Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo.

• Decision Date: 31 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-2401,84-2401
• Citation: 795 F.2d 1385
• Parties: 21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 130 David HANNAH, Appellant, v. CITY OF OVERLAND, MISSOURI; Overland Police Department; St. Louis County, Missouri; Ralph Crump; Raymond Poeschel; Russell Coffell; Robert Morrissey and Michael O'Brien, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1385

795 F.2d 1385

21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 130

David HANNAH, Appellant, v. CITY OF OVERLAND, MISSOURI; Overland Police Department St. Louis County, Missouri; Ralph Crump; Raymond Poeschel; Russell Coffell; Robert Morrissey and Michael O'Brien Appellees.

No. 84-2401.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 1986.

Decided July 8, 1986.

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1986.

Edwin O. Switzer, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Robert Herman and J. Michael Waller, St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

Before McMILLIAN and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, and HANSON, ^* Senior District Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff David Hannah appeals from the judgment entered by the District Court ¹ in favor of all defendants. Hannah filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging, inter alia, that he was arrested and detained without probable cause on a capital murder charge; that the arresting officers used unreasonable and excessive force in arresting him; that at the police station after the arrest he was forced to remove all of his clothes except his underwear and to remain unclothed for several hours; that he was threatened and assaulted by the police officers during interrogation; that the police officers suppressed evidence that exonerated him; and that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical and dental needs during his pre-trial detention at the St. Louis County jail. At the close of all the evidence at trial, the District Court directed verdicts for and dismissed without explanation defendants City of Overland, Overland Police Department, Chief of Police Raymond Poeschel, Detective Robert Morrissey and Detective Michael O'Brien. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the three remaining defendants, Detective Ralph Crump, Officer Russell Coffell and St. Louis County.

I.

Robert "Red" Musgrove was murdered on June 18, 1981 between 12:30 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. on the front parking lot of his residence and business on Woodson Road in Overland, Missouri. Musgrove had been shot four times in the chest with a .38 caliber weapon, possibly fired from a nearby alley. The St. Louis Major Case Squad and the Overland Police Department investigated the murder. Detective Ralph Crump of the Overland Police Department was in charge of the Overland investigation. Detectives Robert Morrissey and Michael O'Brien and Officer Russell Coffell assisted in the investigation.

The investigation uncovered evidence that a life insurance policy on the victim's life had been purchased just prior to the murder, and that the named beneficiary under the policy was the victim's estranged wife, Sharon Musgrove. Mrs. Musgrove's boyfriend at the time of the murder was Charles Bullock, who was an acquaintance of David Hannah.

David Hannah, upon request by the Overland police, voluntarily spoke with the investigating officers as many as seven or eight times prior to his arrest on July 2, 1981. Detective Crump testified that Hannah gave them a written statement in their first interview with him on June 19 stating that he and Bullock were drinking together on the night of the murder, and that they later ate at a Taco Bell restaurant on Woodson Road. Hannah stated that they arrived at Taco Bell at approximately 12:30 a.m. The Taco Bell restaurant is located within a block of the murder scene. Other witnesses interviewed by the Overland police confirmed that Hannah and a car matching the description of a car driven by Hannah at the time of his arrest on July 2 were seen at the Taco Bell restaurant at the approximate time of the murder.

In the early morning hours on July 2, 1981, defendants Crump and Coffell interviewed a Danny Beede. Beede had been taken into custody by the Overland police because of an outstanding arrest warrant. Beede, who initiated the conversation, told Crump and Coffell that on June 27, 1981, he had been drinking at a local bar with a man whom he knew as "Dave." His description of Dave--a thirty-year-old white male, 5'9", medium build--generally matched David Hannah's features. According to Beede, Dave had told him that he had shot a man four times in the chest with a .38 from an alley, and had silenced the shots by placing a baby bottle nipple over the revolver. Dave also stated that the victim's wife would receive a large sum of money and that he would receive a new motorcycle as payment for his role in the murder. Many of the details provided by Beede lent credibility to his statement because they matched details of Musgrove's murder that had not been released to the press or to the general public. Based in large part on Beede's statement and the other information noted above which was then available to the Overland Police Department, Hannah was arrested without a warrant at the direction of defendant Crump at 2:30 a.m. on July 2, 1981 (immediately after Beede gave his statement).

Hannah was taken to the Overland police station and was charged with capital murder. After being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, Hannah gave a written statement to the police. ² In that statement Hannah admitted that in late May 1981 Charles Bullock had offered him $1000, a motorcycle, and a trip to Jamaica if he would kill Robert Musgrove. Bullock also said, according to Hannah, that if Musgrove were killed he and Sharon Musgrove "would be rich." Hannah stated that he refused the offer, after which Bullock responded that it was only a joke and that he was just testing Hannah. After the murder, according to Hannah, Bullock and Sharon Musgrove talked about their "newly acquired wealth."

Hannah also was given a polygraph examination on July 2. When asked whether he shot Musgrove and whether he was present when Musgrove was shot, Hannah answered "no." In the opinion of the polygraph examiner, Hannah was "deceptive and not truthful in his answers." Hannah was released later that day by the Overland police.

On the basis of this and other corroborating information, the Overland police obtained an arrest warrant on Hannah for capital murder, and Hannah was arrested a second time on July 27, 1981. A St. Louis County grand jury returned an indictment for capital murder against Hannah on August 3, 1981.

Hannah was detained in the St. Louis County jail for approximately eleven months until the criminal charge was dropped on June 25, 1982. According to Joseph Larrew of the St. Louis County prosecutor's office, the capital murder charge was dropped when Danny Beede, the prosecution's key witness, refused to testify or cooperate with the prosecutor unless he was given some kind of "deal" regarding a prison sentence he then was serving in Ohio on an unrelated conviction. Because the St. Louis County prosecutor's office had no authority or jurisdiction to agree to such a bargain in exchange for Beede's testimony, which was of critical importance to the State's case, the charges were dropped. Hannah then filed this civil rights action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights arising out of his arrests and his detention in the St. Louis County jail.

II.

On appeal Hannah alleges five grounds of reversible error by the District Court. Hannah contends that the court erred in: (1) refusing to allow him to testify as to his "alibi"--i.e., his innocence and his whereabouts at the time of the murder; (2) refusing to admit into evidence the deposition testimony of two persons regarding perceived threats made to them by Overland police officers; (3) admitting evidence of his prior criminal convictions during cross-examination to impeach his credibility; (4) directing verdicts in favor of five of the defendants; and (5) denying leave to amend the complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

A.

Hannah first contends that the District Court erred in refusing to allow him to testify as to his "alibi"--i.e., his innocence generally and his whereabouts on the night of the murder specifically. Hannah argues that such testimony is relevant to the issue of whether defendants acted in good faith and had probable cause to arrest him on July 2, 1981 and again on July 27, 1981.

An appellant bears a heavy burden under the appellate standard of review of a district court's evidentiary rulings. Whether to admit or exclude testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. This Court will reverse a district court's decision to exclude evidence only if the district court has abused its discretion. United States v. Curnew, 788 F.2d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir.1986); Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir.1985) ("Questions of relevancy are committed to the broad discretion of the trial court....").

It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an individual's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Sartin v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 434 (8th Cir.1976). But a police officer "who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (suspect's innocence of the criminal charge is irrelevant to his claim since the Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested).

This Court often has addressed the issue of probable cause. We previously have stated that

[i]n determining whether probable cause exists to make a warrantless arrest, a court will consider whether the totality of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person in believing the individual arrested had committed ... an offense. Probable cause is to be assessed in terms of the circumstances confronting a reasonably cautious police officer at the time of the arrest, and the arresting officer is entitled to consider the circumstances, including arguably innocent...