Hannum v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1891
• Citation: 18 S.W. 269
• Parties: HANNUM v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

18 S.W. 269

HANNUM v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1891.

Appeal from criminal court, Knox county; J. W. SNEED, Judge.

J. C. J. Williams and Hood, Cate, Brown & Coulton, for appellant. Attorney General Pickle and Rowen & Welcker, for the State.

LEA, J.

The plaintiff in error appeals from the judgment in this cause against him, whereby he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the following errors for reversal are relied on:

1. There was a change of venue in this case from Blount to Knox county. After the papers were filed in the criminal court of Knox county, Judge LOGAN, the presiding judge, in February, 1891, ordered a special panel to be summoned in this case, to be present on the 5th day of May. This order was made, as alleged in affidavit of defendant for a new trial, during the absence of defendant and his attorneys. On the 5th day of May, Judge SNEED, who had succeeded Judge LOGAN as criminal judge, granted a continuance until May 14th, and, in the presence of defendant and his attorneys, informed the special panel that they must be present at that time. The jury was selected from the panel without objection, and before exhaustion of challenges. There is no pretense of any prejudice on the part of the officer summoning the jury, or that defendant was in any way prejudiced by the action. If any reason existed why he should likely be prejudiced by such a course, he should have brought it to the attention of the court, and stated his reasons, and asked for a discharge of the panel. If there was any error in ordering the panel in the first instance by Judge LOGAN, in the absence of the defendant, it was cured by Judge SNEED, who, after the continuance, ordered the same panel to return on the 14th of May, the day fixed for trial; and the judge may name the special jurors to be summoned. Clingan v. Railroad Co., 2 Lea, 726; Mayor, etc., v. Sheperd, 3 Baxt. 373.

2. The conduct of one of the jurors is relied on as reversible error. The defendant, in his affidavit for new trial, says that, as the jurors were entering the courtroom, at the door, he saw some one talking to a juror; that the person talking, as well as the juror, was a stranger, and unknown to him; and the officer in charge of the defendant states, in an affidavit, that he saw the same thing; that the juror was just going in the door of the court-room, kept walking, and only leaned his head; heard nothing that was said, and the person was a stranger to him. The officer in charge of the jury swears that no one approached the jury; that he stood in the door, as the jury entered the room, and he saw no one attempt to talk to the jury; and each of the jurors swear that no one spoke to them as they were entering the door of the court-room. Neither the officer nor the defendant said who the juror was. Conceding the entire good faith of defendant and the officer, we think they have simply been mistaken. In a case creating so much interest and curiosity as we can see this case created, where attended by crowed court-rooms and approaches, other men thronging about the jury to get into court may be very easily and no doubt were mistaken for a juryman and another talking; and, in view of the sworn statement of the officer in charge of the jury, and of each of the jurors, that it did not occur, we hold that there was no error in refusing a new trial upon this ground.

3. It is insisted that a new trial should have been granted because the jurors had doubts as to the guilt of the prisoner, else they would not have recommended him to the mercy of the court; and an affidavit of some of the jurors was presented, stating the reasons why they were in favor of finding mitigating circumstances, and recommending the defendant to the mercy of the court. Thereafter each and every one of the jurors was introduced, and, at great length, examined and cross-examined upon the questions if they followed the charge of the court, and if they had a reasonable doubt, then or at the time of their verdict, of the guilt of the defendant, and...