Hannah v. State, 93

• Decision Date: 12 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 93,93
• Citation: 3 Md.App. 325,239 A.2d 124
• Parties: Bruce George HANNAH, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 325

3 Md.App. 325

239 A.2d 124

Bruce George HANNAH, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 93.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 12, 1968.

Joseph E. O'Brien, Jr., Rockville, for appellant.

Henry J. Frankel, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Wm. A. Linthicum, Jr., State's Atty., for Montgomery County, Barry H. Helfand, Asst. State's Atty., for Montgomery County, Rockville, on brief.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

MORTON, Judge.

The Appellant, Bruce George Hannah, Jr., was convicted of arson and burglary by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Judge Walter H. Moorman, the presiding judge, sentenced him to the Maryland Penitentiary for periods of fifteen years and five years, respectively, the sentences to be served concurrently.

In this appeal, he contends (1) that the failure of the lower court to make timely appointment of counsel constituted a denial of due process and (2) that there was legally insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

Hannah was arrested on July 14, 1966, in connection with a fire which had occurred in St. Paul's Methodist Church, Kensington, Maryland, early in the morning of May 3, 1966. Unable to furnish bond, he remained incarcerated until his trial, which was held on December 8, 1966. He had waived a preliminary hearing on July 19, 1966; was indicted on September 8, 1966; and arraigned on October 7, 1966, at which time counsel was appointed to represent him. His Motion to Dismiss for Lack of a Speedy Trial was based on the alleged excessive lapse of time between the date of his arrest and the appointment of counsel. The Motion, after hearing, was denied by the lower court on October 25, 1966.

I.

In support of his first contention, the Appellant argues that the failure to appoint counsel in a timely manner: (a) prevented the Appellant from making a well reasoned decision with regard to his right to a preliminary hearing, (b) made more difficult the preparation of his defense with respect to the collection of evidence, and (c) caused a delay in the trial of his case, thereby denying him his right to a speedy trial. We find these arguments to be unconvincing.

There is no requirement that a preliminary hearing be held, even if demanded, since it is not an essential proceeding in obtaining a valid conviction, Ross v. Warden, 1 Md.App. 46, 52, 227 A.2d 42, and even where a preliminary hearing is conducted, this Court has held that, except in the most unusual circumstances, an accused has no absolute right to have counsel appointed prior thereto. Crumb v. State, 1 Md.App. 98, 104, 227 A.2d 369. The Appellant's reliance upon Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, is misplaced. Miranda and Escobedo deal with the validity of confessions in the absence of counsel; and as Chief Judge Murphy stated for this Court in State v. Hardy, 2 Md.App. 150, p. 155, 233 A.2d 365, p. 368:

'Contrary to the view that Hardy's attorney urged upon the court at the post conviction hearing, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, deals with representation by counsel at the trial itself, and does not apply the right to counsel 'retrospectively to every substantive stage of a criminal proceeding in Maryland.' There is no constitutional requirement that a person be granted counsel at the time of arrest.'

It is apparent, therefore, that the lapse of time between the Appellant's arrest and the appointment of his counsel did not constitute a denial of a speedy trial or a denial of due process of law.

II.

We think there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The record revealed that the Minister of St. Paul's had left the church about 10:50 P.M. on the evening of May 2, 1966, being the last to leave. About 12:50 A.M. on the morning of May 3, 1966, he received a call telling him of a fire at the church. Upon his arrival he could see that the sanctuary was in flames and thereafter he was able to enter the church with the Fire Marshall. He was unable to say whether anything was missing. However, he did identify a partially burned photograph of a religious picture used as a teaching aid in the church school. He explained that it was found on the floor of an interior storage closet in a room where only teachers in the school were allowed; that the picture, along with others, was regularly kept on a table in the outer area; and that the pictures were not distributed outside the church. It was on this picture that the Appellant's fingerprints were found.

The Minister further testified that certain entrance doors to the church were normally open during the day and normally closed and locked by a night watchman between 10:30 P.M. and 11:00 P.M. each evening. Referring to the evening in question, the Minister stated: 'We pay a man to lock that building and I was there when he locked the building.' He conceded, however, that he did not personally check to ascertain whether the doors were actually locked, but he did hear the doors being closed. Finally, he testified that when he arrived during the fire, one of the exterior doors, which had been closed prior to the fire, was open.

A detective of the Montgomery County Police Department testified as to the finding of the Appellant's fingerprints and estimated that...