Hannon v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections
| Citation | 562 F.3d 1146 |
| Decision Date | 19 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-15991.,07-15991. |
| Parties | Patrick Charles HANNON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Suzanne Myers Keffer, William M. Harris, III (Appointed by District Court). Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.
Katherine Vickers Blanco, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
In this death penalty case, we consider whether the Florida state courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they ruled that petitioner, Patrick Hannon ("Hannon"), failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was inadequate during the penalty phase of his trial. The district court concluded that the state courts' resolution of Hannon's claim of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel was not unreasonable. We agree with the district court and conclude that the state court rulings were not objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment denying Hannon federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The Supreme Court of Florida recited the facts of the crime as follows:
Around Christmas 1990, Brandon Snider, a resident of Tampa, went to Indiana to visit relatives. While there, he went to the home of Toni Acker, a former girlfriend, and vandalized her bedroom. On January 9, 1991, Snider returned to Tampa.
On January 10, 1991, Hannon, Ron Richardson, and Jim Acker went to the apartment where Snider and Robert Carter lived. Snider opened the door and was immediately attacked by Acker, who is Toni Acker's brother. Acker stabbed Snider multiple times. When Acker was finished, Hannon cut Snider's throat. During the attack, Snider's screams drew the attention of his neighbors. They also drew the attention of Carter, who was upstairs. Hearing the screams, Carter came downstairs and saw what was happening. He then went back upstairs and hid under his bed. Hannon and Acker followed Carter upstairs. Then Hannon shot Carter six times, killing him.
Several days into Hannon's trial, Ron Richardson ("Richardson"), an original co-defendant and alibi witness for Hannon, reached an agreement with the State. Richardson pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact and testified against Hannon. Richardson testified that when he, Hannon, and Acker left his house on the night of the murders, Hannon possessed his (Richardson's) firearm. Richardson testified that he saw Jim Acker stab Snider several times and that Snider's throat was not cut before Hannon approached Snider. He also stated that he saw Hannon go upstairs with a gun and that he heard shots. Richardson stated that after the murders, Hannon put clothes in a brown bag that he (Hannon) burned, and they threw the gun and knife in the river. Richardson also stated that Hannon told him that he (Hannon) shot Robert Carter ("Carter") and cut Snider's throat. (R. Ex. A-10, Vol. 10 at 1167-92.)
The jury found Hannon guilty of both murders and, after a penalty proceeding, unanimously recommended a death sentence. The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances applicable to both murders: (1) the previous conviction of a violent felony (the contemporaneous killings); (2) the murders were committed during the commission of a burglary; and (3) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a), (d), (h) (1991). As to victim Carter, the court found the additional aggravating factor that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e) (1991). The trial court found no statutory mitigating circumstances, but did consider testimony from Hannon's parents and Toni Acker that Hannon was not a violent person and could not have committed the murders. The trial court also considered the fact that Hannon's original co-defendant, Richardson, was no longer facing a possible death sentence. The trial court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and followed the jury's recommendation, imposing death sentences on Hannon for the murders of Snider and Carter. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld Hannon's convictions and death sentences. Hannon, 638 So.2d 39. The United States Supreme Court denied Hannon's petition for writ of certiorari. Hannon v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1158, 115 S.Ct. 1118, 130 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1995).
In March 1997, Hannon filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, presenting 34 claims for relief. Hannon later filed an amended motion to vacate judgment, presenting 21 claims. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing and issued an order stating that it would conduct an evidentiary hearing on seven of Hannon's claims, one of which was his claim of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Hannon post-conviction relief, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. See Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d 1109 (Fla.2006).
Hannon then proceeded to federal district court where he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied Hannon all relief and denied Hannon's motion to alter or amend the judgment and his motion for a certificate of appealability ("COA"). We granted Hannon's request for a COA on the sole issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.
Whether the district court erred in finding that the state courts' resolution of Hannon's claim of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel for failing to present sufficient mitigation evidence and mental health evidence was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law.
"When examining a district court's denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, we review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error." Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). We review de novo a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir.2008), petition for cert. filed, 2009 WL 379109 (U.S. Feb. 11, 2009) (No. 08-1032).
Hannon's habeas petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which establishes a "general framework of substantial deference" to review every issue the state courts have decided. Diaz v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 402 F.3d 1136, 1141 (11th Cir.2005). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's judgment
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law where the state court either applied a rule in contradiction to governing Supreme Court case law or arrived at a result divergent from Supreme Court precedent despite materially indistinguishable facts. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.2006). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal court may grant relief "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
"Significantly, AEDPA codifies a presumption that the factual findings of state courts are correct, which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence." Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir.2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 651, 169 L.Ed.2d 517 (2007). This presumption applies to fact findings made by both state trial courts and state appellate courts. Id.
The legal principles governing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are well defined in our jurisprudence. "An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). "The standard we apply in assessing the first prong is that of a reasonable attorney, not a paragon of the bar." Dill, 488 F.3d at 1354. There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance is reasonable, and to rebut that strong presumption, Hannon "`must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.'" See Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc)). To establish the prejudice prong, Hannon must show that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
On appeal, Hannon contends that the district court erred in its finding that the state courts' resolution of his...
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