Hanel v. Freund

• Decision Date: 05 May 1885
• Citation: 17 Mo.App. 618
• Parties: H. HANEL, Respondent, v. L. FREUND ET AL., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

17 Mo.App. 618

H. HANEL, Respondent,

v.L. FREUND ET AL., Appellants.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

May 5, 1885.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, BARCLAY, J.

Reversed and remanded.

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK, for the appellants: An employe, leaving before the end of his term without good cause, cannot recover.-- Downs v. Smit, 15 Mo. App. 583; Earp v. Tyler, 73 Mo. 617; Henson v. Hampton, 32 Mo. 408; Aaron v. Moore, 34 Mo. 79; Yeats v. Ballentine, 56 Mo. 536.

MCENTIRE & LOEVY, for the respondent.

THOMPSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace upon the following statement of claim:

“ST. LOUIS, Mo., April 7th, 1884.

L. Freund & Bro. to Hermann Hanel, Dr.

To 8 1/2 days work done and performed, ending.

April 6th, 1884, c. $24.

$6.80.”

The plaintiff had a judgment before the justice, and the defendant appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court the defendant did not appear on the day on which the case was called for trial, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff by default for $6.80, the sum above claimed. On the same day the defendant, by his counsel, filed a motion to set aside the default on the following grounds:

1. “That the case was tried while the attorney for the defendant was engaged in another court.”

2. “That this court has no jurisdiction to try the case anew or to render said judgment.”

3. “That defendants have a meritorious defence.”

Annexed to this was an affidavit of the defendant's attorney stating that, at the time when the default was taken, he was engaged in another cause in another room of the same court, and that he left the room and went to the court in which the default was taken, at 20 minutes past 10 o'clock in order to inform this court of his engagement in the other room, when he learned that the judgment by default had just been rendered; that he then appealed to the court to have it set aside, and that the court directed him to file a motion to that effect; that his name was entered as attorney for the defendant on the attorney's docket in the court room, and that he believes that the plaintiff knew of that fact, and that he nevertheless asked for the default. The affidavit then proceeded thus: “Affiant further says that he knows defendants to have a good defence to this action, consisting in this, that plaintiff was employed by defendants for the term of one month, or from month to month, and that plaintiff left their employ before the end of the month and during such month without good or any reason, and brings this suit for the pro rata wages, contrary to the law and contract; that he knows this from the sworn evidence produced at the trial before the justice of the peace.”

The court refused to set aside the default, filing a written opinion which is preserved in the bill of exceptions, in which the only ground for so refusing is stated as follows: “Defendant claims that plaintiff engaged to work for a specified time and left before it was finished, and without cause. The suit is on a quantum meruit and the facts recited by defendant are no bar to plaintiff's recovery, unless it also appeared that defendant was in some wise injured or damaged by reason of plaintiff's giving up the service before expiration of the time for which he was engaged. This is not claimed. Hence, if the plaintiff actually worked for a period for defendant, as admitted, and the work was beneficial to the latter, the reasonable value thereof can be recovered.”

On the same day on which this motion was overruled, the defendant filed a motion for a rehearing, urging, among other grounds, that the court erred in holding that the defence described in the affidavit was not a legal defence to the action. The court overruled this motion, at the same time filing another written opinion, which is likewise preserved in the bill of exceptions, setting forth more elaborately than in the former opinion the views of the court to the effect that the defence set up in the affidavit was not a good defence to the action, because the action being upon a quantum meruit, it was not a defence that the plaintiff had broken his contract by quitting the service of the defendants before the expiration of the month for which he had agreed to serve them.

1. The first question which arises is, whether the reason which the court gave for refusing to set aside the default can be considered at all. If it can be considered, then the second question is, whether it was a good reason.

Where a court of nisi prius makes a ruling upon a question of law, a reviewing court is not concerned with the reason which induces the nisi prius court so to rule; since, if the ruling is correct in point of law, it will not be reversed because an erroneous reason may have been given for making it. It is, therefore the universal rule that the judges of the courts of first instance are not bound to state the reasons which lead their minds to the conclusions embodied in their rulings, much less to deliver written opinions, although it is highly proper and commendable in them to do so. A court which delivers its judgments, without announcing its reasons therefor, is not likely to retain the confidence of the bar and the public; and we know from our own experience that nothing so conduces to the careful decision of causes as the habit of stating the case and giving in writing the reason for the judgment which the judge renders or the ruling which he makes. As a general rule, opinions written by the circuit judges form no part of their record on appeal or error, although embodied in the bill of exceptions; though sometimes, where the case has been tried by the judge without a jury, they have been treated as declarations of law given by him of his own motion in the absence of any given in a more formal manner. But while these opinions are, as a general rule, no part of the record on appeal or error, it does not follow that the practice of bringing them to our attention is not conducive to the administration of justice. We have found them in...