State v. Creasman

• Citation: 10 Ired. 395,32 N.C. 395
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 31 December 1849
• Parties: THE STATE v. COONROD CREASMAN.

10 Ired. 395

32 N.C. 395

THE STATE

v.COONROD CREASMAN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1849.

Where, on a capital trial, the prisoner challenges a juror for favor, and the Solicitor for the State admits the cause assigned to be true, the prisoner is bound by his challenge and cannot afterwards be allowed to have the matter tried, either by triers or the Court.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Buncombe County, at the Fall Term 1849, his Honor Judge ELLIS presiding.

The prisoner was indicted for rape. In forming the jury, a person tendered was challenged by him for favor, and the counsel for the state admitted the cause assigned to be true, and the Court thereupon allowed it. On the part of the prisoner, it was then insisted, that the admission, that the juror was not indifferent for the prisoner, did not of itself authorize his discharge; and that the prisoner had a right to examine him on oath touching that matter, and, if it should thereby appear that he was indifferent, then that the prisoner had a right to elect him of his jury. But the Court refused to consider the matter further.

The woman alleged to have been violated, was examined on the trial, and, after proving the fact, she stated, as a part of her testimony, that she made no outcry at the time, and gave no information of the injury to any person for four or five months after it occurred--assigning, as the reason for her conduct in those respects, that the prisoner thratened to kill her, if she did not submit or if she should ever tell any one. Evidence was further given to support and discredit the testimony and character of the wittness. The counsel for the prisoner moved the Court thereupon to instruct the jury, that the great length of time, before the prosecutrix made known the alleged violence, created such a presumption against the truth of her testimony, that the jury ought not to rely on it, but ought to acquit the prisoner. The Court refused to give that instruction, but informed the jury, that the admission of the witness, that she made no outcry, and that she concealed the alleged wrong so long, was a circumstance which tended to her discredit, and ought to be considered by the jury accordingly; and that it was for them to determine from those circumstances, and from the reasons she gave for her conduct, together with the evidence of her character, and the other evidence affecting her credibility, how far she was entitled to belief. And...