Handforth v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 26 November 1889
• Citation: 22 N.E. 634,150 Mass. 149
• Parties: HANDFORTH v. JACKSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

150 Mass. 149

22 N.E. 634

HANDFORTH v. JACKSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Franklin.

November 26, 1889

COUNSEL

Austin De Wolf, for plaintiff.

S.T Field and Dana Malone, for defendant.

OPINION

C ALLEN, J.

At the trial the plaintiff contended that the defendant's agreement to withdraw from the ice business in Greenfield was illegal and void, but he does not insist upon that in this court. The limitation of space saves the agreement from being in illegal restraint of trade. See Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469, 16 N.E. 299, and cases there cited. But the plaintiff's main contention before us is that the ice-houses were real estate, and so did not pass to the plaintiff, and that the defendant, by his deed to Mrs. Boutwell, conveyed the title to her, and thus cut off the plaintiff's title to them, and that therefore the defendant should be held to have rescinded his agreement with the plaintiff; and that upon such rescission the plaintiff may recover the value of the property delivered by him to the defendant, less the value of what he received from the defendant. The grounds upon which the decision in the superior court rested are not stated in the report, but the facts, which are stated in detail, not only warrant a finding, but we think sufficiently show, that the ice-houses were personal property, and that the title to them passed to the plaintiff. The first ice-house was built by the defendant while he was a lessee of the land upon which it stood. The next three were built by him after he and Bardwell became owners of the land, with the consent of Bardwell, who acknowledged that they belonged to the defendant as his individual property, with the right to remove them. Under this state of things, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into the agreement of December 3, 1886, by which the ice-houses were to become the property of the plaintiff. On the same day the defendant and Bardwell executed the lease of the land to the plaintiff, in which they in express terms declared the ice-houses to be the property of the plaintiff, and agreed that he might remove them at or before the expiration of the lease; and the plaintiff thereupon entered into possession of them. There was thus at all times a distinct understanding on the part of the owners of the land that the ice-houses should be and remain personal property, and this was sufficient to make them such. Howard v. Fessenden, 14 Allen, 124, 128 129; Korbe v. Barbour, 130 Mass. 255. Mrs. Boutwell took her title with knowledge of the lease to the plaintiff, and thus must be held to have known that she took no title to them. It thus appears, upon the facts stated in the report, that the plaintiff had all that he bargained for from the defendant, except two days' work...