Hann v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | 39881-8-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | KIM A. HANN, individually, Appellant, v. PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY., Respondent |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Kim A Hann appeals a summary judgment order dismissing her claim against Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company for underinsured motorist coverage. She claims marital status discrimination. We affirm.
On September 9, 2005, Hann was a passenger and John Combs was driving Hann's vehicle westbound on 6th Avenue in Tacoma. Combs turned right on a green light onto Jackson Avenue when Richard Squire, an uninsured driver, failed to stop at the red light and struck Hann's vehicle. Hann sustained serious personal injuries.[1]
Hann made an uninsured motorist claim to Metropolitan Insurance Company, with which she had personal injury protection (PIP) and uninsured motorist coverage (UIM). Combs had vehicles of his own that he insured through Progressive; he also had UIM coverage. Progressive paid personal injury protection benefits (PIP) to Combs but denied Hann's request for such benefits, explaining that she was not insured under Combs's policy.
In October 2008, Hann sued Progressive, seeking UIM benefits because her own UIM coverage was insufficient to fully compensate her for her injuries. Progressive denied her request, explaining that she was not an insured person under Combs's policy. On July 10, 2009, Progressive moved for summary judgment. Hann responded, claiming that Progressive's policy discriminated against her on the basis of marriage (she and Combs lived together but were not married). The trial court granted Progressive's motion. Hann appeals.
We review a summary judgment order de novo, making the same inquiry as the trial court; summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue about any material fact and, assuming facts most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law subject to de novo review. Overton v. Consol. Ins. Co., 145 Wn.2d 417, 424, 38 P.3d 322 (2002).
Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 154 Wn.2d 165, 171-172, 110 P.3d 733 (2005).
The Legislature has mandated that the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Chapter 49.60 RCW, be liberally construed to eliminate and prevent discrimination. RCW 49.60.020. Additionally, any exceptions to the chapter are to be narrowly confined. Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989).
In the underinsured motorist context, the statutes reflect a strong public policy of protecting innocent victims of automobile accidents from underinsured and uninsured drivers. Blackburn v. Safeco Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 82, 794 P.2d 1259 (1990).
Hann seeks UIM benefits under Combs's Progressive insurance policy because her own UIM coverage with Metropolitan was insufficient to fully compensate her for her injuries. Hann is not covered under the terms of Combs's policy because (A) she is not listed as an "insured person" and (B) her vehicle was not listed as a "covered vehicle."
Under Combs's Progressive policy, an "insured person" is "you." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 81. "You" is yourself, anyone else declared on the policy, and the spouse of an insured, and a relative. CP at 81. Hann is not the insured, is not declared on the policy, is not Combs's spouse, and is not a relative. Thus Hann is not an "insured person" under the express language of Combs's policy.
A "covered vehicle" is any vehicle declared on Combs's policy or a replacement vehicle. Hann's vehicle is not declared in the policy. CP at 80.
Combs could have declared Hann on his policy but apparently chose not to do so. And Hann, who insured herself through Metropolitan, could have purchased higher UIM limits but chose not to; she also could have chosen to insure with Progressive, but did not. Reading the four corners of Combs's policy, Progressive did not err in refusing UIM coverage to Hann.
Hann argues that had she been married to Combs, she would have been covered under his insurance policy with Progressive and that the policy therefore discriminates against her as an unmarried person. We need not analyze this claim because there was no coverage for Hann or her vehicle under Combs's policy regardless of her marital status. Combs's policy contained an "owned vehicle" exclusion. Such exclusions "prevent an insured from receiving coverage on another household car by merely purchasing a single policy." Barth v. Allstate Ins. Co, 95 Wn.App. 552, 560, 977 P.2d 6 (1999) (quoting Brown v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 42 Wn.App. 503, 507, 711 P.2d 1105 (1986)).
RCW 48.22.030 specifically authorizes these exclusions, and courts have repeatedly held them not to contravene public policy. Barth, 95 Wn.App. at 560. Schelinski v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. 71 Wn.App. 783, 790, 863 P.2d 564 (1993); Anderson v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 43 Wn.App. 852, 856, 719 P.2d 1345 (1986). Schelinski involved an insured driving his wife's vehicle, which was insured by another insurer. The court applied the exclusion and affirmed that it did not violate public policy. Brown involved a passenger-husband who had insurance through a different insurance provider on two other vehicles. The court affirmed the denial of coverage and held that the provision was neither ambiguous nor contrary to public policy.
Hann's vehicle was not a covered vehicle under Combs's Progressive policy in that it was not listed on his policy nor was it a replacement or newly-acquired vehicle under his policy. It made no difference if they were married. Part III, the UIM coverage, included the following exclusions:
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