Handler v. Remington Arms Co.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1957
• Citation: 144 Conn. 316,130 A.2d 793
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Morton HANDLER et al. v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, Inc. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 793

130 A.2d 793

144 Conn. 316

Morton HANDLER et al. v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, Inc.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 26, 1957.

Jay E. Rubinow, Manchester, with whom were D. J. Harry Webb, Jr., Manchester, and, on the brief, John D. LaBelle, Manchester, for appellants (plaintiffs).

DeLancey Pelgrift, Hartford, with whom was George D. Stoughton, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

DALY, Associate Justice.

This negligence action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the named plaintiff and expenditures made and to be made by the other plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. From the judgment rendered thereon the plaintiffs have appealed. In the assignments of error they claim that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested and in the charge given.

The plaintiffs offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, the following facts: On January 6, 1951, the named plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, was sixteen years of age and a student at the Manchester High School. He was extremely well versed in the construction, operation and maintenance of firearms, having used them for a period of several years. A few days prior to January 6, Ronald Pitcher had loaned him a revolver. It had been purchased by Pitcher less than a year before and had been fired on numerous occasions without incident. On January 6, the plaintiff and several other persons, including Pitcher, were at a practice shooting range used by members of the Manchester High School rifle team. Pitcher had with him ammunition manufactured by the defendant. It was of the proper size and type for use in his revolver and was in a small cardboard box of the kind used by the defendant in packaging and selling ammunition at retail. After the revolver had been fired by each member of the party at least once, the plaintiff took some cartridges from the box, inserted them in the chamber of the revolver and fired it. He then fired it again. When he did so, sparks flew from the revolver and part of the case of the discharged cartridge passed through his eye. The cartridge was defective as a result of the manner in which it had been constructed. The defect caused parts of the cartridge case to be exploded into the plaintiff's eye, and he sustained extremely serious injuries. The revolver was in good condition and was fired numerous times thereafter without incident. Because of the inspection methods employed by the defendant, defective cartridges manufactured by it could escape detection and be sold in the field of commerce.

The defendant offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, the following: The ammunition was purchased by Pitcher more than a year before the suit was instituted, but less than a year before the plaintiff sustained his injuries. The tolerances of the revolver were greater than standard tolerances. The defendant observed, in the manufacture and inspection of its cartridges, reasonable standards of care. Although the revolver was fired without incident both before and after the plaintiff was injured, this was happenstance, and it was unsafe for use.

The plaintiffs' requests to charge appear in the footnote. ¹ The court, in its charge, did in general terms state the rule which permits a jury to reach conclusions by drawing reasonable inferences from facts found to be proven, but it made no reference to the specific principles of law set forth in the requests. The plaintiffs contend that one of the issues in the case was whether the cartridge in question was defective and that another was whether, if the cartridge was defective, the defect was caused by the negligence of the defendant in manufacturing and inspecting it. The propositions embodied in the first and second requests were correct statements of the applicable rules of law. Dickson v. Yale University, 141 Conn. 250, 253, 105 A.2d 463; LeBlanc v. Grillo, 129 Conn. 378, 382, 28 A.2d 127. Likewise, the proposition contained in the third request was an accurate statement of the applicable rule of law. Jump v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 117 Conn. 110, 120, 167 A. 90. 'When evidence is offered by either party to prove a certain state of facts, and the claim is made that they are proved and the court is correctly requested to charge the jury what the law is, as applicable to the case, the court must comply.' Berman v. Kling, 81 Conn. 403, 407, 71 A. 507, 509; Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 82. The substance of the plaintiffs' requests to charge, which, were correct and adapted to the issues, should have been incorporated in the charge. The court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested by the plaintiffs.

The defendant averred, in an amendment to its answer, that the act or omission alleged in the...