Handy v. State

• Citation: 60 A. 452,101 Md. 39
• Parties: HANDY v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 23 March 1905
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

60 A. 452

101 Md. 39

HANDY v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 23, 1905

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wicomico County; Henry Page and Henry Lloyd, Judges.

Henry J. Handy was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PEARCE SCHMUCKER, and JONES, JJ.

James E. Ellegood, for appellant.

Atty Gen. Wm. S. Bryan, Jr., for the State.

PEARCE J.

Henry J. Handy shot and killed his wife under circumstances disclosed in the record, of extraordinary deliberation and set purpose, and, being convicted of murder in the first degree by a jury in the circuit court for Wicomico county, and being sentenced to death, has brought this appeal from rulings of the court made in the course of the trial.

The first exception arose in this way, as stated in the record: "J. Cleveland White, being called and examined by the court and sworn on his voir dire, and, after the usual questions were propounded by the court, declared by the court to be a qualified juror, the prisoner's counsel then proposed to ask the juror questions; but the court declined to allow them to do so, but ruled that the questions could be propounded to the court, for the court to repeat to the respective jurors, to which ruling the prisoner excepted." The second exception was taken to the refusal of the court to propound to Charles Workman, also sworn on his voir dire, a question proposed by the prisoner's counsel, viz., whether the juror was a married man; the counsel stating that they desired to enlighten themselves as to the propriety of exercising the right of peremptory challenge. These two exceptions will be considered together.

The right claimed under the first exception is the absolute and unqualified right of the prisoner's counsel, after a juror upon his voir dire has been by the court declared to be competent, to interrogate him at pleasure, and without the intervention of the court, for the purpose of determining whether the right of peremptory challenge shall be exercised; while, under the second exception, the claim is that the court is bound to put to the juror any question which counsel may request the court to put, under the ruling on the first exception.

There is no statute in this state upon the subject, and we have been referred to no case in this state in which either of these questions has been decided or presented. The decisions in other states are conflicting, but in 12 Am. & Eng.Enc. of Law (1st Ed.) p. 358, it is said, "In the absence of statute, the true conclusion in regard to such questions seems to be that it lies in the discretion of the court either to put the questions, or to allow the counsel to examine;" and on page 359, "The control of the trial of challenges, and of all the proceedings by which a jury is finally selected from those summoned and from the bystanders, is committed to a wide discretion of the court." The same doctrine is stated in Thompson & Merriam on Juries, §§ 241-243. The practice in the courts of England is well settled. In Rex v. Edmonds, 4 Barnw. & Ald. 490, one of the motions for a new trial was made on the ground of opinions supposed to have been expressed by jurors hostile to the defendant's cause. Chief Justice Abbott said: "There was no offer to prove such an expression by any extrinsic evidence, but it was proposed to obtain the proof by questions put to the jurymen themselves. The Lord Chief Baron refused to allow such questions to be answered, and, in our opinion, he was right in his refusal." In Regina v. Stewart, 1 Cox, C.C. 174, the headnote is as follows: "Where a party has the right of challenge, he is not entitled to ask a juryman questions for the purpose of eliciting whether it would be expedient to exercise such right." The defendants were indicted for larceny of goods from tradesmen. The prisoners' counsel, as each juryman came to the box, asked him whether he was a member of an association for the prosecution of parties committing frauds on tradesmen. Baron Alderson said: "It is quite a new course to catechise a jury in this way." Counsel said: "I have a right, my lord, to challenge; and I submit that I am entitled to ask for information that is necessary for the effective exercise of that right." To which Baron Alderson replied: "I cannot allow you to cross-examine the jury. If you like to challenge absolutely, you may do so." In Regina v. Dowling, 3 Cox, Crim. Cases, 509, "the prisoner's counsel, upon a juror being called to the box, required him to be sworn on the voir dire, in order that he might examine him with a view to a challenge if necessary." Erie, J., said: "You cannot do that without first stating some ground for the proceeding." To which counsel replied: "I cannot say I have any instructions with regard to this particular individual." And the judge said: "Then I must refuse your application, unless, indeed, you can quote some authority upon the subject. I think it a very unreasonable thing that a juryman should be cross-examined, without your having received any information respecting him."

From the courts of this country the following cases may be cited In Bales v. State, 63 Ala. 30, Chief Justice Brickell said: "The proposed examination of Smith, Tucker, and Strange, to ascertain whether they were subject to a challenge for cause, after they had been examined by the court, was properly refused. We know of no authority, and we perceive no reason, for any such speculative. inquisitorial practice, consuming needlessly the time of the court, and offensive to the persons subjected to it." In State v. Creaseman, 32 N.C. 397, a juror tendered was challenged by the prisoner for favor, and the state admitted the cause, and the court allowed it, but the prisoner insisted he still had a right to examine him on oath, and, if he...