Hanovich v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 08 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 07-1527 ADM/JSM. |
| Citation | 579 F.Supp.2d 1172 |
| Parties | Barbara HANOVICH, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Frank W. Levin, James V. Roth, Frank W. Levin PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.
Lonnie F. Bryan, United States Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron dated August 6, 2008. Having reviewed the files and records herein, and there being no objections to said Recommendation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART consistent with the Report and Recommendation;
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) is DENIED; and
3. This case is REMANDED to the SSA for further proceedings.
Defendant has denied Plaintiff Barbara Hanovich's application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. Plaintiff has now instituted this action seeking review of the denial of benefits. The matter is now before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff is represented by Frank W. Levin, Esq. Defendant is represented by Lonnie F. Bryan, Assistant United States Attorney. This Court has jurisdiction of the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and it is properly before the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). For reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 8] be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 11] be DENIED.
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for social security disability benefits on February 18, 2003, alleging disability since December 31, 1987. (Tr. 61-64, 79). Plaintiff first met the insured status test on January 1, 1991, and her insured status expired on March 31, 1996. (Tr. 67, 94). Plaintiffs application was denied initially, and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 28-32, 35-39, 41-43). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 44). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Townsend-Anderson on March 23, 2005. (Tr. 1160-1201). On October 24, 2005, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 18-25). The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied a request for further review. (Tr. 6-8). The denial of review made the ALJ's findings final. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir.1992); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Plaintiff has sought review of the ALJ's decision by filing a Complaint with this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Docket No. 1]. The parties now appear before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 8] and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 11].
Congress has prescribed the standards by which Social Security disability benefits may be awarded. "The Social Security program provides benefits to people who are aged, blind, or who suffer from a physical or mental disability." 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a); Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir.1992). The Social Security Administration shall find a person disabled if the claimant "is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant's impairments must be "of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The impairment must last for a continuous period of at least 12 months or be expected to result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509.
If a claimant's initial application for benefits is denied, he or she may request reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.909(a)(1). A claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsidered decision may obtain administrative review by an ALJ. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929. To determine the existence and extent of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis, requiring the ALJ to make a series of factual findings regarding the claimant's work history, impairment, residual functional capacity, past work, age, education and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Locher, 968 F.2d at 727. The Eighth Circuit described this five-step process as follows:
The Commissioner of Social Security must evaluate: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, he or she may request review by the Appeals Council, though review is not automatic. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-404.982. The decision of the Appeals Council (or of the ALJ, if the request for review is denied) is final and binding upon the claimant unless the matter is appealed to Federal District Court within 60 days after notice of the Appeals Council's action. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. The Court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
1. The credibility findings made by the ALJ.
2. The plaintiffs vocational factors.
3. The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.
4. The plaintiffs subjective complaints relating to exertional and non-exertional activities and impairments.
5. Any corroboration by third parties of plaintiff's impairments.
6. The testimony of vocational experts, when required, which is based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth plaintiffs impairments.
Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir.1980)).
The review by this Court is limited to a determination of whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir.1992). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir.1994). "The substantial evidence test employed in reviewing administrative findings is more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the [Commissioner's] findings." Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987). "`Substantial evidence on the record as a whole,' ... requires a more scrutinizing analysis." Id. In reviewing the administrative decision, "`[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment or findings of fact. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939. The Court should not reverse the Commissioner's finding merely because evidence may exist to support the opposite conclusion. Mitchell v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.1994); see also Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213 (). Instead, the Court must consider "the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory." Gavin, 811 F.2d at 1199.
The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir.1991). Once the claimant has demonstrated he or she cannot perform prior work due to a disability, the burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. Martonik v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 236, 239 (8th Cir.1985).
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits under Sections 216(i) and 223. (Tr. 23). The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on January 1, 1991, and continues to meet them only through March 31, 1996.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful...
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