Haney v. Board of Com'rs of Roads & Revenues of Bartow County

• Decision Date: 17 July 1893
• Parties: HANEY v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF ROADS & REVENUES OF BARTOW COUNTY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

18 S.E. 28

91 Ga. 770

HANEY v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF ROADS & REVENUES OF BARTOW COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 17, 1893

Syllabus by the Court.

The act approved October 21, 1891, (Acts 1890-91, vol. 1. p. 135,) in relation to public roads, is a general law, and as such does not, because it provides that it "shall not go into effect in any county in this state until it is recommended by the grand jury of said county," violate the constitutional requirement that laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state. Nor does the act confer upon grand juries the powers of legislation. This act is not unconstitutional, in that it denies the right to trial by jury, nor as creating a rate of taxation not uniform in its character, nor as containing more than one subject-matter, or matter different from what is expressed in its title.

Error from superior court, Bartow county; T. W. Milner, Judge.

Action by the board of commissioners of roads and revenues of Bartow county against D. J. Haney, as a defaulter, under the general road law. Judgment for the board of commissioners, and Haney brings error. Affirmed.

J. W Harris, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

A. W Fite, A. S. Johnson, and John H. Wikle, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN J.

This case involves the constitutionality of the act approved October 21, 1891, (Acts 1890-91, vol. 1. p. 135) known as the "General Road Law." We will briefly deal with the several objections to this act in the deal with the several objections to this act in the order in which they were presented to us.

It was insisted that, viewed as a special or local law, this act must fall--First, because there was at the time of its passage a general law on the same subject already in existence, and embodied in the Code, from section 597, to section 666, both inclusive; and, secondly, because it was passed without local a publication, as required by the constitution. We do not think this act either is, or was intended to be, special or local legislation, and tended to be, special or local legislation, and will therefore proceed to inquire whether or not, viewed as a general law, it can constitutionally stand. The learned counsel for the plaintiff in error earnestly contended that, regarded as a law of a general nature, this act violates the constitutional requirement that such laws shall have uniform operation throughout the state, because the territory in which it can operate is limited to less than the whole state by the provision in the law itself that it "shall not go into effect in any county of this state until it is recommended by the grand jury of said county." That this objection is not well taken has been settled by the principle announced with reference to the "general local option liquor law" in Crabb v. State, 88 Ga. 584, 15 S.E 455. What is therein said concerning the general liquor law is equally true of the general road law, viz. that there is no county in the state to which this law will not, in certain contingencies, which the laws itself anticipates, be applicable. If every grand jury in Georgia should recommend that this road law go into effect, its operation would become universal all over the state; and therefore, in our opinion, the act may and does apply to every county in the state. The distinction between this act and the county court act, as construed by this court in Lorentz v. Alexander, 87 Ga. 444, 13 S.E. 632, is the same as that between the latter act and the general liquor law, which was pointed out in the Crabb Case, supra.

The objection that the act before us confers upon grand juries the powers of legislation is, also, not well taken. It has...