly after her injury and application for compensation. She alleges that she had not given permission for the access, which was accomplished through the account assigned to Nurse Young. She claims that Sheriff Mahar personally directed other employees of the Sheriff's Department to access her medical records to obtain information which was later used to deny hercompensation claim.

Plaintiffs further allege that in August 2011, plaintiff Jason Dessingue, a Corrections Officer at the Jail, underwent heart surgery and missed approximately three weeks of work. He alleges that, because he had openly supported another candidate for Sheriff, he had a "hostile relationship" with Sheriff Mahar. In March 2013, Mr. Dessingue received a letter from Samaritan stating that information about his medical care may have been improperly accessed by Jail employees, and a report indicating that Jail staff had accessed his medical records on August 23, 2011, while he was absent from work following his heart surgery. He alleges that he had not given permission for the access, which was accomplished through the account assigned to Nurse Young. He claims that Sheriff Mahar personally directed other employees of the Sheriff's Department to access his medical records to determine whether he was receiving medical treatment during the period of absence.

In the single cause of action, headed "Violation of Constitutional Rights under Color of State Law - Invasion of Privacy," plaintiffs state:

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a citizen's right to privacy against unreasonable government intrusion. Citizens have a clearly established right in maintaining the confidentiality of medical information.

The actions of the Individual Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right to privacy in their medical information, in that the Individual Defendants used the [Jail] medical computer to access the Plaintiffs' medical records to gain advantage over them in their employment with the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Department. In the alternative, the Individual Defendants, even if they did not actually access the Plaintiffs' medical records, conspired with each other to violate the Plaintiffs' right to privacy.

The Individual Defendants' actions were motivated by bad faith and malice.

The County of Rensselaer is directly responsible for this constitutionalviolation based on the actions of their chief policy maker, Sheriff Jack Mahar.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.)

DISCUSSION

The parties have completed discovery. The remaining defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the claims of all three plaintiffs. As explained below, the motions are granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

A party moving for summary judgment must show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the movant has met this burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant to adduce evidence establishing the existence of an issue of material fact. See Linares v. McLaughlin, 423 Fed.Appx. 84, 86 (2d Cir. 2011). If the non-movant fails to make such a showing, the movant is entitled to summary judgment. A court deciding a summary judgment motion must "resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Conclusory statements, mere allegations, or unsubstantiated speculation, however, are not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. See id.; accord Jeffreys v. City of N.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

As stated above, plaintiffs assert a single cause of action: a Fourteenth Amendment claim of violation of their rights to privacy. It is well established that "there exists in the United StatesConstitution a right to privacy protecting 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.'" Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). This right to privacy, also characterized as a right to confidentiality, extends to personal medical information. See id. The privacy of medical information, however, has been "constitutionalized" only within "narrow parameters," such that "the interest in the privacy of medical information will vary with the condition." Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York, 631 F.3d 57, 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2011). In Doe, the Second Circuit recognized a constitutional right to privacy with respect to a person's HIV status, noting that HIV infection is a "serious condition" and finding that, while "there are few matters that are quite so personal as the status of one's health, and few matters the dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater control over," this is "especially true with regard to those infected with HIV or living with AIDS." 15 F.3d at 267. In Powell v. Schriver, the Second Circuit found a constitutional privacy right with respect to transsexualism, noting that, "[l]ike HIV status as described in Doe, transsexualism is [an] unusual...