Handel v. Powell
| Decision Date | 30 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. S09A0074.,S09A0074. |
| Citation | 284 Ga. 550,670 S.E.2d 62 |
| Parties | HANDEL v. POWELL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Calandra A. Almond, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Parks, Chesin & Walbert, A. Lee Parks, Andrew Y. Coffman, Atlanta, for appellee.
Michael K. Jablonski, amicus curiae.
Appellant Karen Handel is the Secretary of State of Georgia. On June 9, 2008, the Secretary filed a challenge to the qualifications of James R. Powell, who had filed a declaration of candidacy and affidavit to be a candidate for Georgia Public Service Commission, District 4. OCGA § 21-2-5. The Secretary asserted that candidate Powell did not reside in the district he seeks to represent, leaving for resolution whether the candidate will have resided in the district for twelve months prior to election to that office, as is statutorily required by OCGA § 46-2-1(b).
While "domicile" and "residence" have different meanings, with "domicile" denoting a permanent place of abode and "residence" not necessarily being permanent (Avery v. Bower, 170 Ga. 202(2), 152 S.E. 239 (1930) ()), the residency requirement for a candidate for, or holder of, public office refers to domicile. Clark v. Hammock, 228 Ga. 157(2)(a), 184 S.E.2d 581 (1971). See also Dozier v. Baker, 283 Ga. 543(1), 661 S.E.2d 543 (2008). OCGA § 21-2-217(a) sets out fifteen rules to be followed, so far as they are applicable, in determining the residency of a person desiring to qualify to run for elective office, and OCGA § 21-2-2(32) defines "residence" as used in Chapter 2 of Title 21, as meaning "domicile."
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Secretary's challenge, ruling that the candidate had presented persuasive evidence that, in 2006, he had moved into District 4 with the intent to make it his home. The Secretary then issued a ruling that the candidate resided in Cobb County and was therefore not qualified to run for the District 4 position. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court of Fulton County which reversed the Secretary's decision. The Secretary filed an application for discretionary review which this Court granted, and we have expedited appellate review of this case. 1
At the hearing before the ALJ, the Secretary presented evidence that the candidate purchased property in District 4 in 2006 (Towns County property), owned property outside District 4 (Cobb County property), and enjoyed a homestead exemption on the Cobb County property until May 2008. Asserting that a person's homestead exemption establishes an irrebuttable presumption of legal residence, the Secretary maintained that the candidate's Cobb County homestead exemption established the candidate did not reside in District 4.
The ALJ denied the Secretary's challenge after determining that the court could consider residency evidence other than a homestead exemption and found that the candidate had presented persuasive evidence that he had moved in 2006 to Towns County with the intent to make his home there.2 With regard to the matter of the homestead exemption, the ALJ found that the candidate twice unsuccessfully attempted to establish homestead in Towns County, with his March 2007 application to transfer his homestead exemption from Cobb County to Towns County having been denied because it was filed after Towns County's annual deadline for such transfers. Guided by the series of statutory rules for determining residency for candidate qualification set out in OCGA § 21-2-217, the ALJ concluded the candidate met the residency requirement.
The matter then went before the Secretary, who determined the candidate was not qualified to be a candidate for Public Service Commission, District 4, because he did not meet the residency requirement. In her final decision, the Secretary reiterated the ALJ's factual findings and, in her conclusions of law, the Secretary stated that the address in which a person has declared a homestead exemption is deemed to be the person's residence address (OCGA § 21-2-217(a)(14)), and that a homestead is the legal residence and domicile of the applicant for homestead for all purposes. OCGA § 48-5-40(3)(K).
The candidate's appeal of the Secretary's decision to superior court was confined to the record of the proceedings before the ALJ and the Secretary, and was decided by the trial court without a jury. OCGA § 21-2-5(e). The parties agreed the facts were not in dispute and the issue was one of law. The trial court ruled that the Cobb County homestead exemption, standing alone, was not a basis to determine the residency requirement adversely to the candidate, "particularly in light of the undisputed evidence that [the candidate] spent the majority of time in Towns County, was registered to vote and voted in Towns County, paid taxes there, registered his automobiles there, and attended church there." The trial court reversed the Secretary's final decision.
In this Court, the Secretary maintains the trial court erred when it failed to defer to the Secretary's decision because there is evidence in the record supporting the Secretary's decision that the candidate was not a legal resident of Public Service Commission District 4.
OCGA § 21-2-5(e) provides the standard of review a superior court is to employ when reviewing a decision by the Secretary of State on a challenge to a candidate's qualifications. It is virtually identical to the standard of review provided in the Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-19(h), in that OCGA § 21-2-5(e) directs the superior court to
not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of State as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the Secretary of State are: (1) In violation of the Constitution or laws of this state; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the Secretary of State; (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; (4) Affected by other error of law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary and capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
We recently addressed the standard of review set out in OCGA § 49-4-153(b)(2), itself virtually identical to that provided in the Administrative Procedure Act, in Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Community Health, 284 Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 223 (2008). In that case, we pointed out that judicial review of an administrative decision is a two-step process: because the court reviewing an administrative decision must accept the agency's findings of fact if there is any evidence to support the findings, the court must first determine if there is evidence to support the factual findings; the court then "is statutorily required to examine the soundness of the conclusions of law drawn from the findings of fact supported by any evidence." Thus, judicial review of an administrative decision does not end with the determination that the findings of fact have evidentiary support. Id. at 160, 664 S.E.2d 223.
Inasmuch as the parties acknowledged there was no factual issue, i.e., the facts as found by the Secretary were supported by the record, the superior court limited itself to an examination of the soundness of the Secretary's conclusions of law. The Secretary maintains the superior court was required to give deference to the Secretary's interpretation of OCGA § 21-2-217 since the Secretary is charged with enforcing that statute. See Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Community Health, supra, 284 Ga. at 159, 664 S.E.2d 223. While judicial deference is afforded an agency's interpretation of statutes it is charged with enforcing or administering, the agency's interpretation is not binding on the courts, which have the ultimate authority to construe statutes. McKee v. City of Geneva, 280 Ga. 411, 413, 627 S.E.2d 555 (2006). It is the role of the judicial branch to interpret the statutes enacted by the legislative branch and enforced by the executive branch (Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775(3), 631 S.E.2d 351 (2006)), and administrative rulings will be adopted only when they conform to the meaning which the court deems should properly be given. Sawnee EMC v. Ga. Public Svc. Commn., 273 Ga. 702, 706, 544 S.E.2d 158 (2001). The judicial branch "make[s] an independent determination as to whether the interpretation of the administrative agency correctly reflects the plain language of the statute and comports with the legislative intent." Id. See also Plymel v. Teachers Retirement System, 281 Ga. 409(4)(c), 637 S.E.2d 379 (2006); McKee v. City of Geneva...
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