Hancock v. Variyam

• Decision Date: 17 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–0772.,11–0772.
• Citation: 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 561,400 S.W.3d 59
• Parties: Joseph E. HANCOCK, Petitioner, v. Easwaran P. VARIYAM, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

400 S.W.3d 59

56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 561

Joseph E. HANCOCK, Petitioner,

v.Easwaran P. VARIYAM, Respondent.

No. 11–0772.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Dec. 5, 2012.

Decided May 17, 2013.

Benjamin H. Davidson II, Donald M. Hunt, Lawrence Matthew Doss, Lubbock, TX, for Petitioner, Joseph E. Hancock.

Allyson Newton Ho, Houston, Robert W. St. Clair, Lubbock, TX, for Respondent, Easwaran P. Variyam.

JUSTICE GUZMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this defamation suit involving two physicians, we clarify a longstanding distinction between defamation and defamation per se in the context of statements that relate to one's profession. While a defamatory statement is one that tends to injure a person's reputation, such a statement is defamatory per se if it injures a person in her office, profession, or occupation.¹ The common law deems such statements so hurtful that the jury may presume general damages (such as for mental anguish and loss of reputation). Here, in a letter sent to colleagues and others, a physician accused a fellow physician of lacking veracity and speaking in half truths, resulting in an award of $90,000 in actual damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation and $85,000 in exemplary damages. Because the statements did not ascribe the lack of a necessary skill that is peculiar or unique to the profession of being a physician, we hold that they did not defame the physician per se. Thus, we cannot presume damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation, and consequently the physician was required to prove actual damages. We further conclude there is no evidence of mental anguish because evidence of some sleeplessness and anxiety—but evidence of no disruption in patient care or interaction with colleagues who read the defamatory letter—does not rise to the level of a substantial disruption in daily routine or a high degree of mental pain and distress. Likewise, there is no evidence of loss of reputation because there is no indication that any recipient of the defamatory letter believed its statements. Lastly, because the physician did not establish actual damages, he cannot recover exemplary damages. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment affirming these damages and render judgment that the plaintiff take nothing.

I. Background

Dr. Easwaran P. Variyam was the Chief of the Gastroenterology Division of the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center (the Division) in Lubbock, a state chartered medical school. Dr. Joseph E. Hancock served as an associate professor under Variyam. A dispute arose between the doctors in 2006 over the transfer of patients from Hancock's care to Variyam's after Variyam became the on-call doctor for the Division. Variyam sent a letter to Hancock “to express [his] disapproval in the strongest words possible of the lack of professionalism and disregard for patient care that you exhibited this morning.” The letter detailed the alleged manner in which Hancock's transfer of patients violated the Division's policy and copied the Chair of the Department of Internal Medicine (the Department). The letter gave Hancock an opportunity to respond before Variyam lodged a formal complaint.

Hancock responded by sending a letter the same day to the Chair of the Department, the Dean of the School of Medicine, a Division colleague, and the entity reviewing the Division's application for accreditation for its gastroenterology fellowship. In the letter, Hancock resigned his faculty position under Variyam, stated that Variyamhad a “reputation for lack of veracity” and “deals in half truths, which legally is the same as a lie.” ² The Division's fellowship was not accredited, and in February 2006, the Chair of the Department removed Variyam as Chief of the Division.

Variyam sued Hancock for defamation and sought damages for his removal as Chair, loss of reputation, and mental anguish. Hancock moved for partial summary judgment on Variyam's claim for damages for removal as Chair, which the trial court granted. The trial court subsequently granted a directed verdict that Hancock's letter was defamatory per se. The jury rejected Hancock's substantial truth defense and awarded Variyam $30,000 for loss of past reputation, $30,000 for loss of future reputation, $15,000 for past mental anguish, $15,000 for future mental anguish, and $85,000 in exemplary damages (after finding by clear and convincing evidence Hancock made the statements with malice). The trial court entered judgment on the award.

The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that accusations that someone is a liar are “so obviously hurtful to the person aggrieved that no proof of [their] injurious character is required to make [them] actionable.” 345 S.W.3d 157, 164. The court rejected Hancock's argument that the statements were not defamatory per se because they were ambiguous and did not injure Variyam in his profession. Id. at 165–67. The court also found legally and factually sufficient evidence of damages and noted that general damages are difficult to determine and left largely to the fact finder.³Id. at 169–71. We granted Hancock's petition for review. 55 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 1169, 1171 (Tex. Aug. 17, 2012).

II. Discussion

Hancock argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the directed verdict because the statements were not defamatory per se. Hancock also contends the evidence of damages is legally insufficient. We agree and address each argument in turn.

A. Defamation Per Se

Hancock asserts his statements that Variyam had a “reputation for lack of veracity” and “deals in half truths” cannot constitute defamation per se because, among other things, they did not injure Variyam in his profession as a physician. Variyam responds that the statements were defamatory per se because his profession requires a truthful reputation in regard to patient care, interaction with other physicians, teaching, research, and publishing. We agree with Hancock.

Defamation is generally defined as the invasion of a person's interest in her reputation and good name. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.1988); see alsoTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 73.001. Defamation is delineated into defamation per se and per quod. Historically, defamation per se has involved statements that are so obviously hurtful to a plaintiff's reputation that the jury may presume general damages,⁴ including for loss of reputation and mental anguish. ⁵ A statement that injures a person in her office, profession, or occupation is typically classified as defamatory per se.⁶ Defamation per quod is defamation that is not actionable per se.Black's Law Dictionary 480 (9th ed.2009).

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the rationale for presuming harm in defamation per se cases “has been the experience and judgment of history that ‘proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.’ ” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 112, at 765 (4th ed.1971)). The Court has further explained that presuming damages in defamation per se cases “furthers the state interest in providing remedies for defamation by ensuring that those remedies are effective.” Id. at 761, 105 S.Ct. 2939.

As we recently observed, the damages a defamation per se plaintiff may recover is an issue “courts have not resolved ... in an entirely consistent manner.” Salinas v. Salinas, 365 S.W.3d 318, 320 n. 2 (Tex.2012). We last discussed defamation per se in depth in 1942. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246 (1942). The constitutional landscape as it relates to defamation has changed significantly since our Renfro decision. To provide appropriate context for examining the issues presented, we briefly discuss the most significant and relevant developments.

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the United States Supreme Court sought to reconcile the competing concerns of free speech and a free press with the legitimate state interest in compensating victims of defamation for the harm inflicted upon them. 418 U.S. 323, 340–42, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). The Court held that the state interest in compensating defamation victims “extends no further than compensation for actual injury.... [T]he States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. at 349, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The Court pointedly observed that “the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs ... gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury.” Id. The Court concluded:

It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury.... [A]ll awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury.

Id. at 349–50, 94 S.Ct. 2997.

The Court reiterated in Time, Inc. v. Firestone that Gertz required compensatory awards to be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury. 424 U.S. 448, 459, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976). But the Court later clarified in Dun & Bradstreet that this requirement pertained to public speech and that, in a defamation suit between private defendants concerning private speech, recovery of presumed and punitive damages does not violate the First Amendment. 472 U.S. at 761, 105 S.Ct. 2939. For private speech, the Court explained that the First Amendment still...