Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Nortoni

• Decision Date: 06 February 1900
• Citation: 154 Mo. 142,55 S.W. 220
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: HANNIBAL & ST. J. R. CO. v. NORTONI et al.

55 S.W. 220

154 Mo. 142

HANNIBAL & ST. J. R. CO. v. NORTONI et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

February 6, 1900.

INVALID DEEDS — CANCELLATION — CLOUD ON TITLE — PARTIES.

1. Where plaintiff was the owner and in possession of a tract of land, and B., while occupying a small portion thereof, was fraudulently induced to execute a deed of the entire tract to defendants, plaintiff could not maintain a suit for the cancellation of the deed, since B. had a right to convey any interest he believed he possessed, and the deed was between third parties, and deprived plaintiff of no right.

2. Where defendants fraudulently induced B. to execute to them a deed to land owned by plaintiff, B. was a necessary party to an action to cancel the deed.

3. Where plaintiff was the owner and in possession of land, and the county deed records showed that a third party attempting to convey the land had no title thereto, plaintiff was not entitled to a cancellation of such third party's deed, as a cloud on his title, since such deed required no extrinsic evidence to show its invalidity.

Appeal from circuit court, Macon county; Andrew Ellison, Judge.

Bill by the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company against Bert D. Nortoni and John E. Gilleland. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This is a suit in equity by plaintiff for the purpose of having a certain warranty deed, in the petition described, purporting to convey a tract of 40 acres of land in Macon county, of which plaintiff is the owner in fee and in possession, to defendants, declared null and void, and a decree entered canceling and removing the same, as being a cloud upon plaintiff's title. The petition charges that plaintiff was the owner and in possession of the land; that for some years prior to May 31, 1893, one William M. Blake occupied some 3 or 4 acres of said land, and that about the 31st day of May, 1893, the defendants, conspiring and intending to injure and defraud this plaintiff, went to said Blake and suggested to him that he should claim said land, and offered to pay him money if he would deed the same to them, and, by their representations and solicitations, fraudulently influenced and induced said Blake to claim the same, and procured from said Blake a warranty deed conveying said lands to them for the recited consideration of $250. The petition further charged that in fact no consideration was paid for said land; that the defendants at the date of their pretended purchase, and for years prior thereto, knew that the land belonged to the plaintiff, and that the said Blake had no title or interest in or to said land. The petition further alleged that the defendants had filed the deed thus corruptly and fraudulently obtained by them for record in the office of the recorder of deeds in and for Macon county, and caused the same to be spread upon the deed records of said county, and that the defendants claim that said Blake entered upon said land under claim of title in himself, adverse and hostile to plaintiff, and that said Blake has had the open, notorious, and continuous possession of said 3 or 4 acres of land, under color of title to the entire tract, holding the same adversely, for more than 10 years prior to the institution of this suit, and claim that, by virtue of such color and claim of title and adverse possession, he had become vested in law with the title thereof. The defendants demurred to the petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, and that the petition showed that the plaintiff was the owner in fee, and likewise in possession, and because, under the allegations of the petition, it does not appear that there is or can be a cloud on the plaintiff's title. The court sustained the demurrer, and, plaintiff declining to plead further, rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition, from which plaintiff appealed.

Spencer & Mosman and Ben Eli Gutheri, for appellant. Dysart & Mitchell, for respondents.

BURGESS, J. (after stating the facts).

Plaintiff claims that the facts stated in the petition entitled it to a decree...