Hanna v. Ford

• Decision Date: 07 October 1940
• Docket Number: 34225
• Citation: 198 So. 37,189 Miss. 464
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HANNA v. FORD

198 So. 37

189 Miss. 464

HANNA v. FORD

No. 34225

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 7, 1940

APPEAL from the circuit court of Forrest county, HON. F. B. COLLINS Judge.

Suit by Frank H. Ford against Mrs. E. W. Hanna, to cancel defendant's interest in land. From a decree of the Circuit Court affirming a decree of the county court for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and bill dismissed.

Reversed and bill dismissed.

George W. Currie and Alfred Moore, both of Hattiesburg, for appellant.

We submit to the court that the judgment and decree of the circuit court was manifestly erroneous, and that the appellee lost any right of redemption under the 1932 Act. It is apparently the contention of the appellee that irrespective of the provisions of Chapter 286, Laws of 1932, he still had until two years after he became twenty-one years of age in which to redeem the property, as provided under the old law. It is clear that in the present case the tax sale under which the appellant claims was made not before, but at least two years after the passage of the Act of 1932, which limited the appellee's right to redeem to a period of two years after the tax sale. If the tax sale under which the appellant claims had been made before the passage of Chapter 286, Laws of 1932, it might be argued that the Act if retroactive would be unconstitutional, or that it would not apply to sales made prior to its passage, so as to divest a then vested right of redemption. But in the present case, there is no possibility that the appellee had any vested right of redemption, except as provided by the law in force at the time of the making of the tax sale. We submit that there is therefore no question whatever of the validity, as well as the applicability of Chapter 286, Laws of 1932, to the present case.

The legislature has a perfect right to pass statutes which lengthen or shorten periods of redemption from tax sales provided only that they do not undertake to destroy a vested right of redemption under a law in existence at the time the sale was made.

Dingey et al. v. Paxton et al., 60 Miss. 1038; Moody v Hoskins, 1 So. 622; McNamara v. Baird et al., 16 So. 385; Russell Inv. Corp. v. Russell, 182 So. 102; Capital State Bank et al. v. Lewis et al., 2 So. 243; Jones County Land Co. v. Fox, 83 So. 241; Price v. Harley, 107 So. 673; Everett v. Williamson, 143 So. 690; Byers Machine Co. v. Cobb Bros. Const. Co. et al., 179 So. 565; Code of 1930, secs. 3238-3243 and 3264, as amended by Laws 1932, Chap. 286.

We submit that the case of Moore et al. v. Rotenberry, 196 So. 758, is exactly in point here, and that the opinion of the court in that case settles all questions in controversy here squarely against the appellee.

The amendment was intended to restrict, rather than to enlarge, the saving clause in favor of infants, so as to limit their right to redeem their land within two years after attaining full age to such land as they might, after the passage of the act, inherit or acquire by will; and was doubtless intended to prevent the conveyance of land to minors by deed thereafter for the sole purpose of permitting the land to be sold while the title was in the name of such minor, with the intention on the part of the grantor to continue in possession and enjoyment of the same without the payment of taxes during the period within which the minor would have had to redeem, had the amendment not been adopted so as to limit the right to redeem, within two years after reaching his majority, to only such land as he may have inherited, or acquired by will.

Chap. 286, Laws 1932; Sec. 3256, Code of 1930.

In construing every statute, the supreme court of the State of Mississippi has repeatedly held that the fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.

Darnell v. Johnson, 109 Miss. 507, 68 So. 780; Roseberry v. Norsworthy, 135 Miss. 845, 100 So. 514.

F. M. Morris, of Hattiesburg, for appellee.

The appellant instead of taking the plain and unambiguous statement of law as found in Chapter 286 of the Laws of 1932, page 613, which chapter amends Section 3264 of the Code of 1930 prefers to so construe it by inserting words that were never intended by the Legislature and to hold their position tentatively it would be necessary for this court to rewrite the law rather than to construe its plain meaning as the Legislature wrote it.

No principle is more firmly established, or rests on more secure foundations, than the rule which declares when a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, that the Legislature shall be intended to mean what they plainly expressed, and, consequently, no room is left for construction.

Koch and Dryfus v. Bridges et al., 45 Miss. 247.

Measuring this statute by this rule, it is clear that the Legislature by this amendment, intended to limit its application to infants only who had land on the date of the enactment of the statute, or may thereafter inherit or acquire land by will.

The court is urged by counsel for appellant to hold that the Legislature intended, and that this statute means, to limit the application of this saving clause to infants who have inherited, or may hereafter inherit or acquire lands by will. To so construe it would be against the rules of good grammer and against the plain meaning expressed in the statute; and it would be against the rules of liberal construction which our supreme court has held should be applied in such cases.

Redemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor of those seeking to redeem their lands.

Derrington v. Ross, 90 So. 682, 128 Miss. 16; Gousquet v. Brown, 119 So. 166, 152 Miss. 171; McLain v. Meletio, 147 So. 878, 166 Miss. 1.

The further argument should be made that the verb "have" in the sentence: "Saving only to infants who have or may hereafter inherit or acquire by will" means to possess or own at the time of the Legislature's enactment. It is a matter of common and correct usage to say: "I have certain lands" meaning to own and to possess the same.

Twentieth-Century Dictionary; Potter v. Eaton, 26 Wis. 382, 383.

To make the statute mean what the appellant claims it should mean, the meaning of the statute would be distorted as follows: "Saving only to infants who have inherited or may hereafter inherit or have acquired or may hereafter acquire by will." It is clear that the intention of the Legislature was, as held by this court in the case of Moore et al. v. Rotenberry, 196 So. 758, that this statute was intended to prevent the title of land, after the passage of the act, from being conveyed to infants for the purpose of preventing the collection of taxes thereon. To construe the statute as the county and circuit courts construed it, effectively places a distinction upon the limitations due to minors after the enactment but recognizes the existing and continuing rights of minors who had land before the passage of the act by using the words "who have land."

The only change accomplished and intended to be accomplished by the Legislature in amending Section 3264 of the Code of 1930 by Chapter 286 of the Laws of 1932 was to prevent in the future persons from conveying land to minors for the sole purpose of enlarging the time for redemption and the Legislature by its very words recognizes a difference in the status of minors who had land prior to its enactment and minors who acquire land in any manner after the time of the enactment of the statute.

OPINION

McGowen, J.

On June 23, 1939, Frank H. Ford, Jr., appellee, filed on the equity side of the County Court of Forrest County, Mississippi, a bill against Mrs. E. W. Hanna, the appellant, in which he alleged, as follows:

That certain lands in the City of Hattiesburg, Forrest County, had been patented by the United States to an individual, and after many conveyances, Frank H. Ford, Jr., became the owner thereof by a deed dated December 10, 1931, and recorded in the land records of that county.

That F. H. Ford, Jr., being unable to pay the State and county taxes due on the said lot for the year 1933, the property was sold to the State of Mississippi for taxes, and that thereafter the title was permitted and allowed to mature in the State, except for the fact that the appellee was then a minor.

That the appellee was twenty-one years of age on July 25, 1938, and that he had until July 25, 1940, within which to redeem the land from the tax sale.

That the appellant, Mrs. Hanna, undertook to purchase the land from the State of Mississippi at a time when she knew or ought to have known that the appellee was a minor, and that he had until July 25, 1940, within which to redeem the property.

That the husband and agent of Mrs. Hanna represented to the State Land Commissioner that he, Ford, the appellee, was twenty-five years of age; and that this was a misrepresentation and was made in order to fraudulently procure the land from the State.

That the State issued a patent for the said land to Mrs. Hanna, the appellant, on April 25, 1939, referring to the land deed records for the recordation thereof.

That appellee, Ford, wrote the appellant that he desired to redeem the property, and enclosed a check for $ 52.50, being the alleged amount paid by Mrs. Hanna for the land, and that she refused to accept the check and returned it to him.

That the appellee owes the appellant $ 52.50, out of which the cost of this case should be paid, and tenders $ 52.50 with his bill. It is charged that the property is worth less than $ 1, 000.

The prayer of the bill was that the appellee be permitted to redeem the property from the State and that all interest of the appellant, Mrs. Hanna, in...