Hanover Cnty. Unit of the NAACP v. Hanover Cnty.

• Decision Date: 13 May 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-599
• Citation: 461 F.Supp.3d 280
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: HANOVER COUNTY UNIT OF THE NAACP, Plaintiff, v. HANOVER COUNTY and County School Board of Hanover County, Defendants.

461 F.Supp.3d 280

HANOVER COUNTY UNIT OF THE NAACP, Plaintiff,

v.HANOVER COUNTY and County School Board of Hanover County, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-599

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Signed May 13, 2020

Ashley Joyner Chavous, Cyril Djoukeng, Pro Hac Vice, Emily Mondry, Pro Hac Vice, Grant Drews Johnson, Jason Raofield, Pro Hac Vice, Covington & Burling LLP (DC), Azadeh Erfani, Kaitlin Banner, Pro Hac Vice, Tristin Brown, Pro Hac Vice, Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affair, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

David P. Corrigan, Jeremy David Capps, Maurice Scott Fisher, Jr., Melissa Yvonne York, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, Richmond, VA, Dennis Anthony Walter, Yvonne Steenstra Gibney, Hanover County Attorney's Office, Hanover, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert E. Payne, Senior United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on HANOVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 25) (the "MOTION"). Having considered the MOTION, the supporting, opposing, and reply memoranda, the supplemental briefing, and the arguments of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED that HANOVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 25) will be granted.

BACKGROUND

The County School Board of Hanover County (the "School Board") moves to dismiss the COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (ECF No. 1) (the "Complaint").¹ After ordering supplemental briefing, (ECF No. 47), the Court held a hearing on the MOTION on January 14, 2020, at which the Court ordered additional briefing addressed to Claim 2 of the Complaint, which is based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the Complaint, the Hanover County Unit of the NAACP (the "NAACP") challenged the School Board's use of Confederate names and imagery at Lee-Davis High School ("Lee-Davis") and Stonewall Jackson Middle School ("Stonewall Jackson") as violations of NAACP members' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) The NAACP alleges that the schools' names and the team and student body names are "ubiquitous in student life" and that these names "feature prominently in student curricular and extracurricular activities, including sports, clubs, and performing arts." (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.)

The School Board approved the name "Lee-Davis" in 1958. (Id. ¶ 4.) Lee-Davis opened in 1959 and was not fully desegregated until the 1969-1970 school year. (Id. ) Its school team and student body name is the "Confederates," and Lee-Davis uses a Confederate soldier as its mascot in official school activities (Id. ¶ 3.) When students from Lee-Davis graduate, they walk "behind a banner with pictures of Lee and Davis and the motto ‘Tradition and Pride.’ "² (Id. ¶ 10.) Lee-Davis's lobby contains banners with the school's name on it and a seal with Lee and Davis's images. (Id. ¶ 63.) The name "Lee-Davis" is also on the school's outdoor scoreboard, and the phrases "Lee-Davis Confederates" and "Tradition and Pride" are on its indoor gym scoreboard. (Id. ¶ 64.) "The name ‘Confederates’ is used when announcing players and calling plays during sporting events." (Id. ¶ 65.) The names "Lee-Davis" and "Confederates" are also "used in school-wide chants at pep rallies and other school spirit events." (Id. ¶ 66.) Nearly 1,500 students are currently enrolled at Lee-Davis. (Id. ¶ 60.) Fewer than 10% of those students are African American. (Id. )

Additionally, in 1969, the School Board approved the name "Stonewall Jackson," and Stonewall Jackson opened in 1970. (Id. ¶ 6.) The school team and student body name is the "Rebels," which is a reference to Confederate soldiers. (Id. ¶ 5.) In front of Stonewall Jackson is a sign that says, "Home of the Rebels." (Id. ¶ 67.) Football uniforms have the name "Rebels" on them. (Id. ¶ 68.) Over 1,000 students are currently enrolled at Stonewall Jackson. (Id. ¶ 60.) Fewer than 10% of those students are African American. (Id. )

The NAACP alleges that its members "are dissuaded from participating in academic and extracurricular activities" because of the school and team names. (Id. ¶ 88.) One NAACP member requested a variance to allow his or her child to attend a different middle school, but this request was denied, and the family turned to home-schooling. (Id. ¶ 89.) Another NAACP member's child attends a specialized academic program at another high school to which the child applied "to avoid attending a school that celebrates the Confederacy and to avoid glorifying Confederate figures through extracurricular activities." (Id. ¶ 91.) Other NAACP members' children do not participate in school-sponsored activities because of the school and team names. (Id. ¶¶ 92-93.)

The Complaint asserts three counts. Claim 1 alleges that the School Board violated the First Amendment by "compelling [the NAACP's] members to express a view with which they disagree, namely that slavery and other values of the Confederacy should be endorsed and glorified." (Id. ¶ 102.) In Claim 2, the NAACP alleges that the School Board violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by naming the schools. (Id. ¶¶ 114-40.) Lastly, Claim 3 alleges that the School Board has violated the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (the "EEOA") by not changing the schools' names and team and student body names. (Id. ¶¶ 141-50.)

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE NAACP HAS STANDING TO PROSECUTE CLAIM 1

As a threshold matter, the NAACP does not have standing to prosecute the compelled speech claim because its members are indispensable to the prosecution of that claim. For the reasons stated below, Claim 1 will be dismissed for lack of standing.

"[T]o satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) that it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). "For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a " ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto ’; that is, it must actually exist." Id. Furthermore, to have standing, "the plaintiff must have suffered an injury or threat that is credible, not imaginary or speculative. Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although "actual arrest or prosecution for violating a statute establishes an injury in fact, so too may a credible threat of prosecution thereunder." Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301 ; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) ) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

When considering standing in freedom of speech cases, the Court "must assume the [plaintiff's] claim has legal validity." Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 239 (quoting Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1093 ("[W]here the plaintiff presents a nonfrivolous legal challenge, alleging an injury to a protected right such as free speech, the federal courts may not dismiss for lack of standing on the theory that the underlying interest is not legally protected."). "[S]tanding requirements are somewhat relaxed in First Amendment cases." Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 235.

In this case, the NAACP claims associational standing–i.e., it brings this case on behalf of its members. (ECF No. 56 at 1-2.) "An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when [ (1) ] its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, [ (2) ] the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and [ (3) ] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). "[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). However, "an organization lacks standing to assert claims of injunctive relief on behalf of its members where the fact and extent of the injury that gives rise to the claims for injunctive relief would require individualized proof." Jefferson v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, No. 2:10-cv-316, 2010 WL 11527350, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2010) (quoting Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 714 (2d Cir. 2004) ) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd 452 Fed. App'x 356 (4th Cir. 2011) ; see also Int'l Woodworkers of Am. v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1267 (4th Cir. 1981) (same). And, "an organization lacks standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of its members when the relief requested would require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Jefferson, 2010 WL 11527350, at *3 (quoting Bano, 361 F.3d...