Hanney v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 20 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:13-cv-2928-T-36MAP |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER P. HANNEY, Plaintiff, v. MOISES GARCIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause comes before the Court upon five motions to dismiss: (1) Defendant David Gee [sic], Sheriff, Hillsborough County, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law and Counterclaim (Dkt. 15); (2) Defendant Moises Garcia's Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 16); (3) Defendant Victor DeJesus Miranda's Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 17); (4) Defendant Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. D/B/A Tampa General Hospital's Motion to Dismiss "Proposed Supplemental Complaint" and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 21); and (5) Defendant Miguel Santamaria's Motion to Dismiss "Proposed Supplemental Complaint" and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 28). Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the motions to dismiss (Dkts. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37). Having considered the motions to dismiss and Plaintiff's responses thereto, and relevant legal authorities, the Court will now grant Defendants' motions to dismiss.
On November 17, 2009, Plaintiff arrived at the emergency room at Tampa General Hospital ("TGH") in Tampa, Florida, for treatment of a stab wound to his abdomen. While Plaintiff was receiving treatment, Defendant Garcia, a detective with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, and Defendant DeJesus-Miranda, a deputy with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, questioned and obtained information from medical staff at TGH regarding "pain control medication given to the Plaintiff."2 Garcia and DeJesus-Miranda also obtained unspecified medical information from Plaintiff's "medical chart," that was left "unattended" by medical staff at TGH.3 The medical information that was obtained from the medical staff and Plaintiff's "medical chart" was "used against the Plaintiff in a criminal action."4
DeJesus-Miranda handcuffed Plaintiff to his hospital bed and obtained statements from Plaintiff without advising him of "his rights."5 The statements were used against Plaintiff during his criminal trial.6
Finally, while Plaintiff was receiving treatment at TGH, Defendant Santamaria, a chaplain employed by TGH, initiated a conversation with Plaintiff.7 Plaintiff "understood" the conversation "to be spiritual guidance," and "assumed" the conversation was "confidential."8 Santamaria, however, disclosed the information he obtained from Plaintiff during their conversation to police, and subsequently testified against Plaintiff during Plaintiff's criminal trial.9
Plaintiff's criminal trial resulted in a conviction for attempted murder and a life sentence.10
The Second Amended Complaint alleges generally that Defendants' conduct violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution, and Florida Statutes, Sections 395.3025(4)(d) and 90.505, and seeks redress for these violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not, however, indicate which provisions apply to each defendant. In recognition of the fact that he is a pro se litigant, the Court will afford him wide latitude when construing his pleadings, and will use common sense to ascertain the violations alleged therein. See S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the Court discerns that it reasonably appears that Plaintiff is alleging that: (1) Defendants DeJesus-Miranda and Garcia obtaining Plaintiff's medical information without a warrant, subpoena, or Plaintiff's authorization violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,Article I, Sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution,11 and Florida Statutes, Section 395.3025(4)(d);12 (2) Defendant DeJesus-Miranda violated Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because DeJesus-Miranda did not give Plaintiff a Miranda warning before obtaining statements from Plaintiff; (3) Defendant Gee (a) as ultimate authority of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department, is responsible for Defendants DeJesus-Miranda and Garcia's actions, and (b) maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff even though Gee knew of Garcia and DeJesus-Miranda's unconstitutional actions; (4) Defendant Santamaria's actions violated Plaintiff's (a) Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and (b) rights under both Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes, Section 90.505;13 and (5) Defendant TGH (a) violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution, and Florida Statutes, Section 395.3025(4)(d) when its medical personnel answered DeJesus-Miranda and Garcia's questions regarding the pain medication given to Plaintiff, and left Plaintiff's medical chart unattended, and (b) violated Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Plaintiff's rights under Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, and Plaintiff's rights under Florida Statutes, Section 90.505 when Defendant Santamaria provided Plaintiff's "confidential statements" to law enforcement.
As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages from each Defendant.14
To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must include a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Labels, conclusions and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action are not sufficient. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, mere naked assertions are not sufficient. Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, would "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). The court, however, is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a "factual allegation" in the complaint. Id. For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court must view the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff requests money damages for alleged violations of Florida Statutes, Sections 395.3025(4)(d) and 90.505 (Dkt. 10 at docket p. 8). This is a state law claim governed by Florida law. Under Florida law, the violation of a statute can give rise to civil liability only if the statute indicates an intention to create a private cause of action. Murthy v. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985-86 (Fla. 1994). Section 395.3025(4)(d) is "designed to protect the privileged and confidential status accorded to a patient's medical records." State v. Johnson, 814 So. 2d 390, 394 (Fla. 2002)(Pariente, J., concurring). Section 90.505 recognizes an evidentiary privilege for communications to clergy. Neither of these statutes, however, expressly creates a private cause of action for their violation. See Fla. Stat., §§ 395.3025, 90.505. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the Florida Legislature implicitly intended to provide a private right of action for violations of these statutes.
"The primary guide in determining whether the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action is the 'actual language used in the statute.'" QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condominium Apartment Ass'n, Inc., 94 So. 3d 541, 551 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)). Nothing in the language of Sections 395.3025 and 90.505 suggests that the Florida Legislature intended to create a private cause of action for a violation of these statutes. See §§ 395.3025, 90.505. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for money damages for the alleged violations of §§ 395.3025 and 90.505 will be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under Article I, Sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution, and requests money damages for those violations. In Florida, however, "no cause of action exists for money damages for a violation of a state constitutional right." Depaola v. Town of Davie, 872 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 4th DCA Dist. 2004) (citing Garcia v. Reyes, 697 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). See also Holcy v. Flagler County Sheriff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65806, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2007) () (citing Garcia, 697 So. 2d 549).15 Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for money damages for violations of Article I, Sections 12 and 23 will be dismissed.
Garcia and DeJesus-Miranda contend that they are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint because: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for a civil rights violation under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA");16 (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) the Second Amended Complaint...
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