Hanlon v. Town of Milton

• Decision Date: 21 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1980-CQ.,99-1980-CQ.
• Citation: 612 N.W.2d 44,2000 WI 61,235 Wis.2d 597
• Parties: James D. HANLON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF MILTON, Town Board of Milton, William Cunningham, Harold Traynor, Ronald Kaiser, Gerald Fredrick, James Clark, and Kenneth Hull, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

235 Wis.2d 597

2000 WI 61

612 N.W.2d 44

James D. HANLON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF MILTON, Town Board of Milton, William Cunningham, Harold Traynor, Ronald Kaiser, Gerald Fredrick, James Clark, and Kenneth Hull, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-1980-CQ.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument January 7, 2000.

Decided June 21, 2000.

For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by J. Ric Gass, John F. Hovel, Joseph S. Goode, Michael D. Rosenberg and Kravit, Gass, Hovel & Leitner, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Joseph S. Goode.

For the defendants-appellees, there was a brief by Ted Waskowski, Meg Vergeront and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, and oral argument by Ted Waskowski.

¶ 1. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.

This is a certification of a question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (1997-98).¹Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 186 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 1999). The question of law certified for determination is:

Whether a litigant challenging an administrative determination according to the provisions set forth in Chapter 68 may bring an equal protection claim and whether the reviewing Wisconsin court may consider the merits of such a claim under this chapter when the claim arises from the same transaction forming the basis for the administrative determination so that the failure to raise such a claim invokes the doctrine of claim preclusion.

[1, 2]

¶ 2. We review questions of law independently. In re Badger Lines, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 646, 653, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to discern the intent of the legislature. Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 365, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999).

¶ 3. The Town of Milton (Town)² asserts that James D. Hanlon (Hanlon) is precluded from bringing his equal protection claim for one of two reasons. The Town argues that Hanlon's failure to bring his equal protection claim within his Wis. Stat. ch. 68 certiorari review precludes him from now asserting that claim; alternatively, the Town argues that Hanlon's failure to join his equal protection claim with his ch. 68 certiorari review precludes him from asserting that claim. We do not agree with either reason. ¶ 4. We conclude that a litigant cannot bring a claim for money damages grounded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983)³ in a certiorari proceeding brought under Wis. Stat. ch. 68. We further conclude that although Hanlon could have joined his § 1983 claim with his ch. 68 certiorari review, he was not required to do so. Failure to join these actions does not preclude him from now bringing his § 1983 claim.

Procedural History

¶ 5. The procedural facts giving rise to this question of law can be briefly recounted. In 1990 Hanlon sought a conditional use permit from the Town of Milton Planning and Zoning Committee (Committee). Hanlon wanted to operate a gravel quarry on his agricultural property. The Committee held one meeting in February 1990 at which it considered Hanlon's application as well as two other applications for conditional use permits. These two applicants, defendants James Clark and Gerald Fredrick, were members of the Planning and Zoning Committee. Fredrick was not in attendance at the meeting. Clark abstained from voting on both Hanlon's application as well as his own permit request.

¶ 6. Hanlon's application met with significant public opposition and was denied primarily on this basis. The two remaining applications were approved. Local residents raised no objection to these permit requests.

¶ 7. Hanlon appealed. In September 1990 the Town of Milton Town Board (Board) affirmed the decision of the Committee.

¶ 8. In October 1990 Hanlon sought certiorari review in Rock County Circuit Court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 68.13 (1989-90). In an order issued in November 1991 the circuit court reversed the Board's decision. The circuit court found the Board's decision to have been arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable and that the Board failed to comply with requirements for conducting a hearing on administrative review as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 68.11 (1989-90). The circuit court ordered that a new hearing be held in compliance with the statute.

¶ 9. On remand, a hearing was conducted before an independent hearing examiner. After taking evidence, the examiner denied Hanlon's application in September 1994.

¶ 10. In October 1994 Hanlon again sought certiorari review. In November 1995 the circuit court reversed the hearing examiner's decision. The Town appealed. In an unpublished decision issued in September 1996 the court of appeals reversed this ruling and upheld the Town's decision to deny Hanlon's 1990 application for a conditional use permit. This court denied Hanlon's subsequent petition for review.

¶ 11. In September 1997 Hanlon brought an action in federal district court under § 1983, alleging that the defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law by denying his conditional use permit application, and seeking money damages. The Town moved for summary judgment, which was granted. Hanlon appealed. Subsequently the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to this court the question we now address.

Analysis

¶ 12. We have been asked to address a narrow question of law: when a municipal administrative determination gives rise to an equal protection claim for money damages actionable under § 1983, must this equal protection claim be brought and heard in a Wis. Stat. § 68.13 certiorari proceeding brought by the litigant? The Town argues that failure to assert the § 1983 claim within the Wis. Stat. ch. 68 proceeding, or to join these claims arising from the same transaction, results in claim preclusion. See Northern States Power v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). We disagree with both arguments.

¶ 13. We first address the Town's argument that Hanlon's § 1983 claim for money damages must be brought in his Wis. Stat. § 68.13 certiorari proceeding.⁴ The Town contends that the purpose of Wis. Stat. ch. 68 is to provide a constitutionally sufficient process for the review of municipal determinations that implicate rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wis. Stat. § 68.001.⁵ Although we agree that litigants can raise constitutional objections to municipal determination in certiorari review, we do not agree that a claim for money damages based upon § 1983 may be brought in this forum.

¶ 14. In a certiorari proceeding a litigant may argue that his or her constitutional right to equal protection has been violated in an effort to establish that a municipal determination was not made according to law or is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive. Tateoka v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 220 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 670-72, 583 N.W.2d 871 (Ct. App. 1998) (equal protection challenge considered in Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10 certiorari review); Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Dane County, 183 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 292-96, 515 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1994) (challenging a zoning board decision on equal protection grounds in certiorari review); Shannon & Riordan v. Zoning Board, 153 Wis. 2d 713, 722, 724-31, 451 N.W.2d 479 (Ct. App. 1989) (denial of equal protection and due process rights argued in certiorari review brought under Wis. Stat. §§ 62.23(7)(e)10, (i) and 753.04).

¶ 15. However, and key to understanding this issue, there is a distinction between presenting an equal protection argument in a Wis. Stat. ch. 68 certiorari proceeding and asserting an equal protection claim for money damages under § 1983.

¶ 16. One purpose of a § 1983 claim is to create a tort remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights by government action. Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 297, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). The relief available to a litigant from the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) is limited. Under § 68.13(1) the court can only affirm, reverse, or remand for additional proceedings in accord with the court's judgment.⁶ In contrast, remedies demanded by Hanlon in his § 1983 claim included monetary damages and reasonable attorney fees.⁷

¶ 17. According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments:

The general rule [concerning claim splitting] is largely predicated on the assumption that the jurisdiction in which the first judgment was rendered was one which put no formal barriers in the way of a litigant's presenting to a court in one action the entire claim including any theories of recovery or demands for relief that might have been available to him [or her] under applicable law. When such formal barriers in fact existed and were operative against a plaintiff in the first action, it is unfair to preclude him from a second action in which he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from presenting in the first.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c), cmt. c (1982). [3]

¶ 18. Because the issue of monetary damages could not have been litigated in the Wis. Stat. ch. 68 proceeding, we conclude that Hanlon's § 1983 claim could not have been brought by him within his ch. 68 certiorari review.⁸

¶ 19. We turn next to the Town's alternative argument. The Town points out that Wis. Stat. ch. 68 provides that the remedies within ch. 68 "shall not be exclusive." Wis. Stat. § 68.01. The Town asserts that Hanlon could have joined a § 1983 claim to his statutory certiorari claim. The Town contends because Hanlon failed to join these actions, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Hanlon's claim presently before the federal courts.

[4, 5]

¶ 20. Claim preclusion "is designed to draw a line between the meritorious claim on the one hand and the vexatious, repetitious and needless claim on the other hand." Northern States Power, 189 Wis. 2d at 550 (quoting Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 689-90 (3d Cir. 1985)). Key objectives of the doctrine of...